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Abstract
.
Prevailing theories have failed to take into account the development of policy and
institutions in microstates that are engineered to attract investments in areas of comparative
advantage as these small islands confront the challenges of globalization and instead have
emphasized migration, remittances and foreign aid (MIRAB) as an explanation for the survival
of microstates in the global economy.
This dissertation challenges the MIRAB model as an adequate explanation of investment
strategy in microstates and argues that comparative advantage is a better theory to explain policy
behavior of microstates. These small economies can take advantage of their exotic locations and
natural endowments of sun and sand to develop a robust tourism sector through prudent
investments and incentives in collaboration with stakeholders in the industry. This case study on
the Fiji Islands will demonstrate that microstates are capable of developing policy instruments
that encourage investments, even during periods of deep political crisis, thus underscoring a
maturation of institutions in small post-colonial societies.
The development of the tourism industry in Fiji was neither an ad hoc exercise nor an
instance of creation ex nihilo, as both government and the private sector recognized over time
the economic potential of tourism as a conduit for national development. The state collaborated
in this endeavor by building institutions and supporting investments in hopes of capitalizing on
the positive spillovers that could occur from a robust tourist industry. This dissertation argues
that investments undertaken by the Fiji Islands in the tourism sector was a rational strategy to
fully exploit its comparative advantage through the development of sophisticated institutional
and organizational structures that emerged to meet the challenges of a complex global industry.
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Chapter One
Introduction

MAP: OCEANIA

Introduction
This dissertation explains investment policy in microstates of Oceania through exploring
the experience of the Fiji Islands from 1975 to 2010. The study of investment policy in
microstates fills a gap in the expansive literature on investment policies over the last three
decades (Diamond and Diamond 2006; OECD 2003; Anthoine 1979) and gives us a lens to
examine the survival strategies of small island states in the international system. A careful
enquiry on the Fiji Islands as a typical microstate will demonstrate both the challenges and

capabilities of microstates in developing policy instruments to encourage investments even
through periods of deep political crisis, thus underscoring a maturation of institutions in small
post-colonial societies.
(a) From Sugar to Tourism
The Fijian economy for the better part of a century was dominated by sugar production
which began with the early European settlers in the 1860s and developed into an export
commodity by the colonial government in 1883, lasting through Independence into the 1980s.1
Since then, the production and export of sugar in Fiji has steadily declined due to a pair of
internal and external reasons which will be explored later in greater detail, such as the intractable
problems of land tenure and the World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling against sugar
subsidies. The cessation of leases under ALTA (Agriculture Landlord and Tenant Act) and the
end of the preferential trade agreement with the European Union in 2005 has forced the State to
come up with alternative policies to plausibly replace an industry which may not survive without
life support. The emergence of the tourism sector in Fiji and the eventual eclipse of sugar
production as the country’s dominant industry refocused the government’s attention away from
agriculture and towards tourism. This transition from sugar production to a tourism based
economy in Fiji has not been examined from an institutional and policy perspective and
challenges the dominant narrative of microstates as institutionally “failed societies.” The Fiji
Islands like other microstates in Oceania rationally perceived tourism as a natural fit congruent
with its endowments and developed strategies to exploit its comparative advantage. It has thus
tied its investment policies with the tourism sector.

1

See http://www.fsc.com.fj/history_of_sugar_in_fiji.htm for a brief historical timeline. (Accessed September 5
2011).
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This project therefore focuses on the tourism industry in Fiji and seeks an explanation for
its success and adaptability and examines the role that the state has played in ensuring the current
dominance of the sector in Fiji. I further look at the evolution of institutions and policies that
emerged in Fiji as a response to the needs and challenges peculiar to tourism in a small island
economy and postulate that tourism was a legitimate tool for economic development. The
tourism industry as a unique and complex undertaking required adept institutions, stakeholder
relationships, international collaboration and the construction of agencies, incentives, policies,
domestic support, resources and human capital to become a successful sector. The one notable
failure examined in greater detail in chapter four was the shift in direct investment by the state
using public funds to underwrite large tourism development projects in Momi Bay and Natadola,
resulting in substantial losses. The demands imposed on the industry to expand carrying capacity
encouraged the state to become a direct partner in tourism development but the failure of these
projects emphasized rather expensively the importance of the state in building institutions rather
than resorts. The Fijian example is an ideal case study on how small island states situate
themselves in the global economy and negotiate through the international system.
(b) Tourism and Crises
The military coup d’état of 1987 in Fiji was a pivotal event in the South Pacific. It was
the first coup of its kind in Oceania, and it occurred in the most politically and economically
developed country in Oceania. While a substantial body of work has emerged in the two decades
since the coup, on the political, cultural, social and ethnic implications of that crisis, and
diagnosing the causes and consequences of the coup (Howard 1991; Sutherland 1992: Lawson;
1996;), very little work has emerged on examining its effect on policy, institutions, sectors and
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agencies,2 especially studies that examine the role of domestic political crisis on investment
policy in general and the tourism sector in particular, Beirman (2003) and King and Berno
(2002) have come closest in probing this question. Most scholarship has either focused on
macro-political issues such as constitutions, democracy, elections or normative concerns over
race, ethnicity, culture (Crocombe, Neemia, Ravuvu Vom Busch 1992) or resource allocations
such as land and most recently customary fishing rights (Maunders 2007; Cooke and Moce
1995). These are important and significant issues that continue to occupy scholars and interested
parties in moving Fiji and other troubled islands beyond the current political stalemate, and a
study on investment policy hopes to contribute to that end.
The volatile political situation in Oceania in recent years has understandably received a
disproportionate amount of scrutiny and scholarly analysis, especially Fiji and the Solomon
Islands, but serious inquiry about state initiatives and policies have been lacking. Most research
has focused on political determinants, i.e. the effects of corruption, economic freedom and
democracy and its relationship with investments, growth and development. I do not eschew the
importance of these variables, and as studies have indicated, the role these determinants play in
securing investments, especially FDI. However, an exaggerated emphasis on political
determinants has overlooked the actual policy instruments developed by the state to enhance
investments and economic activity in areas of comparative advantage.
However the unhappy realities of geography, demographics and economics
characterizing microstates have had deep institutional and political consequences and therefore
severely restricted their capacity to develop investment strategy as compared to countries with

2

The work by Yash Ghai (1990) is a notable exception to the general emphasis on political developments, i.e.
democracy and nation building.
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robust factor endowments, abundant human capital and sophisticated infrastructure.3
Consequently, the prevailing theory has emphasized migration, remittances and foreign aid
(MIRAB) as an explanation for the survival of microstates in the global economy.
This project challenges the MIRAB model as an adequate explanation and instead argues
that comparative advantage is a better theory to explain policy behavior of microstates. The
small economies of Oceania have taken advantage of their exotic locations and natural
endowments of sun and sand to develop a robust tourism sector through prudent investments and
incentives between the different stakeholders. This dissertation is an examination of how the
microstates of Oceania, given the many limitations of size and resources, have managed to not
only survive but occasionally flourish in the international system, contrary to the expectations of
the MIRAB model.

Table 1.1: Microstates
MICROSTATES - OCEANIA
POPULATION (2007)

GDP (2007-US$)

GDP per capita (2007-US$)

MICRONESIA (FSO)

108,000

235.9M

2,183

FIJI

3,824

869,000

3.3B

KIRIBATI

98,000

67M

686

NAURU

10,745

45Ma

4,522

NIUE

1,625b

10Mc

6,088c

MARSHALL ISLANDS

61,815

149.2M

2,851

SAMOA

189,000

397M

2,101

SOLOMON ISLANDS

508,000

377M

741

TONGA

103,000

246M

2,397

VANUATU

229,000

494M

2,160

21,200,000

911.0B

43,010

4,200,000

128.7B

30,390

AUSTRALIA
NEW ZEALAND

Sources: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade http://www.dfat.gov.au (accessed November 21,
2009).
a
2005 figures, b 2006 figures, c 2003 figures
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The story of Singapore as the model of how a small State has become a major player in the global economy is
often invoked, but as authors Leichter (1983), Grice and Drakakis-Smith (1985), Rowley and Warner (2007) reveal,
none of the Pacific Islands share Singapore’s policy and human resource management, nor does the State in these
Islands control the factors of production to the extent that Singapore does.
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Motivations
This research project challenges the prevailing theory (MIRAB) which assumes that
microstates are incapable of structuring investment strategies because they are too weak and
unstable and subsequently lack the institutional sophistication required of states in creating
policies amenable for development. Are microstates hapless victims reduced to a mendicant
status, passively afloat in the wide-open sea as the MIRAB model suggests? Granted that these
small economies may not have the policy sophistications of larger societies, but does it
necessarily follow that agencies and sectors are incapable for formulating a coherent investment
policy? Finally the political scorecard has not been favorable to these small islands, but there are
no failed states in Oceania or presence of brutal conflicts that are common elsewhere. Even the
coup d’états in Fiji from 1987-2006 have been benign in nature, executed without a single shot
fired, minus casualties or bloodletting. Jon Fraenkel (2004) conclusively exposed the limitations
of comparing the Pacific Islands with the tribulations of Africa, methodologically and
substantively by positing that natural resources, proxy conflicts during the cold war, deep ethnic
and linguistic cleavages were the defining characteristics of post-colonial Africa and a significant
ingredient to its enduring instabilities, none of which could minimally characterize the
microstates of Oceania.
The MIRAB model however inadvertently demonstrates many capabilities of microstates
that are easily overlooked, i.e. (1) microstates are able to train people with desirable skills that
are exportable (2) microstates can develop sophisticated bureaucracy to capture aid and
remittances (3) microstates have enough State and institutional power to bounce back from crisis
and not descend into anarchy following political upheaval, all of which I argue are quite helpful
in constructing policy that encourages investment.

6

The case study on Fiji will show that microstates are capable of developing policy
instrument to encourage investments, and those agencies and sectors are able to collaborate and
successfully execute policy. I will also show the impact of crisis on policy, although I make no
assessment on the virtues and values of democracy nor do I dispute the economic analysis of the
costs of political crisis. This project simply examines the influence of crisis on policy, how did it
change? What affect it had on agencies and sectors? A thorough explanation of investment
policy in microstates will require a close sectoral examination and one sector that is common for
all the microstates in the region is tourism. Not only has tourism emerged as the most important
industry among microstates in Oceania (McElroy 2003), but also more importantly serves as a
hard-case example of the one industry most vulnerable to political crisis and upheaval.
The results of this project will have important implications for microstates in Oceania,
how is investment policy developed in these small economies? What kind of policy instruments
government’s favor? What sort of influence is exerted by powerful sectors of the economy? How
capable are agencies in executing policy? What is the effect of political crisis on policy? Were
governments in microstates prudent in favoring a particular sector? What are the long-term
consequences of these investment policies?
Political crisis significantly affects both the ability of the state to develop policy
instruments and sectors vulnerable to political shocks. However the central puzzle will be to
determine to what degree if any did investment policy change from before the political crisis and
after, as well as scrutinize the effect of the crisis on the tourism sector to empirically determine
the effect of the crisis. The operating hypothesis is that while there were some adjustments to
policy instruments and sectoral disruptions in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, over the
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longer term (ten years beyond the initial crisis the government’s decision to continue with its
investment policy especially in tourism has proven to be prudent and efficacious).
Paresh Narayan (2005) in a significant article echoes this last hypothesis about the
transitory effects of political crisis on tourism and argues that government policy calling for
greater investment in the sector is justifiable. However his economic model elides over why the
largest sector of the economy has been insulated over the long run from the deleterious effects of
a severe political crisis, which this project hopes to answer. Rory Scott (1988) and Michael Hall
(1994) have tentatively responded that as long as political instability is not followed by political
violence, then the tourism sector is capable of bouncing back from crisis. The emphasis on Scott
and Hall’s study has been on the industry per se, while this project is fundamentally interested in
the permutations of policy, notwithstanding the valuable contributions to the debate.
The MIRAB Model
In 1984 authors Geoffrey Bertram and Ray Waters developed a model that sought to
explain investments among the microstates in Oceania that emphasized migration, remittances
and foreign aid to prop up the bureaucratic apparatus of Island economies (henceforth referred as
MIRAB). Building on the existing template of microstates ostensible lack of endowments,
Bertram and Waters posed the seemingly obvious question, what explains the survival of these
microstates (Bertram 1999:1-2)? The state they concluded was irrelevant in the economic
success of these microstates, because “the living standards of indigenous island populations were
raised and maintained by financial transfers from the metropolitan powers” (Bertram 1999:3).
With the exception of the Kingdom of Tonga, all of the microstates of Oceania were former
colonies of Great Britain, United States, New Zealand, Australia and France (which still retained
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parts of French Polynesia).4 Since independence, the movement of peoples from the islands to
the metropoles has steadily increased the current of labor and remittances (Brake 1993; Ward
1989; Narayan and Smyth 2003; Ware 2005; Robertson 2006). The export of peoples has
resulted in an economy dependent on the flow of remittances and attenuated the necessity of
developing policies conducive to investments. Bernard Poirine (1998:32) in response to the
initial question posed by Baldacchino (1983) on comparative advantage and microstates, argued
in defense of MIRAB that island economies simply chose to export labor that in turn generated
remittances5 back to the islands.
The second and third component of the MIRAB model emphasizes foreign aid and
“nontradable production generally dominated by government, hence the term Bureaucracy”
(Bertram 1999:1). Because of the long colonial histories of these islands, the largesse of foreign
aid to sustain their economies is an extension of the colonial legacy and responsibility, echoing
Deryck Scarr (1990) that “…transfers of aid to Pacific Island countries is a contractual exchange
between former metropolitan powers and the islanders: in return for ending their direct political
responsibility for the islands welfare and securing their strategic interests…by underwriting the
costs of statehood”. Microstates should therefore embrace their rentier status argue Baldacchino
(1993:43) and Kaplinsky (1983: 203-204) and seek to exploit the existing relationships as well as
cultivate new sources of aid or as John Connell (1991) quoted in Baldacchino (1993) frankly
asserts, “The only semblance of ‘self-reliance’ is the reliance by microstate citizens upon their

4

Microstates that are not sovereign entities are excluded from this project (for example, Cook Islands, American
Samoa, New Caledonia) are among some of the main islands that are not part of this analysis (see also the section on
microstates in this proposal).
5
The World Bank website has a comprehensive analysis on the global flow of remittances at
http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org. It is outside the scope of the project to argue on the merits and demerits of
remittances but to demonstrate the inadequacy of the MIRAB model in explaining investment policy in microstates.
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abilities to negotiate the sums of money they need, in return for whatever marketable rights they
are willing to surrender.”
Microstates as Weak
Not only are microstates deemed irrelevant in developing investment policy under the
rubric of MIRAB, but also neither state institutions nor specific sectors of the economy are
capable of formulating policy. The natural limitations of size and resources also limit the
capabilities of microstates to engage in the sophisticated task of policy development (Warrington
1994:109). Economic vulnerability together with geographic isolation and a dependence on a
single primary commodity have not created opportunities to develop the technical abilities
required for policy development. For example the study by Doecke Faber and Tosca Vijfeijken
(1994) from the European Centre for Policy Management6 on tourism and agriculture policy in
the Eastern Caribbean7 concluded, that lack of skills, weak agencies and powerful industry
influences colluded to hamper policy and the ability to rationalize inter-sectoral objectives (Faber
and Vijfeijken 1994:106-107). These microstates, thrust abruptly into the modern world with
nascent institutions (Warrington 1994:117-120) are ill equipped to handle the task of complex
policy formulations and subsequently, consistent with the MIRAB model, ought to focus on
retaining and deepening ties with their former metropoles, who in return will manage the
investment policy of their former colonies (Hoetjes 1992:142-143).
The case of Vanuatu seems to confirm the notion of microstate weakness, in a study
conducted by Michael O’Donnell and Mark Turner (2005:617) on the administration of public
sector agencies. A clear lack of any coordinated policy stream, skilled staff and integration

6

The website is at http://domino.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/navigation.nsf/index.htm (accessed
January 3, 2010).
7
Antigua and Barbados, The British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, Montserrat, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent and The Grenadines.

10

between policy development, implementation and sectoral feedback, exposed the incapacity of
Vanuatu to develop coherent policy. Compounding the problem was the chronic political
instability that resulted in nine different governments in nine years through 2004 (O’Donnell and
Turner 2005:621).
Microstates as Unstable
Given the political realities on the ground in recent years, there is perhaps a justified
wariness about the prospect of a vibrant and stable Oceania. The riots in Tonga in 2006, the
conflict and subsequent military intervention in the Solomon Islands and the fourth coup d’état
in Fiji have raised questions about democratization, political stability and state capabilities in
Oceania (Reilly 2004; Wainwright 2003; Hayward Jones 2008). One analyst after observing the
political crisis that engulfed Fiji and Solomon Islands in 2000 bluntly concluded that the South
Pacific was undergoing the process of “Africanisation” (Reilly 2000). Democratic failure and
political instability that seemed endemic to African regimes had finally arrived in Oceania, such
as (1) the growing tensions in the relationship between civil regimes and military forces, (2) the
intermixture between ethnic identity and the competition for control of natural resources as
factors driving conflicts (3) the weakness of basic institutions of governance such as prime
ministers, parliaments and, especially, political parties (4) and the increasing centrality of the
state as a means of gaining wealth and of accessing and exploiting resources (Reilly 2000:262263). Ron Duncan and Satish Chand (2002) moved from Reilly’s political assessment of why
Oceania was in crisis to the prosaic struggles over resources and opportunities in a region
referred to as an “arc of instability.” Enormous reserves of natural resources, poorly delineated
rules marking property rights, persistent unemployment and weak central governments created a
perfect storm for chronic instability in Oceania. The roots of this instability could go even deeper
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into the very structure of pacific society, i.e. its ethnic makeup, cultural allocations of resources
and the traditional chiefly structure, all of which, as Benjamin Reilly (2004) and Asesela Ravuvu
(1992) suggested, conspire against the adoption of democracy or political stability. Imposed
upon this balkanized structure was western democracy that as Stephanie Lawson (1996) argued
was bound to fail sooner or later.
The coups in Fiji (1987, 2000, and 2006) only underscored the political instability of
Oceania and characterized the region as unstable, governments as weak and states on their way
to failure. Stewart Firth (2001:277) noted that the consequences of the 2000 coup in Fiji,
Political instability affected the three largest countries in the Pacific Islands and therefore affected the
region as a whole. Smaller island countries depend particularly on Fiji as a transport hub and centre of
regional organizations, many of them jointly funded by Forum member states, which have a direct financial
investment in Fiji. Smaller states also have an interest in regional political stability, because events in one
major country can give the whole region a bad name among tourists and potential investors. The reputation
of the South Pacific as a whole was at stake.

Prior to the events of 2000 in Fiji was the 1987 military coup, the first of its kind in Oceania and
set the template of instability and crisis in the South Pacific. Gerard Finin and Terrence WesleySmith (2000) suggest that the 1987 coup in Fiji revealed profound institutional weakness in the
power of the State to manage its interests and execute policy, especially policies that may offend
elite groups and individuals. Economists Paresh Narayan and Biman Prasad (2007) provided
evidence of the long-term consequences to Fiji’s economy as a result of the coups showing
declines in trade, GDP and real growth.
Theoretical Foundations
Governments develop a variety of policy instruments to encourage investments, develop
specific sectors, and protect domestic industries within a deeply competitive economic
environment, globally and domestically, (Diamond and Diamond 2006; Porter 2008). Driven by
the necessity to attract foreign direct investments, countries have subsequently rearranged
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policies that accommodate FDI. Table 1.2 illustrates the regulatory changes that nation-states
have pursued in order to secure FDI for their host economies.

Table 1.2: National Regulatory Changes Towards FDI, 1995-2006
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
No. of Countries introducing changes
63
66
76
60
65
70
71
72
No. of regulatory changes
112
114
150
145
139
150
207
246
More favorable to FDI
106
98
134
136
130
147
193
234
Less Favorable to FDI
6
16
16
9
9
3
14
12
Source: UNCTAD database on national laws and regulations. See the World Investment Report, 2007 p. 14

2003
82
242
218
24

2004
103
270
234
36

2005
93
205
164
41

2006
93
184
147
37

This project primarily focuses on the development of investment policy within a
microstate, notwithstanding the significant emphasis on political determinants as important
factors in attracting FDI, (Jensen 2006; Blanton 2007; Lall and Narula 2004). While the saliency
of FDI as a conduit for economic growth and development is hardly a debatable proposition for
most economies (Banerjee, Oetzel and Ranganathan 2006; Dailami and Leipziger 1998),
political determinants that either attract or inhibit FDI are very much part of the debate. Some
scholars (Egger and Winner 2006; Habib and Zurawicki 2002; Wrage 2007) have argued that
foreign investors are repelled by corruption and lack of transparent institutions, and therefore less
likely to invest in a particular country while others stipulate the necessity of democratic norms in
attracting foreign direct investments (Jakobsen and de Soysa 2006; Li 2006; Jensen 2003; Oneal
1994; Busse 2004; Harms and Ursprung 2002). This project is limited to examining the impact of
political crisis on investment policy and the ensuing sectoral responses and focus on the kinds of
policy instruments governments employ in these small economies to develop and enhance
investments such as subsidies, investment aid, locational incentives (all of which are used
interchangeably, see Thomas 2000, 2007) and the institutional and sectoral forces instrumental in
the development and implementation of investment policy. What can we know about the
interaction between government agencies and powerful sectors that explain investment policy in
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microstates? What was the impact on both policy and sector in the event of a severe political
crisis?
John Dunning’s (1971, 1973) eclectic theory of FDI based on ownership location
internationalization (OLI) and James Brander and Barbara Spencer (1985) on strategic trade
theory helps situate the use of policy instruments by governments to encourage investments. In
studying the behavior of multinationals, Dunning postulated three important attributes that
incentivize FDI, (1) the firm must possess ownership specific advantages enabling it to exploit
economies of scale, (2) the ability to internalize foreign production processes and (3) the host
country must possess location specific advantages, i.e. factor endowments, market structure
government legislation and policies.
Secondly, the genesis of policy is not a creation ex nihilo event but occurs within the
matrix of rules, agencies and actors. Peter Hall (1995:90-113) began his institutional analysis of
British economic policy in the 1970’s within a broader “matrix of competing interests and ideas”
(91) which included both the Labor and Conservative governments of the day, the “white paper”
on Competition, Credit and Control (CCC), the Bank of England, the powerful financial sector in
the City of London, the permanent secretary of the treasury, the research departments of the
brokerage house, independent institutes, the Center for Policy Studies established by the
Conservative Party, the British press, the Trade Unions and the British party system. Hall went
on to conclude that only by examining the complex interaction between these actors and agencies
could one adequately explain British economic policy in those years.
Similarly, Nitsan Chorev (2007) in his study of US trade policy illuminates the specific
role that multiple actors played to shift the center of gravity from protectionism and towards a
liberal trade regime over six decades (1934-1994). The US Congress, Chorev argues was
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generally more amenable to protect declining industries at the expense of free traders but by
1994 when the United States joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), the logic of free trade
was a fait accompli. This transformation occurred as a result of institutional shifts made possible
by the complex interaction between stakeholders at each epoch. During the era of free trade, the
role of the service sector (banking and finance, transportation, construction, telecommunications,
management consulting, advertising, education and entertainment) is especially highlighted in
the ensuing policy shift, as well as the influence of the Executive Branch, including the United
States Trade Representative, the Departments of Treasury and Commerce on the new trade
policy (Chorev 2007:149-194).8
In his excellent study of British and German Labor Ministries between World War 1 and
the Great Depression, Tien-Lung Liu (1998) addresses the problem of policy shifts using a
contingency theory model that shows state agencies as active interlocutors over policy according
to historical conditions “simultaneously or alternatively favoring important groups such as
capitalists, organized labor, and state managers” (Tien-Lung Liu 1998:43, 51-55). Contingencies
according to Liu “…are defined as crucial historical events that have momentous impacts on
state policies because they facilitate or hinder dominant classes, organized labor, and state
agencies to achieve their goals by shifting the balance of power within and between them” (TienLung Liu 1998:54).
Policy, as these scholars have argued occurs, within a political and institutional
environment (Krasner 1984), and explaining the permutations of investment policy in
microstates will entail a close examination of state agencies, investment boards and influential
sectors, most notably the tourism industry, using insights from historical institutionalism in order

8

I am not making any assessment on the merits of Chorev’s analysis; I am simply interested in observing the
relationship between governments, state agencies and powerful sectors over the formation and direction of policy.
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to develop a clearer understanding about the roles played by the aforementioned actors in the
formation of investment policy. Historical institutionalists, writes Theda Skocpol, (1995:106)
“…are more likely to trace sequences of outcomes over time, showing how earlier outcomes
change the parameters for subsequent developments.” Furthermore, she writes, historical
institutionalists are “also interested in conjunctures of separately located processes or conflict”.
Skocpol raised this issue in regards to the paucity of historical and sociological delineation in
rational choice theory. If we interpret the universe and our place in it through the matrix of
institutions, then historical institutionalism seems to provide a fuller picture of social reality.
Importance of Crisis
Finally an important puzzle in this inquiry is the role of crisis and its impact on
investment policy. This is a significant investigation of the effect of political crisis on actual
policy and provides an opportunity to examine in fine detail the effect it had on all aspects of
investment policy in microstates in Oceania. The substantial literature on the political crisis of
1987 in Fiji has either focused on the complex political causes and it’s enduring consequences
nationally and regionally or has emphasized the role of political determinants Gounder (1998,
2002; Prasad and Asalu-Adjaye 1998, Nelson and Singh 1998) on economic growth and
development. While debate on the future of democracy among the Oceanic Islands is important,
it cannot obviate the responsibility of stakeholders to develop investment strategies within the
parameters of their resource capabilities.
The third component of this project examines investment policy through the lens of the
punctuated equilibrium model by asking the following questions, how was policy affected by the
crisis? What effect did the crisis have on the tourism sector? Did it force the state and its
agencies to rethink/renege on its commitment to the tourism sector? What role did the industry
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play in maintaining the significant levels of support it had received prior to the crisis? If
investment policy remained unchanged and tourism industry escaped unscathed, did it vindicate
the preponderant bias of the state regarding its incentive priorities? Are investment policies in
microstates by dint of their size, location and insignificance insulated from political disruptions?
An affirmative response would compel a reexamination of standard arguments especially for
micro-economies to separate policy instruments that enhance investments and political
developments that enhance rights and liberties.
Stephen Krasner (1984) argued, “…Change is episodic and dramatic, rather than
continuous and incremental. Crisis is of central importance” so too John Ikenberry (1989)
argued, “…change is likely to be episodic and occur at moments of crisis (war and depression)
when existent institutions break down or a discredited and when struggles over basic rules of the
game change.” Similarly, John Hogan combining insights from historical institutionalism argues
that choices made at the genesis of institutional formation will have an enduring effect over its
lifetime. Hence, institutional change occurs not as a gradual process over time, but abruptly in
sudden punctuated moments when “trigger events”9 emerge. Policy change is subsequently
predicated on severe crisis or endogenous shocks (Greif and Laitin 2004) using a model first
derived from evolutionary biology (Gersick 1991).
In policy analysis, punctuated equilibrium theory has been comprehensively developed
by Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones (1993, 1998), first in explaining agenda setting and
interest group behavior in American Politics (1993) and more recently with James True, the
dramatics shifts in federal budgeting (1998). For example, they observed that government
spending fluctuated between postwar adjustment till 1956, rapid growth through 1974 and

9

See Hogan (2006, 660).
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restrained spending post 1976 (Baumgartner, Jones and True 1998) as a response to fundamental
domestic shifts in priorities and control over appropriations. One could similarly postulate the
expansion of the federal deficit and budget under the last Republican administration as a
response to a shift in budget priorities brought on by the crisis of September 11, 2001.10
Punctuated equilibrium theory is a useful model to explain any possible shift in policy
and institutions in Fiji as a result of the dramatic crisis of 1987. Unlocking the puzzle of possible
changes in investment strategies before and after the coup will significantly contribute to
understanding the role of the state, sectors, agencies and help explain investment policy in
microstates, especially those undergoing similar political difficulties.
The Argument
Islands with close and in some cases, dependent ties with metropolitan powers (such has
Samoa, Cook Islands and Tonga with New Zealand), Nauru with Australia and Federated States
of Micronesia (FSO), Palau and Marshall Islands with the United States have encouraged labor
mobility and the subsequent receipts of remittances as policy, while all microstates in Oceania
receive some form of foreign aid packages which is a byproduct of lender priorities, historical
associations, foreign policy objectives and the national interests of donor countries. The MIRAB
model relegates microstates to a permanent dependency status and nullifies their achievements in
developing investment policy congruent with their comparative advantage.
The central idea that animates the MIRAB hypothesis is that microstates are
institutionally anemic societies wedged between perennial weaknesses or teetering on failure.
The complicated challenge of exploiting comparative advantage and formulating regulations and

10

I am not in a position to analyze the specificities of Baumgartner, Jones and True’s examples, which is outside the
scope of this paper. These examples are highlighted to demonstrate the applicability of punctuated equilibrium to
explain policy changes.
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policies is beyond the ken of these small island communities and thus the only alternatives
available to them is beg and borrow. A careful examination of the Fiji Islands as a representative
microstate yields a different set of conclusions than the one proposed by the MIRAB model and
argues that comparative advantage is a better model to explain investment in small island
communities by analyzing the development of the tourism industry in Fiji.
Table 1.3: Hypothesis
Competing Theories
MIRAB

Comparative Advantage

Policy

External migrant worker schemes to
encourage labor mobility
Relaxed capital controls to capture
remittances
Closer metropolitan and regional
partnership to enhance Aid inflows

Investment allowances and subsidies
for hotel and resort development
Tax holidays and duty exemptions
Reduction on VAT (value added tax)
and utility licenses

Institutional Assumptions

Endemic political instability
Anemic policy networks
Sectoral cooptation

Microstates while limited and
dependent, retain institutional
capabilities to develop investment
strategies in line with their
comparative advantages

Empirical Expectations

Robust labor movements in period under
investigation
Increase in remittances as a greater
percentage of GDP
Reliant on greater levels of foreign Aid to
maintain State functionality

Expansion of the sector under
investigation (Tourism)
Institutional deepening between
stakeholders in the industry
Increasing role of the State in
managing the sector through
investments and incentives

Theory under Crisis

Confirms institutional assumptions
Increases migration, remittances and Aid
Enhanced reliance with regional and
metropolitan powers

1. Collapse of Tourism industry
Loss of State investments in the
sector
Realignment of stakeholders to
disengage from the industry and
pursue investments in less vulnerable
sectors
2. Hypothesis supported-promotion
of Tourism is congruent with
comparative advantage
Microstates can develop investment
policy and have the institutional
capacity to manage policy through
severe crises

Data

Department of Immigration
The Fiji Bureau of Statistics

Fiji Trade Investment Board
The Fiji Development Bank
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Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
The Reserve Bank of Fiji

The Fiji Visitors Bureau
The Reserve Bank of Fiji
The Fiji Bureau of Statistics

Methodological Issues
(a) Defining Microstates
The United Nations through its Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) commissioned
in 1967 the first international panel to discuss the structure and nature of microstates and
released its report three years later (UNITAR 1971). Drawing upon Charles Taylor’s typology of
microstates, the UN report conceptualized microstates along demographic, spatial and economic
lines, while admitting to the arbitrariness of their definitions (UNITAR 1971:30). The UNITAR
report used a population between 100,000 and 1 million to denote a microstate and established a
pattern of broad inexactitude, while Taylor stipulated a population of up to 3 million as
indicative of a microstate (Dommen and Hein 1985, 10) an astonishingly high number at a time
when world population stood at only 3.7 billion.11
Elmer Plishke’s (1977) influential work on microstates restricted them to a population
under 300,000 in order for a state to qualify as a microstate which included a category of sub
microstates with a population below 100,000. Michael Gunter in the same year as Plishke’s study
appeared (1977) employed a 1 million population cutoff to define a microstate in his analysis of
the United Nations microstate problem. By the 1990s scholars were pushing demographic limits
for microstates up to 1.5 million (Hindmarsh 1996:38; Bray1991:505). The current limits on
population that would be constitutive of a microstate stand at the 1 million mark (Goldstein,
Rivers and Tomz 2007:52). While this is a reasonable demographic ceiling accepted for this

11

Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World
Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp (accessed November 21, 2009).
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project together with GDP and territorial size, I contend that within the rubric of political
economy, these categories will have to be slightly revised.
The second level of microstate categorization attempted by the UNITAR report was
along territorial size (UNITAR 1971, 59-78) based on the 1966 UN statistical yearbook. Apart
from including both self-governing and dependent territories into its analysis and the dated
nature of the report, the most serious problem was finding an acceptable cutoff for territorial
size. For example Fiji in 1966 (a British Colony) had a population of 478,000 and a land area of
18,169 sq. km whereas Namibia (under South African administration) had a population of
584,000 and a land area of 824,292 sq. km. While both Fiji and Namibia could qualify as a
microstate under the population marker (below the 1 million population threshold) could one
reasonably adduce Namibia as a microstate with a territory 45 times that of Fiji? Unsurprisingly
later studies including Plishke (1977) and Dommen and Hein (1985) abandoned territorial size as
a categorical marker that defined a microstate just as UNITAR did in its later deliberations on
small states and territories.
Separately from the UNITAR report, Raimo Vayrynen (1971) used aggregate variables
(area, population, GNP, military budget, value of industrial production) to define and measure
small power status. While he did not isolate the phenomena of microstates as a distinct category,
Vayrynen did include GNP as a measurement of small power but he established no cutoff point
in his analysis. Dommen and Hein (1985, 123) using the UNCTAD figures from 1980 suggested
a GDP/GNP of US500 million as a measurement of a microstate. Unfortunately as the authors
observe, because of the anemic economies of the African sub-continent, Equatorial Guinea with
a GDP of 69 million is territorially larger than 10 independent island economies combined.
Conversely, Iceland with a population 315,459, and an area size of 103,000 sq. km and a GDP
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per capita of 52,493 USD12 hardly qualified as a microstate when compared with the Solomon
Islands with a population of 508,000 and a GDP per capita of 741 USD.13
The United Nations decades after the UNITAR report have only exacerbated the
confusion over microstates with its current classification of least developed countries (LDCs),
landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) and Small Island developing states (SIDS). The later
small island developing states (SIDS) includes Haiti with a population of 9 million and a GDP
per capita of 1,300 USD as well as Singapore with a population of 4.6 million and a GDP per
capita of 49,700 USD.14 Thus, even while retaining the population threshold of one million
peoples as indicative of a microstate, the wide diversity and disparities between states (See Table
1.4) make any analysis of investment policies common to deeply problematic. This research
project will therefore limit itself to explaining investment policies of microstates in Oceania
(Rolfe 2006) using the experience of the Fiji Islands as a case study.
Table 1.4: Microstates with Population <1 Million (2009)
AFRICA

Pop.

Djibouti
Comoros
Cape Verde
Equatorial Guinea
Sao Tome and
Principia
Seychelles

864,000
676,000
506,000
676,000
163,000

EUROPE
Cyprus
Montenegro
Luxembourg
Malta

Pop.
871,000
620,000
486,000
409,000

ASIA
Brunei
Maldives

Pop.
390,000
309,000

87,000

OCEANIA
Fiji
Solomon Islands
Vanuatu
Samoa

Pop.
849,900
523,000
240,000
179,540

CARIBBEAN

Pop.

Guyana
Bahamas
Barbados
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and
Grenadine
Grenada
Antigua and Barbuda
Dominica
St. Kitts and Nevis

738,000
342,000
256,000
172,000
109,000

SOUTH AMERICA
Suriname
Belize

Pop.
520,000
307,000

106,000
88,000
67,000
52,000

12

2008 data retrieved from official government databank at http://www.statice.is. (accessed January 5, 2010)
2007 data retrieved from Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade http://www.dfat.gov.au. (accessed
January 5, 2010)
14
2007 data retrieved from United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries,
Landlocked Developing Countries and the Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS) at
http://www.unohrlls.org/en/home . (accessed January 5, 2010)
13
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Iceland
Andorra
Lichtenstein
Monaco
San Marino

315,459
86,000
36,000
33,000
31,000

Federated States
111,000
of Micronesia
Tonga
104,000
Kiribati
98,000
Marshall Islands
62,000
Palau
20,000
Tuvalu
10,000
Nauru
10,000
Source: UN population database at
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2008/wpp2008_text_tables.pdf. (accessed January 5,
2010)

(b) Why Microstates?
Microstates as the Commonwealth Secretariat stated (Bray and Hui 1989:130) “…are not
simply a scaled a scaled down version of large countries. They have an ecology of their
own…there is a cluster of factors which suggest particular strategies in the smaller states of the
world.” Microstates, even within the cluster of the developing world, remain on the periphery
because of their size, economic potential and geographical isolation for non-contiguous states
(Quester 1983). The last factor is particularly salient for the microstates of Oceania who find
themselves geographically isolated and increasingly marginalized in the new global economy.
While not discounting the calculations of power and national interests exercised by nations
beyond the cluster of microstates, this research will demonstrate that even very small economies
share a similar logic and desire to construct strategies within their polities for investments and
economic opportunities (Crawford 1989).
The microstates in Oceania while diverse in size and population still share important
attributes as a cluster and validate a closer examination of any one of these Islands as
representative of this cohort. My reasons for investigating the Fiji Islands as the locus of a case
study is predicated on my deep familiarity with the country as well as with the widely accepted
consensus on the centrality and importance of the Fiji Islands within Oceania, especially among
the other microstates. The microstates of Oceania are all geographically non-contiguous and with
23

the exception of Tonga were until recently colonial outposts. Secondly, the five largest Islands
(Fiji, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Samoa and Tonga)15 have experienced political conflicts and
tensions within their societies (see Table 1.5), and finally all of these microstates, while
predominantly agricultural, have via the state attempting to develop mechanisms to diversify
their economies. This project aims to explain the development and implementation of these
investment policies through a focused case study on the Fiji Islands.
Table 1.5: Politics and Governance in Microstates
COUNTRY

GOVERNANCE

FIJI

Military Junta (from Dec 2006) (excluded from seasonal worker scheme as
developed by Australia and New Zealand)

VANUATU

Parliamentary democracy (political instability last 15 years).

SAMOA

Parliamentary democracy (NZ provides defense) special quota for NZ residency
and seasonal employment.

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Parliamentary democracy (political instability from 1998-2003) Australia/NZ
have troops on the ground.

TONGA

Constitutional monarchy (political instability in 2006) NZ seasonal employment
benefit.

KIRIBATI

Democratic republic.

NAURU

Democratic republic (Australia provides defense)

TUVALU

Constitutional monarchy.

MICRONESIA (FSO)

Democratic republic (free compact with US) relaxed entry and employment
privileges in USA.

PALAU

Democratic republic (free compact with US) relaxed entry and employment
privileges in USA.

MARSHALL
ISLANDS

Democratic republic (free compact with US) relaxed entry and employment
privileges in USA.

Sources: New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade at www.mfat.govt.nz and Australian Dept of
Foreign Affairs and Trade at www.dfat.gov.au . (accessed January 5, 2010)

15

I have excluded the Federated States of Micronesia (FSO), Palau and Marshall Islands because of its peculiar
political status with the United States. Niue, Cook Islands enjoy full citizenship with New Zealand while Samoa is
beneficiary of a quota system). Nauru’s defense is provided by Australia so I am not sure if it qualifies as a fully
sovereign state.
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(c) Fiji Islands as a Typical (and important) Microstate
The microstates of Oceania are at the periphery of global concern and awareness and as
this project demonstrates, remain under-researched in a variety of areas.16 The one area that has
received substantial scholarly attention has been on political developments in Fiji, most notably
the events of 1987 (B. Lal 1988; Robertson and Tamanisau 1988; V. Lal 1988; Sharpham 2000).
The focus on the politics of Fiji reiterated the strategic importance and influence of the Islands
within the South Pacific (Ball 1973) and the obvious regional implications of domestic
developments. Not only is Fiji strategically located, but economically, politically and culturally,
Fiji is recognized as a regional leader and partner in the success and failures of other microstates
in the region (Hayward-Jones 2009).
In an effort to develop regional relationships, the first Fijian Prime Minister Ratu Mara
led in the formation of the Pacific Islands Producers’ Association (PIPA)17 in 1967, the Pacific
Island Leaders Forum (Mara 1997), The South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (later
the Forum Secretariat)18 in 1971, and The South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic
Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA)19 in 1981, all of which are headquartered in Fiji. The
influential Pacific Islands Development Program (PIDP)20 based at the East-West Center at the
University of Hawaii was also a Fijian initiative and has traditionally been headed by a Fijian
academic.

16

One exception has been the periodic reports issued by the Pacific Island Development Program (PIDP); see
Sturton and McGregor (1991) and Lal (1994). Jai Narayan (1984) study on the political economy of Fiji between the
colonial eras (1874-1970) is a rare and comprehensive treatment of both politics and institutions see also Howe,
Kiste and Lal (1994) on a general history of the Pacific Islands.
17
This was the first indigenous regional association in Oceania. See Neemia (1986) for an extended discussion of
regionalism in the South Pacific.
18
The website for the Forum Secretariat is at http://www.forumsec.org. . (accessed January 5, 2010)
19
For a current report on the status of regional trade in Oceania, see website at http://www.forumsec.org.
/_Resources/article/files/Pacific%20Regional%20Trade%20and%20Economic%20Cooperation_FINAL%20REPOR
T_December%2020071.pdf . (accessed January 5, 2010)
20
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/pacific-islands-development-program/
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The influence of Fiji in Oceania was further enhanced through the establishment of the
regionally owned University of the South Pacific21 as well as schools of nursing and medicine,
which trains the majority of healthcare professionals in the region. Furthermore, Fiji also serves
as a regional base for most of the international institutions (IMF, UNDP) and foreign chanceries
within the region, for example, the US mission based in Suva serves Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu,
Tonga, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, making it geographically the
largest consular section in the world. As early as the 1930 Fiji’s status as a leader among the
many Islands of the Pacific was being debated between her colonial administrators (Hedstrom
1930).
Beyond the strategic importance of Fiji as the subject of this case study is the theoretical
value Fiji lends to the research question that makes it an ideal case. I postulate that understanding
investment policy in microstates can best be explained through a systemic analysis of the
theoretical rationale behind government policy, how and why it has developed investment
incentives within institutional and resource limits, the interaction between state agencies and
particular sectors, and the impact of political crisis on investment policy. The Fiji Islands fulfill
all of the above criteria and allow the researcher within the parameters of this inquiry a unique
opportunity to examine and explain investment policy in the microstates of Oceania. The
government of Fiji for many years has been active in developing investment strategies (see Table
1.6) through the Fiji Trade Investment Board (FTIB).

21

http://www.usp.ac.fj/
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Table 1.6: Fiji Islands Trade and Investment Board (FTIB) Incentive Targets
FIJI ISLANDS: TRADE & INVESTMENT INCENTIVES
SECTORAL TARGETS
Natural Resources

Service

Transportation/SME

Manufacturing

Mining

Tourism

Bus Industry

Ship Building

Fishing

Film Making and Audio
Visual Productions

Small and Micro Enterprises

Manufacturing

Agriculture
Logging and
Sawmilling

Information
Communication
Technology (ICT)

-

Food Processing

-

Renewable Energy
Projects and Power
Generation

-

Bio-Fuel Production

-

Garment Industry

Source: Fiji Trade and Investments Board at www.ftib.org.fj

Secondly, Fiji has a well-developed bureaucracy22 and multiple stakeholders that help
create a complex political environment and provide an opportunity to study the institutional
dynamics of policy, strategy, power and influence. Investment policy, as I have argued, does not
emerge out of a vacuum, but is a product of intense and complicated negotiations between
various actors through time, and the recent history of Fiji is likely to yield a rich explanatory
schema for understanding investment policy in microstates.
The years in which this study is situated (1975-2010) are significant both in the design of
this project and the puzzle that follows. The 1977 elections were pivotal in returning the
incumbent political party (Alliance) to power with an ambitious plan to develop incentives,
attract FDI and diversify the economy which was dominated by sugarcane farming (Levantis,
Jotzo and Tulpule 2005; Narayan and Prasad 2005; Reddy 2003). Developing the tourism sector
was paramount in the government’s five-year plan (Mara 1997) and established the template for
investment policy for the next decade (Alliance also won the 1982 elections). In 1987, following
the defeat of the Alliance party at the hands of the newly formed Fiji Labor Party (FLP), the
22

The most significant work to date on state agencies from the perspective of labor in Fiji is by Jacqueline Leckie
(1997) and as manifested by the title of her study, state agencies understood themselves as laboring with the State.
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military staged a coup d’état and triggered a political crisis. This project will explain investment
policy both prior to the crisis of 1987 and beyond through 2010 to examine the effect of the
political crisis on policy.
Thirdly, Fiji has the most developed and robust tourism sector in the South Pacific and
thus provides an ideal opportunity to examine the permutations of investment policies on an
important sector of the economy (McDonnell 1998; Rao 2002). The efforts in developing a
viable and thriving tourism industry among the microstates have not gone unnoticed, and
governments in recent years have embarked on an ambitious effort to develop tourism within
their countries.23 Also examining investment policy as applied to the tourism industry serves as a
hard case example. Using Fiji as a case study provides a closer look at the effect of political
crisis on investment policy in a specific sector in microstates. Among all the sectors that the
FTIB (see Table 1.6) has targeted as part of its investment strategy, tourism is seen as the most
vulnerable to political shocks and instability. David Beirman (2003) used a series of case studies
(that included Fiji) to analyze policy shifts and market responses to crisis in the tourism industry.
Tourists tend to leave, with their finances in the event of a national upheaval, and a cursory
examination of any troubled region will indicate the lack of a robust trade in tourism (Faulkner
2001; Ritchie 2004; Wang 2008). Analyzing impacts of shock events on tourism has recently
focused on epidemics (Wen, Huimin and Kavanaugh 2005) on the SARS outbreak in Asia, or
natural disasters (Huang and Min 2002) i.e. the 1999 earthquake that struck Taiwan and sent the
tourism industry in a tailspin.24

23

Similarly a sustained effort has been underway in Africa to develop a robust tourism market as part of its overall
development strategy (Dieke 2000).
24
The Taiwanese government implemented series of aggressive investment strategies to revive the industry ranging
from 30 second commercial spots on CNN to hosting a four day International Travel Fair, discounted travel program
with major Japanese airlines and rebuilding scenic and recreational area through generous loans and grants for the
travel industry (See Huang and Min 2002).
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This project is predicated on the premise that investment policy is an important
component of states developmental strategy, and that given the limited resources these small
economies have, structuring prudent policy instruments entails not only being cognizant of the
dynamic between agencies and sectors but understanding the impact of political crisis on
investment policy. Is the state’s investment in tourism a reliable measure of where limited
resources should be allocated? What role did domestic coalitions play in the formation of
investment policy? Are state agencies that oversee investment strategies capable of withstanding
institutional manipulation in the formation of policy in these small states, especially regarding
the powerful tourism industry? This project is undertaken in hopes of responding to these
questions, objectively, fairly and thoroughly and contributes to our understanding of investment
policy in microstates.
(d) Case Study
Globally, national governments employ a wide array of incentives and policies to attract
investments and promote development. The case study on the Fiji Islands in explaining
investment policy in microstates fills a theoretical lacuna on how very small and non-contiguous
states use policy instruments to develop investment strategies. While the expansive use of
government measures to encourage investment is widely acknowledged, there has not been any
systemic study of investment policy in microstates as far as I can ascertain.
However the use of case studies in political science has raised some objections, especially
in possible violations of important assumptions in scientific research. I posit that it is desirable
within the scope of this research to use the case study method and that the methodological
literature provides ample support to overcome the most important objections that may possibly
impair scientific investigation of this project.
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Lijphart (1971) argued that one of the advantages of pursuing a case study was the ability
of the researcher to focus on a salient issue of interest given the constraints of time and resource.
This could he stated “make an important contribution to the establishment of general
propositions and thus to theory building in political science” (Lijphart 1971:691). Similarly,
Alston (2008) stipulates that case studies “allow the analyst to isolate the impacts of a theoretical
concept in a more detailed and compelling manner” (Alston 2008, 103) through examining the
specific policy and institutional arrangements of individual societies. As Lijphart (1971)
observes, case study is one of several methods used in political science (Lijphart 1971:682) and
therefore not exclusive of quantitative analysis (King, Keohane, Verba (1994:43-46), but as
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005:20) suggest, statistical research is frequently
preceded by case studies. The goal of case studies outlined by Alston (2008:121) and salient for
this project is that (a) to understand an issue prior to modeling it (b) the ability to test theoretical
hypothesis (see Lijphart 1971:691) and (c) to shed credible light on the workings of institutions
and economic working of society.
The specific loci of investigation in case study make generalizability problematic and, as
Yin (2003:10-11) states, imprecise research could be easily collapsed into mere narratives. I
concede that examination of a single anomalous event cannot contribute to an overall
understanding of political phenomena, but a study of Fiji within a cluster of microstates is
scientifically valid. While theories generated from a case study of Fiji may not be applicable to
OECD countries, it should reliably contribute to an understating of investment policies in
microstates.25

25

One possible mechanism to overcome the problem of generalizability is through Lieberman’s (2005:436) theory
of nested analysis which allows researchers to “explore general relationships and explanations” without eschewing
the “specific explanations of individual cases.”
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Ancillary to the problem of generalizability in case studies is issue of “conceptual
stretching” (Sartori 1970) that authors George and Bennett (2005, 19-21)) argue could be
substantially attenuated through case studies. Instead of “lumping together dissimilar cases to get
a larger sample” they suggest that case studies allow for a finer grained analysis of questions
under investigation. This observation is significant for the study of microstates in Oceania, which
while part of a larger cohort of sovereign states with populations below the one million mark
share unique attributes of geography, history and capabilities that creates opportunities for a
focused study in of itself. Even among microstates one has to be wary of drawing conclusions
between contiguous and developed economies such as Brunei or Iceland and the remote islands
of the pacific with very low levels of development. Case studies therefore “identify the universe
or group under investigation” (George and Bennett 2008:25, 69-70) and allow the researcher to
craft a focused and precise research objective, case studies they argue are “stronger at
determining whether and how a variable mattered than at assessing how much it mattered.”
Case studies are prone to the problem of selection bias (King, Keohane and Verba
(1994:128-132) which “is commonly understood as occurring when some form of selection
process in either the design of the study or the real-world phenomena under investigation results
in inferences that suffer from systematic error” (Collier and Mahoney 1996:59). An example
would be investigating the relationship between democracy and economic development using
OECD countries as observations and extrapolating the results to the general population. While
the observations for this project are circumscribed, there is no intrinsic assumption about a
relationship between size and policy, only in explaining how and what factors are engaged in the
structuring of investment incentives within microstates. The focused nature of this investigation
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make the results applicable to other microstates that share similar attributes as opposed to being
generalizable to states that are vastly dissimilar in size and endowments (McKeown 1999).
The lack of representativeness in comparison to statistical analysis can be overcome by
making a trade-off between parsimony and broad applicability with explanatory richness and
fine-grained analysis of the case under investigation. Case study researchers, argue George and
Bennett (2008:31-32), “are more interested in finding the conditions under which specified
outcomes occur, and the mechanisms through which they occur, rather than uncovering the
frequency with which these conditions and their outcomes arise.” Selection bias could be
problematic if microstates were the dependent variable in this investigation, which it is not but
rather investment policy as the variable under inquiry (Dion 1998).
However simply observing the movement of independent variables in explaining
investment policy seems reductionist and lacks the ability to provide a more nuanced analysis of
affective forces involved in the formulation and implementation of a significant policy. Without
negating the importance of quantitative measurements, the purpose of this inquiry is explaining
investment policies in microstates through a careful examination of the different units of analysis
and the possible effect of a severe exogenous crisis, i.e. the military coup d’état of 1987. A better
model would be to use the case study method to explain in detail the permutations and
trajectories of investment policy of microstates in Oceania by examining the experience of Fiji.
Case studies suggest George and Bennett (2008:25) “are stronger at determining whether and
how a variable mattered, than at assessing how much it mattered,” which has deep implications
for the study of investment policy in microstates.
Robert Yin (2003:3-5) uses the example of Allison and Zelikow’s Essence of Decision,
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis as a model of how case studies can move beyond the

32

exploratory stage and into the explanatory phase and “can be the basis for significant
explanations and generalizations” through the creative and successful use of multiple
perspectives and institutional constraints in explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Prudent use of
case studies such as the embedded design model (Yin 2003:19-56) have the potential to unravel
complex policy formulations through its emphasis on examining different units of analysis
individually and in toto (Ragin 1994:101-102; 2004:123-138).
As a caveat, I am aware of important quantitative studies on investment policy in
microstates, which has helped me refine my research agenda throughout this project.26 I am also
cognizant of the use of the case study method to study microstates, investment policy,
institutions and crisis which validates the appropriateness of utilizing case study methodology for
this project.27
Table 1.7: Design & Data: Explaining Investment Policy in Microstates of Oceania
Unit of Analysis

Extant Institutions

Research Questions

Data

Methods of Inquiry

Microstate (Fiji
Islands)

Domestic environment
(constituency
pressures) Regional
environment
(SPARTECA-South
Pacific Regional Trade
and Economic
Cooperation
Agreement)

How did investment
policies emerge?
What were the
political and
economic factors that
led to the
development of
specific investment
incentives? Are this
incentives elite
driven, part of a
regional trend or a
“race to the bottom”
dynamic”?

Legislative record
(Hansard documents),
Regional policy
formulations (South
Pacific Forum
databank).

Archival analysis of
historical record on the
genesis of investment
policy in microstates,
explore patterns and
overall trends.

State Agencies

Departmental
Ministries (Tourism,

How did these
institutional

Ministerial directives
and government

Process tracing to
determine how and if

26

Some notable studies that I have greatly benefited have been Jayaraman and Choong (2006), Gani (1999) on the
determinants of FDI in Fiji and Clague, Gleason and Knack on the determinants of lasting democracy in poor
countries. Also studies in tourism and economic performance by Rosentraub and Joo (2008), and Brau, Lanza and
Pigliaru (2003) have been helpful in showing estimated changes in the dependent variable and linear relationships.
27
On development in small economies, see Winslow (1991-92), Bray and Hui (1989), Anckar (2002), Storey and
Murray (2001), Baldacchino (1999), Thomas (2002). For case studies on institutions, see Cortell and Peterson
(1999), Peters, Pierre and King (2005), Tien-Lung Liu (1998) and sector research; see O’Donnell (2005), Vassiliou
(1995), Kersell (1987) and Agor (1981).
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Lands)
Fiji Trade Investments
Board (FTIB), Native
Land Trust Board
(NLTB), Fiji
Development Bank
(FDB)

arrangements affect
investment policies?
What roles do state
agencies in
microstates play in
formulating
investment policies?
Is the pressure upward
or downward?

records.
Public Service
Commission rules that
regulate interaction
over policy formation
and implementation.

bureaucratic agencies
affect investment
policy in microstates.
What are the limits of
institutional power in
microstates on
investment policy?

Sectors (Tourism,
Agriculture and
Garment
Manufacturing)

Fiji Tourism Board,
Fiji Visitors Board,
Fiji Hoteliers
Association,
Individual Resorts, Fiji
Sugar Corporation,
Fiji Development
Bank,

How has the tourism
industry benefitted
from investment
incentives? What role
has it played in the
structuring of
investment policy in
Fiji? What is the role
of sectoral elites in
microstates over
investment strategy?

Fiji Trade Investment
Board (FTIB) data on
investments in the
tourism sector, Tax
incentive data from the
Reserve Bank of Fiji

Data analysis on the
effects of investment
policy as implemented
within the tourism
sector over time (total
subsidies received, tax
benefits, duty
concessions, etc)
comparative analysis
between the tourism
sector and other
sectors regarding
incentives.

1987 Political Crisis

Tourism Industry,
FTIB

What was the effect
of the political crisis
on investment policy?
Are microstates, by
virtue of size,
insulated from
permanent effects of
political shocks? How
was the tourism sector
affected by the coup?

Newspaper reports on
the political crisis,
tourism data from Fiji
Bureau of Statistics,
and economic data
from the Reserve Bank
of Fiji.

Comparative analysis
of investment policy
before and after the
political crisis; what
changed and how?
Interviews with agency
and trade
representatives on the
effects and long-term
consequences of the
political crisis of 1987.

(e) Hypothesis Testing
The Fiji Islands like other small states in Oceania face deep resource, capital and
demographic limitations yet have managed to reasonably negotiate through the global economy
by developing tourism as a natural extension of their location, natural beauty and languid
surroundings. I explore these developments by examining the formation and implementation of
investment policy in the tourism from the genesis of the industry through periods of crises and
beyond.
In order to successfully prosecute my hypothesis that comparative advantage is a better
theory in explaining microstate behavior in the international system than MIRAB, I will need
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demonstrate the specific role that various stakeholders, institutions and agencies played in
securing the success of the tourism industry. This will entail documenting policies, legislation,
debates, subsidies, funds, land, resources, etc by the Fijian government from 1975-2010 that
ensured the success of tourism in the islands. If it can be demonstrated that the Fijian
government played an active and direct role in the development of the tourism sector in
collaboration with key stakeholders and interest groups over time, than my hypothesis that
microstates are capable of developing policies congruent with their comparative advantage is
vindicated. The alternative is that the limitations inherent to microstates are too great to
overcome, and racked with political instability, economically inefficient, and institutionally weak
and therefore MIRAB may ultimately be a better explanation of how microstates can survive in
the global economy.
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Chapter Two
Tourism as a Developmental Strategy
Introduction
This section provides an overview of the competing models of tourism development and
the externalities that emerge from them. Large scale development projects in tourism have
ranged from exclusive and isolated resorts to urban hotels and niche ecotourism. The myriad of
travel products reflect the diversity of consumer tastes and purchasing power and the ability of
host economies to cater to the needs of an expanding market. The sharp variation in the demand
for tourism in the Pacific explicates the complexity of geography and the level of tourism
development in these microstates (see Table 2.1) but the costs associated with utilizing tourism
as a conduit for development are neither exclusive nor unique to each of these islands. The
pressure on fragile ecosystems and the possible changes to culture and society have to be taken
into account to ensure that tourism development fulfills its strategic potential within national
priorities.
Table 2.1 Tourism Demand in Oceania-Number of Visitors (1996-2001)
COUNTRY

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

48,354

49,866

48,630

55,599

72,994

74,575

339,560

359,441

371,342

409,955

294,070

348,014

KIRIBATI

4,206

5,054

5,679

3,112

4,829

4,574

MARSHALL ISLANDS

6,116

6,254

5,727

4,622

5,246

5,399

NIUE

1,522

1,820

1,736

1,870

1,647

1,407

736,517

726,690

526,298

491,602

526,111

497,685

PALAU

69,330

73,719

64,194

55,493

57,732

54,111

SAMOA

73,155

67,960

77,926

85,124

87,688

88,263

SOLOMON ISLANDS

10,290

13,807

15,802

6,224

2,427

3,418

TONGA

26,642

26,162

27,102

30,949

34,694

32,386

898

1,000

1,100

1,000

1,000

1,140

46,123

49,624

52,085

50,746

57,364

53,300

COOK ISLANDS
FIJI

NOTHERN MARIANA

TUVALU
VANUATU

Source: Treloar and Hall (2005: 171)
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The different models of tourism development that could be beneficial for host economies
are often determined by factors beyond the control of these islands because international tourism
is managed by entities outside the reach of these economies. The stenopeic choices available to
microstates by virtue of their size and endowment capabilities indubitably make the structuring
of a tourism based economy an attractive and viable model for development. The different
trajectories of tourism development in these islands often determine whether industry is
successfully integrated into national economies, as well as whether these societies are able to
manage the negative externalities that arise as a consequence of large influxes of outsiders in
small communities.
Developing tourism involves both tangible and intangible costs, the former through
building infrastructure, creating organizations, subsidizing incentives (Eadington and Redman
1991) while the later includes problems of cultural disintegration, social and ethnic
stratifications, crime and the erosion of informal institutions, etc. While the focus of this project
is on the tangible aspects of tourism and the institutional and developmental challenges facing
microstates, I am cognizant of the valuable contributions by anthropologists and sociologists
(examined later in this chapter) who have made salient critiques of tourism and its negative
social and cultural effects on host communities. An empirical examination of changes in
attitudes, psychology, culture, norms, values, etc. of tourists and hosts is a vast and complex
undertaking and beyond the scope of this project. In spite of the vast scholarship in this area,
there is a paucity of actual ground level study of residents who are most directly affected by the
changes from tourism and is an opportunity for further enquiry. One of the few case studies that
explore the cultural and social effects of tourism in the South Pacific disputes the assertions

37

made by anthropologists and sociologists about tourisms deleterious effects, but a lack of
comparative data makes it unhelpful to generalize (King, Pizam and Milman 1993).
The Advent of Mass Tourism
In the era of mass tourism, international travel is no longer a province of the privileged
but accessible to citizens of advanced capitalist societies, many of whom had now inherited a
new “culture of mobility” (Bianchi 2006). International travel in a previous era was mainly
undertaken by wealthy individuals in an ad hoc fashion and commonly referred to as the “Grand
Tour” (Brennan 2004), while the current wave of tourism is a highly structured product packaged
for mass consumption. Freya Higgins-Desbiolles (2006) in Table 2.2 provides a timeline of the
evolution of travel, with particular emphasis in the postwar era. International travel in the
succeeding decade was increasingly articulated and facilitated through international norms and
institutions within the context of an intertwined globalized economy. The bourgeoning travel
industry has enabled societies in the periphery to engage in the global economy through the
provision of goods and services specific to international tourism, notwithstanding the criticism
that this is a debatable proposition because peripheral societies are too marginal to dictate the
terms of exchange (Goodwin 2007; Wu 1982). Providing the essential accoutrements associated
with tourism is an expensive and complex undertaking and requires systemic policies and
organizational structures for successful prosecution of developmental objectives (Diamond
1977:552; Sautter and Leisen 1999; Gearing, Swart and Var 1976).
Table 2.2: Milestones in the Human Right to Travel and Tourism in the Modern era
TIMELINE

MILESTONE

DETAIL OF EVENT

16–19th centuries

Travel for the Elite

Grand Tour used by European elite as educational
experience

1841

Travel for the workers and
masses

Cook’s Tours are born when Thomas Cook organizes
rail journey between Leicester and Loughborough, UK

End of World War I

Passport as travel requisite

To consolidate nation states and deal with global war,
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passports become widespread (O’Byrne, 2000)
1948

UN Universal Declaration
of Human Rights

Declaration which states the basic rights to travel, rest,
leisure and paid holidays

1954

World passport initiative

Travel document for ‘‘world citizens’’ created by
World Movement for World Citizens to enable the
realization of the right to travel as stated in the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights

1963

International Bureau of Social
Tourism

Organization founded in Belgium chartered to promote
‘‘access to travel and leisure opportunities for all’’

1976

UN International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights

Document which reiterates the rights to rest, leisure
and paid holidays

1980

WTO’s Manila Declaration
on World Tourism

Document which states: ‘‘tourism is considered an
activity essential to the life of nations…Its
development is linked to the social and economic
development of nations and can only be possible if man
[sic] has access to creative rest and holidays and enjoys
freedom to travel’’

1985

WTO’s Tourism Bill of Rights and
Tourist Code

Document which states: ‘‘the right of everyone to rest
and leisure…periodic leave with pay and freedom of
movement without limitation, within the bounds of
law, is universally recognized. The exercise of this
right constitutes a factor of social balance and
enhancement
of national and universal awareness’’

1990s

Human Development Index
drops in 3rd world

Human Development Report describes ‘‘unprecedented
reversals of the 1990s’’ as development went
backwards in dozens of countries (UNDP, 2004, p.
132)

1999
September 11, 2001

WTO’s Global Code of Ethics
for Tourism

Document includes Article 7 on the ‘‘Right to
Tourism’’ which states ‘‘the prospect of direct and
personal access to the discovery and enjoyment of the
planet’s resources constitutes a right equally open to all
of the world’s inhabitants’’. It also calls on the public
authorities to support social tourism

Attack on USA and
subsequent ‘‘War on Terror

Implementation of universal right to travel is set back
with tighter border security, travel advisories and
heightened international tensions
Source: Higgins-Desbiolles, Freya (2006: 1199)

The case study of Fiji challenges the notion of impotency endemic to peripheral
economies and demonstrates how it has been able to organize its policies in order to capture its
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share of the global market in travel. Both the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) and the
World Trade Organization (WTO) recognizes that tourism can be harnessed for social and
economic ends and contributes towards national development if properly organized by all
stakeholders (UNWTO 2004; Honeck 2008). Tourism can either mimic the predictable contours
of the global economy as an exploitative and ultimately destructive enterprise for host
economies, or it can ceteris paribus generate development, employment and opportunity. The
logic of utilizing tourism as a developmental strategy is, I believe, a reasonable policy within the
scope of endowments available to microstates such as the Fiji Islands. The following section
examines the competing theories of tourism development and addresses the criticisms pertaining
to the asymmetrical relationship between the core and the periphery within the context of the
global economy.
Globalization has intensified the pressure on economies to develop policy instruments
that are commensurate with this new reality, or face the danger of being left behind. The survival
of microstates is therefore predicated on their ability to organize their economies in ways that
will maximize their natural and geographical advantages, albeit there are fundamental limitations
intrinsic to the small islands of Oceania. Thus the development of tourism has been the preferred
route of small island economies to optimize their comparative advantage in order to survive and
flourish in the global economy. The MIRAB model grossly underestimates the extraordinary
efforts that microstates in general and the Fiji Islands in particular have undertaken over the last
several decades to develop institutions and structures in order to capture the gains from tourism
for national development.
The physical dimensions of tourism require substantial investments to meet supply
conditions in order to create a product that is essentially amorphous and liminal. The economic,
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environmental and cultural challenges wrought by international tourism are insurmountable for
small economies, argue critics for using tourism as a conduit for development, and point to the
creation of enclave sites as indicative of the exploitative nature of global tourism (Taylor 2001;
Mbaiwa 2005; Freitag 1994). The creation of locales in the periphery to deliver a contrived travel
experience for consumers in the core is financially irresponsible, environmentally destructive and
culturally corrosive. The payoffs for host communities in the form of employment, opportunity
and development are negligible and scarce resources would be better allocated elsewhere.
Alternatively, the functional approach concedes the pervasive and complex influence of tourism
on societies but rejects the implicit assumption that host communities are passive agents lacking
the capacity to direct development and manage the industry consistent with its social and
national objectives.
The competing models of tourism within the literature illuminate the complexity of the
travel industry and expose the deep contested issues inherent in the nature of the sector itself.
Table 2.3 provides a sampling of the expansive literature on the competing arguments regarding
the tourism industry. As Lea (1988: 2) states, “…There is no other international trading activity
which involves such critical interplay among economic, political, environmental and social
elements as tourism…” Both the political economy approach and the functional model enable
theorists and policy analysts to develop a nuanced and critical understanding of the complexity
of international tourism and situate it within the broader currents of development and
globalization (Lea 1988: 10).
Table 2.3 Competing Theories of Tourism Development
Political Economy Approach

Functionalist Approach

Tourism development reflecting colonial
relationships (Britton 1980,1982); The sociospatial nature of tourism development between

Tourism as a rational development strategy
(Wilkinson 1989; Rosentraub and Joo 2010):
Croes 2004: McElroy 2003); Advantages of
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the core and the periphery (Husbands 1981;
Oppermann 1995); Enclave structures (Freitag
1994; Jaakson 2004; Mbaiwa 2005); High costs
of infrastructure development and low skilled
employment opportunities (Diamond 1977);
Unequal dispersal of benefits from tourism
(Brougham and Butler 1981): Negative cultural
impact on host communities (Macnaught 1982;
Wu 1982 Goodwin 2007; Haralambopoulos
and Pizam 1996; Yang 2011); Inauthentic
social construction of the “Other” (Silver 1993;
Wang 1999: Chabra, Healy and Sills 2003:
Taylor 2001Tourism as a “plantation economy”
(Hall 1994); Negative environmental impact of
tourism (Cohen1978; Romeril 1989)

community based tourism (Sebele 2010; Binns
and Nelt 2002); Tourism and poverty
alleviation (Honeck 2008; Hampton 2003);
Tourism as an integrative enterprise (Pearce
2001); Tourism and the diversity of consumer
behavior (Goosens 2000; Gnoth 1997; Chen,
Mak and McKercher 2011); State capacity to
manage tourism (Sautter and Leisen 1999);
Resident attitudes towards enclave resorts
(Hernandez, Cohen and Garcia 1996); Neutral
social impacts of tourism (King, Pizam and
Milman 1993); Tourism as a positive social
force (Higgins-Desbiolles 2006); Sustainable
tourism (Bramwell and Lane 2010; Weaver
2010; Brohman 1996; Beaumont and Dredge
2010).

Political Economy Approach
The political economy model (Britton 1981; King, Pizam, Milman 1993; Baldacchino
1993; Harrison 2004) emplaced tourism in the developing world as an extension of historical ties
between former colonies and their metropolitan overseers. The political and military dependency
that once characterized the relationship between the developing world and Europeans was now
protracted through the market for travel and associated sectors. The tourism industries these
scholars argued perpetuated these asymmetrical relationships through established markets and
investments in host economies and thus creating a new framework of economic and cultural
dependency. The severing of political ties was replaced by tighter economic and cultural
dependency that belied the promise of independence for many of these former colonies.
Criticism of tourism focused on the high capital demands required to meet supply
conditions, the spatial concentration of tourist sites and the cultural construction of the other by
the sending states (Oppermann 1995; Hanna and Casino Jr 2003, Britton 1982). International
tourism is organized along parameters that may either attenuate economic inequalities or further
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exacerbate the asymmetrical relationships that exist between host economies and the sending
states. From a neoclassical perspective, the tourism market functions along a supply and demand
frontier (see Table 2.4). This necessitates the hard investments required by host countries to
provide the physical components if they desire to capture the market in international travel. As
we will see in the case study on Fiji, microstates in particular have to rely on a combination of
private and public resources to fulfill the supply conditions necessary for success or failure in
developing their tourism industry. Tourism, as Sinclair (1998: 14) observes is a “composite
product, involving transport, accommodation, entertainments, natural resources and other
facilities and services such as shops and currency exchange.” The high capital intensity required
for infrastructure projects such as building roads, electricity grids, communications, airports and
accommodations to create conditions amenable for tourism place an unfair burden on receiving
states, many of whom are developing low income economies (Jafari 1974). However countries
desirous of acquiring market share in the intensely competitive travel industry cannot afford to
lag behind in infrastructure development, and therefore feel compelled to undertake expensive
tourism development projects. Freitag (1994: 541) recounts the example of the Dominican
Republic to develop the Puerto Plata coast between 1974 and 1982 into a tourism enclave by
borrowing $76 million dollars to build infrastructure, at the cost of other development priorities.
Table 2.4: Conditions for Developing Tourism
Demand Conditions
Supply Conditions
Exotic Experience

Infrastructure

Service

Accommodations

Entertainment

Transportation

Accessibility

Communication

Affordability
Safety
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A possible alternative sketched by Rosentraub and Joo (2009: Diagram 2.1) is for
governments to develop cooperative partnerships with the private sector and co-invest in
infrastructure projects (Agor 1981), which has the potential for positive spillover effects. In Fiji,
large resort developments receive incentive packages from the government to generate their own
electricity which allows the resort to sell excess wattage to neighboring communities, allowing
rural villagers access electric power. However, the scarcity of capital for developing tourism has
sometimes caused host communities take imprudent risks and incur huge losses. The US1.2
Billion dollar Costa Isabella Project in Puerto Rico which started twenty years ago has yet to be
completed with mounting losses and periodic change in ownership (Hernandez, Cohen and
Garcia 1996:757-759). The troubled Natadola and Momi Bay Project in Fiji is financed through
the public pension fund and is losing almost three hundred million Fijian dollars (the next two
chapters outlines the genesis and implications of these troubled tourism projects in Fiji).
Diagram 2.1: Public Private Partnerships for Developing Tourism

Source: Rosentraub & Joo (2009: 762)

44

Enclave Tourism
Tourism, as Lea (1988) has argued is a comprehensive project touching on both the
temporal and intangible aspects of society. The temporal dimensions of tourism require
substantial investments in supply conditions to meet acceptable standards in order to create a
product that is essentially amorphous and liminal. The spatial concentration of the tourism
industry is intensified by the creation of enclave communities and further exacerbates the
exploitative nature of the relationship between the core and the periphery. Britton (1982:341)
argues that;
In physical, commercial and socio-psychological terms, then, tourism in a peripheral economy
can be conceptualized as an enclave industry. Tourist arrivals points in the periphery are typically
the primary urban centers of ex-colonies, now functioning as political and economic centers of
independent countries…If on package tours, tourist will be transported from international transport
terminals to hotels and resort enclaves. The transport, tour organization and accommodation phases of their
itineraries will be confined largely to formal sector tourism companies. Tourists will then travel between
resort clusters and return to the primary urban areas for departure.

Professor Britton’s critique of the enclave type of tourism development goes beyond the merely
contrived “bubble” experience that self-contained places offer to consumers akin to being on a
cruise ship (Jaakson 2004), into the very economic arrangements that are instrumental in creating
the enclave model of tourism development. Similar to the colonial structures that once governed
these Islands from afar, are now the new organizations that operate and regulate international
tourism from the core, often located in the former metropoles (Husbands 1981). The tourism
industry according to Britton (see Diagram 2.2) is disproportionately biased towards enclave
types of development, for cultural and economic reasons. Operators of self-contained tourist
areas are able to capture most of the tourist expenditures (Hernandez, Cohen and Garcia 1996;
Jaackson 2004; Mbaiwa 2005) from the moment they book their travels to the final departure.
Aside from bureaucratic expenses such as airport taxes or visa fees, guests at inclusive resorts
have little incentive or opportunity to spend during their travels. International tourism is deeply
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intertwined with the social and political structures of host economies and thereby exposes them
to external manipulation by the core countries (Henderson and Ng 2004; Kim, Timothy and Han
2007; Schwartz 1991; Freedman 2005). The promotional advantages enjoyed by enclave tourism
through its close relationship with the metropole can easily be withdrawn over conflicts with
policy and politics, allowing the core to retain political control over the developing world.28
Diagram 2.2: Enclave Model of Third World Tourism

HEAD OFFICES OF
GLOBAL &
NATIONAL
TOURISM FIRMS

International tourist flows largely controlled by
metropolitan corporations

TOURISM MARKET
Metropolitan Economy

TOURIST
INDUSTRY
NATIONAL
OFFICES

TOURIST PRODUCT
Peripheral Economy
Tourist Destination

National
Urban
urban centre
Areas
capital/prim
ate city

RESORT
ENCLAVE

Tourist flows controlled by national
and international firms in the periphery

RESORT
ENCLAVE

RESORT
ENCLAVE

Tourist
Tourist

Attraction

Attraction

Source: Britton (1982: 342)
Tourist

Rural
Areas
Tourist
Attraction
Independent and packaged tourist flows to
the marginal peasant and artisan tourist
sector in the periphery

Attraction
28

The discussion on travel warnings in chapter 5 discusses at length the complicated relationship between host
economies and sending states, given the nature of the industry per se and the impacts of political instability on
tourism.
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Furthermore, enclave models of tourism development have been notorious in the
production of “staged authenticity” in the guise of creating sites that mimic the cultural heritage
of host communities (Chabra, Healy and Sills 2003; Daniel 1996; Hughes 1995; MacCannell
1979). Tourists do not have to venture out beyond the security of their all inclusive sites to
“experience” the thrill of travel in a foreign and exotic location, essentially shielding them from
the social and economic realities of the communities which they ostensibly are guests of. The
desire on the part of the consumer to have an exotic experience and the willingness of the
provider to package it for consumption creates a “reification of the other” argues Taylor (2001)
and does not contribute to heightened awareness and sensitivity of societies different from the
traveler and enlarges the sense of alienation and objectification (Silver 1993; Adams 1984;
Bruner 1991).
An unintended consequence of enclave tourism seemingly overlooked by critics (Aili,
Jiaming and Min 2007) is the ability of both the host community and the tourist sector to insulate
each other from the negative social and cultural impacts of the industry. Whether that is a
desirable proposition is debatable but it is my contention that scholars cannot have it both ways.
Enclave tourism is problematic because its creates a superficial product for travelers, while an
integrated travel experience is detrimental to host culture and society
Functional Approach
In the second conceptual model, Mathieson and Wall (1982), McElroy (2003), Agor
(1981) argue from a functional perspective that tourism as a unique activity should be examined
intrinsically on how it impacts individuals, society, culture and the environment rather than
merely as a tool for political and economic domination. This is not to extricate tourism from the
larger currents of the global economy, but rather to situate the phenomena of international
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tourism within the context of national economies and the ways in which host economies manage
and develop this trade in services (Lea 1988: 10). The functional approach towards tourism
posits the State as an active player in the organization of the tourist industry within its national
development objectives. In contrast to the pessimism of the political economy model in which
tourism is “imposed” on economies (Sautter and Leisen 1999: 312-313), the functional model
attributes agency to actors in the formation and development of tourism, even though it may
occasionally underestimate the complicated historical realities and economic asymmetries (Lea
1988: 16). A functional approach according to Sautter and Lesien (1999: 313) require “all
parties-or stakeholders-interested in or affected by this business within a particular market or
community…to collectively manage the tourism system.”
I concur with John Lea (1988) that both models provide the researcher with an inadequate
framework to understand the phenomena of global tourism. While the development of tourism
has exploited historic relationships and exacerbated inequalities as articulated by the political
economy approach of Britton et.al, developing countries have nonetheless adopted tourism as
part of their development strategy.29 Host economies have invested substantial resources and
capital to develop the tourism industry as a rational response to what they perceive as their
comparative advantage in the global economy, as is the case of the Fiji Islands. This project
situates the development of tourism in the Fiji Islands within the functional model as it most
closely approximates the institutional and organizational diastole of the travel industry. The
focus of our enquiry is from the perspective of the host economy i.e. the microstate instead of the
metropole on which the Britton’s enclave model is biased towards (Lea 1988:11).

29

This is not to suggest that global economic realities and factor endowments may not have constricted their
capacities to choose otherwise, but this project seeks to examine the impact of tourism per se, within the Fiji Islands.
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Table 2.5 illustrates the many possible ways in which host countries can develop tourism
that is consistent with their resource and structural capabilities. Host communities can develop a
fairly diversified and sustainable tourism industry as demonstrated by the Fijian experience. The
complicated nature of the industry requires institutions, incentives and organizational structure to
develop and adapt to the changing consumer needs, environmental pressures and political
instability. Scholars that deny the positive role that tourism can potentially play in developing
peripheral economies make similar assumptions of MIRAB theorists, i.e. that (1) microstates by
virtue of size and endowments lack agency and consigned to a permanent dependent status (2)
tourism is a top down process imposed on the periphery (3) the ability to negotiated pathways to
development is severely compromised or absent (4) incapable of building the necessary
institutions required for policy (5) lack an interest in preserving the environment (6) culture is
either unchanging and frozen for posterity or fragile and susceptible to irreparable damage from
exogenous factors.
Table 2.5: Range of Development Options
Approach to Tourism
Types of Development

Infrastructure

Political Economy

Enclave

Full service luxury Resorts
Self-contained Boutique
accommodations
Island Getaways
Secluded private Resorts

Functional

Integrated

Urban Hotels
Motels/Day Inns
Home stays
Backpackers accommodations
Adventure Tourism
Camping sites
Ecotourism
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The Fijian case study challenges these assumptions and situates the development of
tourism within the broader context of challenges facing small economies. Fiji enjoys a
comparative advantage in tourism because of its location and accessibility to larger and affluent
neighbors, as well as a carefully cultivated image of an island paradise, but also because it has
successfully built the institutional structure required for the industry to take flight. Furthermore,
tourism in Fiji has endured almost twenty-five of chronic political instability and most studies of
tourism have failed to address the phenomena of tourism under crisis. The survival of tourism
through the periods of crisis provides an opportunity to examine both the limits of small states in
the global system and the appropriate policy responses required by them to retain market share,
justify continued investments and minimize collateral damage to other sectors of the economy.
Studies have demonstrated that safety and security play a crucial role in determining
consumer choice about the locations travelers choose to visit. The development of tourism as
well as the ongoing political crisis in Fiji provides an invaluable opportunity to examine the
effect of crisis on the industry, the ability of the State to respond to the crisis and most
surprisingly, the resiliency of the tourism industry to emerge from the political upheavals.
Whether this is indicative of government foresight and commitment to investing in tourism, or
the ability of the sector itself to adapt to crisis can only be determined after the case study on Fiji.
Despite the coverage of the situation in Fiji about its so called “coup culture,” the political
instability it has experienced, I will argue, has been quite benign in nature. In spite of travel
warning and in some cases travel restrictions by sending countries, tourism in Fiji has not been
irretrievably damaged. Consumers, unlike Foreign Service Offices, seem to have a more nuanced
and sophisticated understanding of travel locations than official policies.
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Developing Tourism
John Bryden (1973) argues that tourism emerged as a viable strategy for development in
small island economies within a specific political and economic framework (Bryden 1973:3)
rather than as an ad hoc response to exogenous forces. The Caribbean Commonwealth, the site of
Bryden’s inquiry, appropriated tourism as congruent with their development plans for reasons I
suggest applies to the Fiji Islands. Bryden (1973) observed that the Caribbean Islands had long
historical and political ties with the metropole, they suffered from geographical isolation, had
limited resources and human capital. Survival in the early years following independence either
meant reverting back to dependency with the metropole as implied by the MIRAB model or
developing strategies to exploit their comparative advantage in tourism.
Some possible benefits for development secured by tourism adumbrated by M. Thea
Sinclair (1998:2) include (1) the provision of hard currency to alleviate a foreign exchange gap
and to finance imports of capital goods (2) increase employment (3) increasing the GNP and
personal incomes (4) increase in government tax revenues. Indirect benefits may also include
informal employment, intercultural exchange, positive externalities from infrastructure
developments and spillover effects such as skill formation and technical training.
Data from the World Tourism Organization (WTO) shows that from 1975-2000, global
tourism increased by 4.6 percent per annum (see Graph 2.1) and provided host countries with a
new set of challenges and opportunities to expand their market share.

51

Graph 2.1: Worldwide Growth in Tourism

Source: World Tourism Organization; International Monetary Fund

Tourism is an important industry and for many microstates an essential component of
economic development (Shareef and McAleer 2005; Croes 2006; Wilkinson 1989; Taylor 2006).
This has far reaching implications for all stakeholders involved in this vital sector, especially the
sending nations whose actions have extraordinary consequences over the economies and
livelihoods of receiving states. While travel is not a general necessity for survival, the intake of
tourists for many small economies is (Wang 2009; Narayan 2005; Causey 2007). The efforts in
developing a viable and thriving tourism industry among the microstates have not gone
unnoticed, and governments in recent years have embarked on an ambitious effort to develop
tourism within their countries. However, incorporating tourism as part of a development strategy
for small economies potentially created problems that could negate gains accrued from the
expanding trade in services. The burgeoning tourist industry argues Britton (1982) and Wu
(1982) that tourism foists new forms of dependency on former colonies by metropolitan powers
through control and ownership of factor endowments integral to exploiting their comparative
advantage in global tourism.

52

Tourism and Culture
Neither the insular mode of enclave development nor limiting the movement of peoples
effectively addresses the possible consequences of international tourism on culture and the
environment. Global institutions and norms regulating tourism have emphasized the specific
responsibility of sending states; multinational corporations and travelers play in maintain the
integrity of host cultures, the natural environment and social values. The United Nations
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in its 18th General Conference in
1975 adopted resolution 3.411which authorized the Director General to “undertake a study
concerning the effects of tourism on socio-cultural values” (UNESCO 1976: 75). The UNESCO
study chided theorists of tourism who exclusively focused on its developmental and economic
potential (Bryden 1973: 82) and argued instead that “tourism is something more than an
economic phenomenon with sociological and cultural effects; it has become a phenomenon of
civilization” (UNESCO 1975: 99). Cognizant of tourisms expansive role in host economies, the
World Tourism Organization (WTO) drew from existing norms and institutions ratified in 1999 a
Global Code of Ethics for tourism, with emphasis on the safety of travelers, protection of
indigenous cultures, economic opportunity for host communities and sustainable development
(World Tourism Organization Global Code of Ethics for Tourism:2001).
Tourism as a “phenomenon of civilization” therefore remains a fertile area of scholarship
beyond its institutional and developmental nexus (the focus of this project) by scholars in
sociology and anthropology who seek to understand the effect of tourism on societies, culture,
people, language, food, religion, etc. This section will outline the broad contours of the debate on
the impact of tourism on culture and discuss the findings of few specific case studies as it relates
to the experience of the Fiji Islands and the microstates of Oceania.
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The French, who often admit an acute sensitivity to American tastes and mores, have
occasionally complained about American cultural imperialism (Time Magazine 1995; Powell
1995). Culture, they argue cannot be reduced to its simplest verities because it is not only a
repository of a peoples history, but also their inheritance and identity whether its language,
creed, ritual or food. These essential components of culture however form the core demands of
tourism and make international travel the most expansive exercise in intercultural incursion.
While travel has allowed more people access to other peoples in other places, to explore and to
learn, it is not without its costs. Critics argue that cultural engagement seeks not to explore but to
exploit, for profit and gain, and sending States as capitalist economies seek to comodify and
overwhelm other cultures on its march to maintain economic dominance (Watson and
Kopachevsky 1994). This form of cultural dominance is quite unique, both in its subtlety and
pervasiveness, unlike in previous eras of forced conformity under kings and emperors guided by
the maxim cuius regio, eius religio (whose realm, his religion). International tourism within the
narrative of capitalism wraps its goods and services inside specific cultural contexts, whether
hawking sacred sites in South America or traditional art and music in the South Pacific, brought
to you by Hilton Hotels. International tourism driven by the market imperatives of capitalism
integrates itself to host communities and cultures in order to provide a “unique” product for
consumers eager for an “exotic” travel experience (Crick 1989).
Sociological and anthropological enquiry into tourism is conceptually organized around
the psycho-social motivations of tourists and their encounter with the “other” within a specific
cultural, social and economic milieu. Core issues that are of primary concern to scholars are
according to Cohen (1984: 374-376) are: (1) Tourism as a commercialized hospitality (2)
Tourism as democratized travel (3) Tourism as a modern leisure activity (4) Tourism as a
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modern variety of the traditional pilgrimage (5) Tourism as an expression of basic cultural
themes (6) Tourism as an acculturative process (7) Tourism as a type of ethnic relations (8)
Tourism as a form of neocolonialism. International tourism seen through these lenses emerges as
a problematic and incursive enterprise that objectifies people and their cultures through
comodification and consumerism (Dogan 1989). The tourist (often western) goes off in search of
the exotic and the novel in order to discover oneself and ends up projecting on the other his own
values and priorities, often subconsciously argue Laing and Crouch (2009) and Cater and Cloke
(2007) in their study of tourists rationales for international travel. International travel goes
beyond the prosaic need for rest and relaxation and into the realm of an “extraordinary travel
experience” (Laing and Crouch 2009: 127) through the production of myth, fantasy and
adventure for individuals in search of a unique exploration of the self (Curtin 2010).
International travel as an existential phenomenon belies the socio-cultural examination of
tourism and provides a necessary counterweight against the notion that tourism is merely an
economic and developmental enterprise.
There are few regions in the world that are as emblematic as the South Pacific in
constructing a desirable and evocative image of place and experience. Farrell (1979: 124) wrote,
“Each tourist arrives at a Pacific country or in an island group with his or her preconceived
construction of local life and landscape. This is a very imperfect model, but, nevertheless, it is
for the tourist his gestalt-external, artificial and contrived.” The mystique of the Pacific Islands
are eagerly packaged and promoted by the state and sector for tourists yearning to experience the
myth and mystery of travel to these far flung regions of the globe (Farrell 1979: 125, 128-129).
Farrell’s argument coincides with the arguments by Watson and Llewellyn (1994), Leiper
(1997), Nash (1996/7), Jafari (1986) and Diedrich and Garcia-Buades (2009) that international
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tourism has a deleterious effect on culture for the following reasons (1) the tourist constructs a
false and misleading image of the host culture (2) that mass tourism has an “invasive” character
which deforms host communities through new modes of habits and being. There is a legitimate
concern for microstates in Oceania that visitors, which often outnumber locals given the slight
demographics of these islands, will introduce changes inimical to traditional communities, such
as ways of dress, entertainment and social intercourse. Increases in crime, drug and alcohol
abuse, sexual promiscuity and prostitution are therefore cited as incidences of negative
externalities resulting from an influx of visitors via tourism. In one of the most comprehensive
case studies that examined the relationship between crime and tourism, Australian scholars
Walmsley, Bokovic and Pigram (1981) lamented the lack of research on the effect of tourism on
host communities in spite of the intuitive relationship between the two phenomena (Walmsley,
Bokovic and Pigram 1981: 5-6). Most studies have focused on the effect of crime on tourists
(Brunt and Shepherd 2004; Chesney-Lind and Lind 1986; Brunt, Mawby and Hambly 2000;
Garofalo 1979; Ryan 1993; Mawby 2000). Pizam (1982) failed to find a strong relationship
between crime and tourism development in his case study of all fifty states whereas Fujii and
Mak (1980) Hawaiian case study from the mid seventies revealed higher incidences of property
crimes in tourist areas when compared to other regions. Albuquerque and McElroy (1999)
revealed a similar pattern in the Caribbean where property crimes outnumbered other offenses in
tourist dominated areas. Current research on tourism and casino development by Park (2011)
failed to account for a strong relationship between the two either, and instead hypothesizes that
crime is too complex a phenomenon and cannot be attributed to just one targeted variable. An
obvious limitation of these studies is their focus on the safety and security of tourists abroad
rather than the negative or illicit effects of tourism on host communities. Case studies that have
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sought to empirically examine how tourism actually affects host cultures have been circumspect
in their results on the interaction between tourism, culture and community by King, Pizam and
Milman (1993) on Nadi in the Fiji Islands or the Samos Island in Greece by Haralambopoulos
and Pizam (1996). Casino development in Connecticut was examined by Carmichael (2000) and
the pilgrimage site in Pushkar, India by Joseph and Kavoori (2001) and Andereck, Valentine,
Knopf and Vogt’s (2005) statewide study of host community attitudes towards tourism
development in Arizona and its cultural impacts have all contributed to a better understanding of
the ways in which mass tourism affects host societies (Lindberg and Johnson 1997).
Residents attitudes towards tourism and its perceived effect on their community and
culture are circumscribed by three important factors argue Andereck, Valentine, Knopf and
Vogt’s (2005: 1057). These are (1) the derivation of economic benefits through jobs and taxes
for people and the region (2) socio-cultural production and income opportunities through craftmaking and ceremonies and (3) environmental accouterments such as wildlife parks and nature
developments. Host communities who directly benefit from tourism and related services have an
acquiescent attitude towards the sector as borne out by King, Pizam and Milman’s important
case study of Nadi in the Fiji Islands. Nadi town with its heavy concentration of tourism facilities
and proximity to the international airport was an ideal site to examine many of the assertions
regarding the negative impacts of tourism on the community. A series of extensive interviews
was conducted in collaboration with the University of the South Pacific in English and
vernacular languages to gauge the attitudes, feelings and perspectives of households, individuals
and people directly, indirectly or outside the tourism sector on the impact of tourism on their
community, culture, morals and way of life (King, Pizam and Milman 1993: 654-655). Results
showed that while there were some concerns about drugs and alcohol abuse, increased crime,
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sexual promiscuity and traffic congestion, many of the benefits accrued from tourism such as
employment opportunities, increased tax revenues, income from tourism related industry,
hospitality to strangers and increased confidence among locals in dealing with others
significantly outweighed any negative externalities (King, Pizam and Milman 1993:663).
Unsurprisingly, the tabulated data showed an almost 80% favorable attitude towards tourism
among the inhabitants of Nadi and pride in the fact that the large presence of tourists actually
enhanced the image of their town from being just another rural backwater (King, Pizam and
Milman 1993:656-657).
I am unaware of any current research available which builds on the work by King, Pizam
and Milman regarding changes in attitudes towards tourism in Fiji in the years since they
undertook their study. However, I spent considerable time in Nadi in summer 2010 collecting
data for this project and in numerous informal conversations with individuals directly and
indirectly involved in the tourism industry confirmed the earlier findings by King, Pizam and
Milman.
While it is indisputable that tourism affects culture in profound ways and a fertile area of
scholarship, this project disputes some core claims that are implicit in the literature. (1) One
could reasonably postulate that cultural erosion in societies affected by globalization is not the
fault of the West or the United States, but can directly be attributed to defects intrinsic to the host
culture itself. (2) It is possible that the particular cultural mores and values no longer have the
legitimacy to sustain itself, and when finally confronted with exogenous force, collapsed under
the weight of its own irrelevancy. Furthermore, cultures, like societies are organic and change
and grow, discarding outmoded habits while adopting new modes of being (Rothkopf 1997). (3)
It is reductionist to imagine that cultures would remain untouched through space and time and
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quite unfair to criticize outside forces for affecting the way people live and respond in other
places. Globalization provides a unique opportunity to engage with other cultures and bring to
them the benefits of modernity, whether it is ideas, trade or technology. (4) Finally, one could
argue that tourism provides necessary resources for host communities to develop heritage sites
and fund cultural programs which would otherwise remain in decline.
Generating tourist attractions through cultural intercourse and infrastructure is a complex
undertaking requiring a delicate balance between resource constraints and consumer demands.
What do tourists want when they travel abroad? Is it cost prohibitive to build museums’ and
substitute instead with guided tours of traditional villages and sacred sites? Will intensified
cultural incursions between sending states and host economies erode indigenous society and
irreparably harm flora and fauna? Is traditional culture permanently deformed as a consequence
of this cultural intercourse? These a legitimate issues raised by scholars concerned with the
impact of tourism on culture, but the inordinate bias on tourism as a merely monogystic
enterprise diminishes the reciprocal nature of international travel. As Gearing, Swart and Var
(1976: Table 2.6) argue, the criterion for attracting tourists is as varied as individual tastes and
preferences.
Table 2.6: Tourist Attraction Criterion
Group Heading

Criterion

Considerations

Natural Factors

Natural Beauty

General topography: flora
and fauna, proximity to lakes,
rivers, sea; Islands and Islets;
hot and mineral water
springs; caverns, waterfalls
Amount of sunshine;
temperature; winds,
precipitation, discomfort
index

Climate

Social Factors

Artistic and architectural features
Festivals

Local architecture; mosques,
monuments; art museums
Music and dance festivals;
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Distinctive local features

Fairs and exhibits
Attitudes towards tourists

Historical Factors

Ancient ruins
Religious significance

Historical prominence

Recreational and Shopping Facilities

Sports facilities
Educational facilities

Facilities conducive to health, rest
and tranquility
Nighttime recreation

Shopping facilities

Infrastructure and Food and Shelter

Infrastructure above “minimal
touristic quality”

Food and lodging facilities above
“minimal touristic quality”

sports events and
competitions
Folk dress; folk music and
dances (not organized); local
cuisine; folk handicrafts,
specialized products
Normally of a commercial
nature
Local congeniality and
treatment of tourists
Existence, condition and
accessibility of ancient ruins
Religious importance, in
terms of present religious
observances and practices
Extent to which a site may be
well known because of
important historical events
and/or legends
Hunting, fishing; swimming;
skiing; golf; horseback riding
Archaeological and
ethnographic museums; zoos;
botanical gardens, aquariums
Mineral-water spas; hot-water
spas; hiking trails, picnic
grounds
Gambling casinos,
discotheques; theatres;
cinemas
Souvenir and gift shops;
handicraft shops; auto service
facilities (beyond gasoline
dispensing stations):
groceries and necessities
Highways and roads; water;
electricity, and gas; safety
services; health services;
communication; public
transportation facilities
Hotels; restaurants; vacation
villages; bungalows; motels;
camping facilities

Source: Gearing, Swart & Var (1976: 93)

Tourism and the Environment
Unlike the latent cultural changes that occur in society in its encounter with tourism,
there is nothing subtle about the physical impact on the environment because of tourist industry.
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Accommodating larges influxes of people inevitably impose extraordinary demands on the
environment, from developing infrastructure to providing food, entertainment and all that entails
in making a host economy a desirable travel destination (Doggart and Doggart 1996). What are
the environmental limits to tourism and how can we account for negative externalities, while
maintaining that tourism is a legitimate strategy for development in Fiji and similar microstates
in Oceania?
The scope and diversity of internationalism tourism reveal crucial variations of how
tourism impacts the environment that ultimately determines the policy needs of host
communities. The environmental impact of tourism on London will differ from the challenges to
the environment by visitors to the plains of the Serengeti or the small islands of the South
Pacific. Erik Cohen (1978) provides an excellent four-factor type framework to isolate the
divergent ways in which tourism impacts the environment and situate tourism within the
differentiated challenges facing host economies. Cohen (1978: 220-225) argues that the
environmental impact can only be understood if (a) we know the intensity of tourist site-use and
development, “the number of tourists visiting a locality, the length of their stay, the things they
do and the facilities at their disposal determine the intensity and of the accompanying
development” (b) the resiliency of the eco-system, and its ability to sustain large groups of
people, i.e. is it a huge metropolis like London, the Australian Outback or small islands? (c) The
time-perspective of the tourist developer, are investments predicated with “short-run profits in
mind” or is there a regulatory framework that minimizes the negative externalities brought on by
tourist developments? (d) the transformational nature of tourist development, large scale tourism
ultimately changes the environmental landscape, especially “contrived attractions” like
amusement parks and shopping malls, international tourism as Cohen argues is not confined to
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merely nature spectacles and untouched environs. The debate between the industry demands and
environmental concerns have according to Cohen (1978: 215) coalesced around either protecting
the environment for tourism or protecting the environment from tourism.
That tourism imposes an enormous stress on the environment, often with permanent
consequences is not a debatable proposition, nor is the need for host economies to develop the
necessary infrastructure required to meet the supply conditions for attracting international
tourism, which inevitably impacts the environment. This debate has in recent years shifted
towards sustainable tourism in which national governments are called to play a greater role to
ensure that the integrity of the physical environment is maintained amidst the challenge of
national development strategies. Bramwell and Lane (2010:1) have recently argued that
“Effective management systems for sustainable tourism are, however, likely to require
intervention and regulation by the state.” Quoting a review on sectoral self regulation by
Williams and Montanari (1999:38), they concluded that such an effort was largely insufficient
and short-term. This coincides with Cohen’s argument that the profit-driven time perspective of
the developer is often in opposition to the longer-term sustainability of the environment and the
needs of future generations within host communities. The evolution of ecotourism is an attempt
to maintain the balance between development and the environment and creates opportunities for
stakeholders to develop innovative products beyond the contrived and often ugly tourist clusters
that often symbolize the industry. The success of this policy however is largely predicated on the
ability of governments to oversee tourism development that is sensitive to its environmental
concerns.
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Defining Sustainable Tourism
Sustainable tourism is a mode of travel and development that recognizes the aesthetic
element inherent in nature as well as the contextual and physical limitations within which the
activity takes place (Buckley 2004: 1-4; United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and
Conservation International (CI) 2003; Romeril 1985). In 1993, Valentine took up the challenge
of defining sustainable tourism as comprising of four essential components: (1) it was based on
relatively undisturbed natural areas (2) it was non-damaging, non-degrading, ecologically
sustainable (3) it directly contributed to the continued protection and management of the natural
areas used, and (4) it was subject to an adequate and appropriate management regime (Valentine
1993:108-109). The exclusion of human rights concerns and values prompted Honey (2008) to
argue for the necessity of sustainable tourism respecting and preserving local cultures and
supporting political rights and democratic aspirations, perhaps a well intentioned but an
impractical and contentious emendation. The Fijian government defined sustainable tourism in
its white paper as “a form of nature-based tourism which involves responsible travel to relatively
undeveloped areas to foster an appreciation of nature and local cultures, while conserving the
physical and social environment, respecting the aspirations and traditions of those who are
visited and improving the welfare of local communities” (ESCAP 2003:14).
To better meet the challenge of tourism development and environmental sustainability,
islands nations in the Pacific have begun to craft policies and build institutions to ensure that
their one comparative advantage which is their location and geography is preserved while
providing economic opportunities through the tourist sector. A sampling of microstates in
Oceania (see Table 2.7) outlines initiatives applicable to these islands in order to balance tourism
development whilst preserving their natural and physical endowments.
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Table 2.7: Ecotourism and Development in the Pacific
COUNTRY

POLICY and INSTITUTIONS

American Samoa

Local and federal laws prohibit construction on archaeological sites
The creation of the American Samoa National Park
The establishment of the Historic Preservation Office
The United States Coral Reef Initiative assists in the area of coastal
management

Fiji

Government white paper in 1995 on “Ecotourism and Village-based Tourism”
The establishment of the Fiji Ecotourism Association to promote ecotourism
projects
The first Tourism Resources Owners Conference in 2000 to build on
government white paper
The establishment of an Ecotourism Development Unit inside the Ministry of
Tourism
The Environmental Act of 2005 that regulates sustainable projects in the tourism
sector

Kiribati

The establishment of the National Tourism Marketing and Development Plan
The introduction by the government of a Wildlife Act that prohibits killing birds
indigenous to the Island
The creation of marine conservation areas

Solomon Islands

The formation of the Solomon Islands Ecotourism Association to promote and
encourage sustainable tourist development
The establishment of “Ecolodges” at UNESCO world heritage sites
Collaborative partnerships between Solomon Islands Development Trust and
The World Fund for Nature, Conservation International and the Nature
Conservancy to develop tourism in protected areas such as the Guadalcanal
Province
Source: Ecotourism Development in the Pacific Islands (2003) United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)

Conclusion
The debate over tourism is essentially between microstates and the tourist industry on
ways to develop policies and allocate resources that will maximize national development
priorities and minimize negative externalities, and not on whether one should encourage tourism
for developing island economies. The argument presented here suggests that the small islands in
Oceania are quite aware of the fundamental challenges facing their societies and the costs
involved in developing tourism. In contrast to the MIRAB thesis which asserts that microstates
lack any institutional and organizational capacity to organize their economies other than beg,
borrow or leave, these small economies are doing the best they can to exploit their comparative
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advantage through developing a tourism based economy while fully cognizant of the negative
externalities that will ineluctably emerge.
The development of tourism in the Fiji Islands as a typical microstate therefore
encompass many of the challenges that are unique to small island developing states in the global
economy even though the necessity for social and economic development are not exclusive to
these islands alone. The political economy of tourism in Fiji emerged between two substantial
issues that could not have been foreseen at Independence in 1970, first, the irrevocable decline of
sugar production, long a mainstay of the national economy and secondly, the ongoing political
instability brought on by four coup d’états since 1987. While tourism has gradually overtaken
sugar production in earnings, it has done so in often difficult and complex situation compelling
actors and institutions in Fiji to calibrate resources and policy in lieu of changed circumstances.
The next chapter delineates the institutional framework that is responsible for the
emergence of tourism in Fiji, from uncertain beginnings during the colonial era to its dominant
status today. Over the last two decades the Fijian government, forced by exigent circumstances,
went beyond the regime of incentives and inducements for private investments in the tourism
industry to becoming a direct investor with public funds in it. Chapter five chronicles the reasons
and consequences of State involvement in the sector and how tourism in Fiji could possibly have
transitioned into an industry “too big to fail.” Both State and industry in Fiji have had to respond
to the ongoing political instability in Fiji as well as the environmental challenges facing small
island economies. Chapter six examines the existential threat posed by politics and nature to
tourism and the policy responses by stakeholders to confront these crises.
Neither costs nor externalities can be obviated regardless of which model of tourism a
community chooses to develop (see Diagram 2.3). An enclave model of tourism may insulate the
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host community from social or cultural externalities but at the cost of minimizing benefits for
locals through high leakages, spillover trading opportunities and enclosed infrastructure
development. A more integrated functional model of tourism development has greater negative
externalities but increases the potential a better accrual of benefits for communities. Only when
benefits outweigh costs and externalities could one posit that developing tourism in microstates
has been a reasonably good proposition. Chapter six concludes with a summation on whether
comparative advantage is a better theoretical explanation of microstates survival in the global
economy as opposed to scholars who argue that migration, remittances and foreign aid (MIRAB)
is the best plausible reason that we have that explains the existence of small island economies.
Diagram 2.3: Developing Tourism

Enclave
Tourism

Costs: Infrastructure, Promotional,
Institutional, Political, Developing
Human Capital

Functional
Tourism

Externalities
Social/Cultural, Environmental

Benefits
Employment, Small business opportunities, Foreign Exchange
earnings, Infrastructural spillover, Training and development
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Chapter Three
The Development of Tourism in Fiji
Introduction
The bourgeoning tourism industry in Fiji today could hardly been envisioned decades ago
when the Fiji Islands was a colony of Great Britain. While assorted groups of explorers,
adventurers, sailors and merchants often traversed the vast and hostile Pacific Ocean, few if any
did so for purposes of pleasure or respite.30 The emergence of mass international tourism has
transformed the image of the Pacific Islands as places of escape from a harried world (Laing and
Crouch 2009) on languid beaches and comfortable accommodations with marquee names
familiar to most travelers. International tourism arrived in Fiji, albeit with uncertain origins and
this chapter explores the crucial role that the State played in tourisms emergence in Fiji and the
ensuing impact that the sector had in the development of the economy. This project has
consistently argued that the survival of microstates in the global economy is directly related in its
ability to exploit its comparative advantage within fairly circumscribed parameters. This section
draws on primary documents to delineate the first original examination of the institutional
development of tourism in the Fiji Islands and its investment strategies. The following chapter
will analyze the opportunity costs and consequences of Fiji’s investment policies in tourism
within the context of national developmental priorities and the limitations faced by microstates.
The Fijian case study reiterates a countervailing argument peculiar to microstates against the
dependency model (MIRAB) in the ability of small oceanic states to institutionally develop and
manage their economies. Microstates could either organize national economies through

30

The celebrated travels of Robert Louis Stevenson to the Samoan Islands in the 1880s or Gauguin in Tahiti around
the same time as Stevenson were more exceptions than the rule as individuals who went to the South Pacific Islands
for recreational purposes.
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expanding sources of foreign aid and remittances through labor migration and increased
dependency with former metropoles and regional powers or create the structures necessary for
exploiting their comparative advantage. The case study on the Fiji Islands argues that in spite of
modest beginnings and few resources, small islands could over time develop institutions and
strategies congruent with its endowments and national development.
Historical Origins of Tourism
The development of tourism in the Fiji Islands evolved through four distinct phases (see
Ministry of Tourism General Information on Tourism in Fiji) from its primitive beginnings until
1964 to the birth of mass tourism in the early seventies. From 1973 through 1986 the tourist
industry experienced steady growth only to be disrupted by the ongoing political instability
engulfing Fiji since the first coup d’état of 1987. In a later section I will examine the impact of
crisis and instability on the tourism sector in Fiji and the possible modes in which the industry
had successfully negotiated its way through them.
Most of the old colonial structures in the capital city of Suva in Fiji has now been
replaced by the ubiquitous cinderblock and assorted skyscrapers, but just from the old
Government building in Suva, facing the ocean stands a dilapidated structure that was a jewel in
a neighborhood once strictly reserved for the colonial elite. Named the Grand Pacific Hotel, it
was completed in 1914 to expand the stock of available accommodations for tourists and
travelers to Fiji and those crossing the pacific, via the Islands. The Hotel exuded a certain
charm31 which years later author James Michener (1992: 28-29) would recount his experience of
staying at the Grand Pacific:

31

I had once attended a function at the Grand Pacific Hotel almost 30 years ago and it was as impressive an
experience as Michener described, evocative of the colonial experience and heritage in the Fiji Islands.
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"And then came the target of my trip I would ever make to Fiji: one of the memorable hotels of the world,
not majestic and not particularly spacious, but a haven to all who crossed the Pacific on tourist ships or who
now came by airplane. It was the Grand Pacific Hotel, famed G.P.H of the travel books, a big squarish
building of several floors, with a huge central dining area filled with small tables, each meticulously fitted
with fine silver and china, bud vases, and a facing porch leading out to the lawn that went down to the sea.
It was grand, and it certainly was pacific, and the barefoot Indians who served the meals had a grace that
few hotels in the world could offer and none surpass."

A decade after the opening of the Grand Pacific Hotel, the White Settlement League convinced
the colonial government to establish a tourist bureau to promote tourism to the islands and in
February 1924 the Fiji Publicity Board was formed to “make recommendations with a view to
popularizing the colony to tourists, to provide facilities to tourists to visit places of interest, to
consider the best suitable methods of providing funds for the objects it desired to attain.”
(Ministry of Tourism General Information on Tourism). In 1931, the government according to
the Tourism Ministry report allocated 535 pounds to advertise Fiji abroad as well as producing
literature promoting the colony as a travel destination. Reserved in the National Library of
Australia are the earliest records of these efforts in developing a tourism market by the Fiji
Publicity Board in cooperation with the colonial government of the time with publications such
as “Fifty Trips in Fair Fiji” a souvenir program on the visit of the R.M.S. Strathaird to Suva in
1936 or “How to Spend a Day in Suva” and “How to Spend a Holiday in Fiji” (the former two
published sometime in the 1930’s). These early attempts in developing tourism underscored the
collaborative relationship between the State and the tourism sector and a harbinger of the
complex dependency between the two over the years. Following the Second World War the Fiji
Publicity Board recognized that infrastructure limitations presented substantial obstacles to
expanding the market for tourism in Fiji and lobbied the government to improve the country’s
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only airport32 and build roads between towns and hotels. In 1952 the Fiji Publicity Board
changed to its current name “Fiji Visitors Bureau” and became formally incorporated into the
tourism ministry portfolio of the government.
Institutional Development of Tourism in Fiji
In 1958 the United States Department of Commerce with the Pacific Area Travel
Association (PATA) which Fiji was a founding member sponsored the first comprehensive study
of tourism as a potential vehicle for economic development in the Pacific and the Far East. The
results published in 1961 and known as the “Checchi Report” (Clement 1961) explicated in its
recommendations that Fiji was ideally located geographically to develop a robust tourist market.
The Fiji Islands had easy access by sea and air as well as available markets for tourists due to its
proximity to New Zealand and Australia. Fiji furthermore had a vibrant indigenous culture,
relatively developed and stable and therefore could be the foundation on which to build the
tourism industry (Clement, 1961: 157). The report forecasted that by 1968 with increased state
investments in tourism, Fiji could increase its 1958 visitor arrivals of some 12,000 to 45,000
travelers bringing in receipts from $2.5M (USD) up to $10M (USD) within a decade. This
fourfold increase in visitors and receipts seemed overly optimistic at the time when the tourism
industry in the Islands was still in its formative stages. Fiji astonishingly exceeded both these
benchmarks, with 67,467 visitors to Fiji in 1968 and tourist expenditures totaling $20M U.S.
dollars. Data on visitor arrivals to Fiji from 1960 to 1970 (see Table 3.1) reveal a steady increase
in tourist traffic to the islands across the main sending countries. These results were a
consequence of a calibrated strategy by the State and industry stakeholders to develop an

32

The only international Airport in Nadi was until 1970 managed by the New Zealand government and subsequently
purchased by the Government after Independence.
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institutional structure that would enable Fiji to capture the gains from the emerging travel
industry.
Table 3.1: Visitor Arrivals to Fiji: 1960-1970
YEAR

Australia

NZ

USA

Canada

UK

1960

2241

3186

3414

333

1961

2129

2924

4330

1962

2715

3624

1963

4795

1964

Cont. Eur

Pacific Is.

Others

TOTAL

1477

1837

1784

14272

339

997

1885

2118

14722

5444

542

2009

2449

1472

18255

5705

6023

679

1849

3366

1829

24246

7496

7839

7848

880

2148

1723

2969

721

31624

1965

9092

11169

9535

1293

3018

1606

3236

1186

40135

1966

10056

12342

10204

1299

4017

1963

3772

908

44561

1967

14928

14830

12754

1653

3698

2012

4423

1723

56021

1968

21402

13239

16650

2277

3896

1783

5764

1447

66458

1969

26884

15779

22276

3679

5658

2893

6368

1626

85163

34409
19070
1970
Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics

31257

5574

6491

3439

7436

2366

110042

The first regulation endorsed by the legislative council to encourage tourism in the
Islands was in 1962 when a duty free ordinance was passed to exempt luxury goods such as
cameras, telescopes and tape recorders. With increased visitors from abroad, namely Australia
and New Zealand, this was seen as an attractive measure to promote Fiji as a shopping
destination. Complementing the duty free ordinance was the hugely influential Hotels Aid
Ordinance of 1964 designed specifically to assist the building of new hotels in Fiji. This
legislation remains the institutional benchmark for the expansion and emergence of a serious
tourism industry in Fiji and the site for all incentive mechanisms and structures that the State has
undertaken on behalf of the tourism industry.
The 1964 hotel ordinance was explicitly stipulated as an “Act to provide for the
encouragement of hotels in Fiji by the provision of financial inducements” (Hotels Aid Act:
1964). These included a “cash subsidy of 7 percent of total capital investment, excluding the cost
of land and an accelerated depreciation allowance over a period of 15 years”. Included also was a
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“55 percent investment allowance which in effect meant that 55 percent of the total capital cost
of the project [could] be written off against profits as free of tax” (Hotels Aid Act 1975). These
provisions remained virtually unchanged when the Act came up for debate in Parliament in 1975
and the only significant amendment added in that period was the institution of a new schedule for
the “turnover tax.”33 The consensus amongst both the government of the day and the opposition
was that the incentive structure produced the desired outcome of increasing both facilities and
visitors to Fiji as stated by the Minister of Finance E. J. Beddoes during hearings in Parliament
on the Hotel Aid Act:
“As you are aware Sir, the Ordinance was enacted in 1964 and has been instrumental in assisting the
growth of accommodation facilities and tourism generally. Consequently, we now have accommodation
facilities comparable to the best in the world, ranging from the modest and inexpensive to the luxurious.
There are now over 5,000 hotel rooms and in excess of 12, 000 beds available in the country” (Hansard
Parliamentary Papers 1888:1975).

The Hotel Aid Act was extended by parliament in 1976, 1981 and 1986 remained essentially
unchanged and established the parameters for investment, development and strategies between
the State and the tourism industry in the Fiji Islands.
The first major change to the Hotel Aid Act transpired in 1996 when it was amended to
include a “short life investment” provision for the construction of new hotels. The shift to an
enclave model requiring substantial capital investment compelled the government to expand the
incentive package. The “short life investment” package was specifically designed to encourage
the development of large scale hotels that would facilitate the rapid increase in visitor arrivals to
Fiji (see Table 2) as well as accommodate the future growth of the industry. The amendment
stipulated that:

33

“turnover” means all sums or amounts received or receivable by a hotel for accommodation and refreshment and
all other sums or amounts debited to and included in a hotel guest’s bill” this amounted to a 3% sales tax (See
appendix for the full schedule).
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(a) With a minimum capital investment of not less than F$40 million exclusive of the cost of land, but
including the cost of support infrastructure and overseas consulting fees; and
(b) With a minimum room capacity (in the new hotel) of not less than 200 bedrooms; and
(c) Where the building of the hotel commences at anytime on or after 13 February 1996 and is completed
on or before 30 June 2000.
“Short life investment package” means the various exemptions, concessions, and allowances provided for
by sections 21 to 24 inclusive in respect of a short life investment.

The new amendments to the Hotel Aid Act also replaced the previous year tax exemption with a
new schedule, a special depreciation allowance, carry forward of losses and license to hotels to
generate its own electricity. The following are the details pertaining to section 21-24;
Income Tax Exemption
21. (1) notwithstanding anything in the Income Tax Act the income of the company derived from the
operation of the hotel shall be exempt from the income tax for a period of 20 years.
(2) The Minister shall notify the Commissioner of Inland Revenue when final approval is given.
Special Depreciation Allowance
22. (1) The company shall be entitled in any one of the eight years immediately succeeding the tax free
period to in section 21 to claim a special depreciation allowance against the income arising from the
operation of the hotel of up to the total amount of the capital expenditure incurred in the short life
investment excluding the cost of land.
(2) The special depreciation allowance provided for by subsection (1) shall be an alternative and not in
addition to any claim for depreciation otherwise available under the Income Tax Act.
Carry Forward of Losses
23. Subject to the provisions of the Income Tax Act any loss incurred by the company in the operation of
the hotel may be set off against its income from other sources for the same year or may be carried forward
and set of against what would otherwise have been the total income of the company for the next six years in
succession.
Electricity Generation
24. (1) The company shall be entitled to be issued with a license under the Electricity Act to operate a
generating station for the purpose of providing electricity for the hotel.
(2) Any electricity generated by the company and surplus to the company’s requirement may be sold.
(3) For the avoidance of doubt the company shall comply with all requirements of the Electricity Act in
respect of its generating station.

Table 3.2: Visitor Arrivals to Fiji: 1991-1999
YEAR

AUST

NZ

USA

Canada

UK

Europe

Japan

Asia

Pac Is

Others

TOTAL

1991

86625

30631

31842

15242

16555

26265

27802

7420

16227

741

259350

1992

87395

37227

34802

12602

16795

29513

35960

7206

15627

949

278534

1993

77609

40778

42557

12447

20233

29786

38203

7731

16985

113

287462

1994

85532

53495

45351

12018

23915

31004

39782

8370

17931

1476

318874

1995

78503

59019

39736

10412

24409

30968

45300

11335

17461

1352

318495

1996

79534

63430

38707

11431

28907

31875

44598

21104

18545

1429

339560

1997

80351

68116

44376

13359

35019

32806

44783

18556

20381

1724

359441

1998

100756

70840

48390

12837

39341

29334

35833

9321

22850

1840

371342

1999

118272

72156

62131

13552

40316

28371

37930

9286

26090

1851

409955

Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics
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It can be argued that the new incentive structure promulgated by the State was in
response to the exponential growth of tourism and the corresponding pressures put on existing
facilities. While reliable data is lacking on whom benefited from the previous financial
inducements, it can be reasonably adduced from the 1996 amendment that most of the subsidies
had traditionally been utilized towards constructing small to medium tourist accommodations.
One could postulate that local entrepreneurs had an opportunity to capitalize on State
inducements to become operators of small boutique hotels before the State shifted its investment
policies in favor of larger and more capital intensive projects. In a later section (Chapter 5) data
will show that Fiji has a fairly even distribution of hotel ownership between locals and foreign
nationals in spite of some incentives biased towards enclave type of projects. The parliament in
1999 further amended the Act by splitting the Income Tax provision of the “short life
investment” incentive structure to 10 years for capital investments under F$40 million while
retaining the 20 year tax exemption for capital investments over F$40 million (Amendment Act
1999).
Organizational Structure of Tourism
The anemic organizational capabilities of microstates particularly in the management of
complex sectors such as international tourism pose a significant challenge that is difficult to
overcome. While there has been a gradual localization of professional positions, many island
economies still rely on external expertise and resources for administrative and technical
projects.34 The complications of developing a service industry that is closely intertwined with
global economic forces cannot be exaggerated, nor the many domestic challenges that inevitably

34

A recent example is the formation of an anti-corruption body in Fiji in 2007, the Fiji Independent Commission
Against Corruption (FICAC) and its inability to find personnel with specialized skills to fill key positions (such as
forensic accountants).
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emerge in these traditional and fairly isolated societies. International tourism is a complex
industry and poses significant obstacles for governments in small states to manage the numerous
competing interests and organizations that have a stake in the sector. Both the paucity of
organizational capabilities and the presence of sectoral complexity create insurmountable
barriers according to the MIRAB model for microstates to overcome and successfully execute
their development objectives. An example of organizational complexity required of international
tourism is illustrated in the following report on the effect of climate change on tourism in Fiji
(Table 3.3) and demonstrates the interlocking relationship between multiple stakeholders with
competing agendas in the tourism industry, and the ability of the government to negotiate and
address the issue at hand:
Table 3.3: Summary Report on Effect of Climate Change in the Tourism Sector in Fiji
ORGANIZATION

ROLE

RELEVANT PARTNERSHIP/RELATIONSHIP

Ministry of
Tourism

Advocates sustainable tourism,
supports small (eco)tourism,
operations, policy development and
recommendations: new Master Plan

Department of Environment, Ministry of Health,
Fiji Visitors Bureau, University of the South Pacific

Department of
Environment

Focal point for UNFCCC, National
Communications, Approve
Environmental Impact Assessments
(EIA), climate change policy,
Environmental Act

Ministry of Health, Disaster Management Office,
Ministry of Agriculture, Lands Department,
Meteorological Service, Ministry of Forestry and
Fisheries, SPREP

Meteorological
Service

Climate observation; issue warnings,
work with sectors on climate change
issues

Department of Environment, Disaster Management
Office, Fiji Visitors Bureau, FIHTA, agriculture
(e.g. food for tourists), hydrology (water), public
works (roads, etc), FEA etc.

Disaster
Management
Office

Responsible for disaster
management, work closely with
SOPAC, implement CHARM,
training activities

Department of Environment, SOPAC,
Meteorological Service, Local Town Councils

Department of
Town and Country
Planning

Approve developments (inc. set back
from shore); depend on EIAs
undertaken, require good supply of
information for their approval
process

Department of Environment, Department of Mineral
Resources

Ministry of Health

Administer building codes, work
with border control on diseases, food

Department of Environment, Local Town Councils
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hygiene, water quality monitoring
University of the
South Pacific

Research on climate change,
modeling/adaptation, cyclones,
erosion, marine issues and
sustainable tourism, involved in
tourism Master Plan

Ministry of Health, Disaster Management Office,
Department of Environment, WWF, SPREP

SOPAC

Risk/disaster management, mapping:
CHARM, cost benefit analysis

Department of Environment, Disaster Management
Office, Department of Lands

WWF South
Pacific

Awareness raising for climate
change: start marine based GEF
project

University of the South Pacific

Councils

Local issues; can recommend on new
developments; have health
inspectors, local infrastructure, e.g.
drainage

Ministry of Health, Disaster Management Office

Department of
Lands

Involved in new development (when
land is claimed), role for new policy
re overwater bungalows

Department of Mineral Resources, Department of
Town and Country Planning, SOPAC

SPREP

Regional climate change framework

Department of Environment

Ministry of
Agriculture

Erosion, sedimentation, climate
change will affect crop/yield/land use

Meteorological Service, Department of
Environment

Ministry of
Fisheries and
Forestry

Fisheries deal with marine
biodiversity, coral reefs

Department of Environment, Meteorological
Service, WWF South Pacific

SPTO

Regional marketing organization,
develop new strategies

Fiji Visitor Bureau, SPREP

Fiji Visitor Bureau

National marketing agency, work
closely with businesses on disaster
management

Meteorological Service, FIHTA, tourism operators

Fiji Hotel and
Tourism
Association
(FIHTA)

Represent hotel and diving industry;
lobby at government level; short term
concerns including some aspect of
sustainability

Fiji Visitors Bureau, Meteorological Service, hotel
and dive operators

Fiji Ecotourism
Association

Represent 60 small businesses

Small tourism operators (mainly outer Islands,
Yasawas)

Native Land Trust
Board (NLTB)

Manage land on behalf of native
landowners, negotiate with
developers

Native landowners

Issue investment certificate for new
Fiji Trade
developments
Investment Board
(FTIB)
Source: Ministry of Tourism

While institutions create the necessary structure for microstates to fully exploit their
comparative advantage in tourism, it is the evolution of mediating organizations that plays a
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pivotal role on behalf of both public and private interests in Fiji to promote, nurture and develop
the industry. Tourism in Fiji is a complex industry with multiple stakeholders, special interests
with substantial foreign and local investments in a country that has experienced significant
political crisis since independence. This interlocking relationship between differentiated actors is
not unique to Fiji as governments across the South Pacific have often collaborated with various
representatives on issues pertaining to social and economic development. For example, land
management in microstates according to Peter Lamour (Ghai 1990:27) is “managed by three
methods: by bureaucracies, by markets and by communities.” In a similar study on foreign
investors, Anthony Hughes examined the role that multiple stakeholders played in microstates in
Oceania to create an environment amenable for investment (Ghai 1990:210).
It is a central thesis of this project that microstates have the ability to successfully
construct institutions and organizations to capture the gains from tourism in order to survive in
the global economy despite low administrative capacities. An examination of the principal actors
that facilitate the tourist economy in Fiji will yield important insights into how small states
exploit their comparative advantage and execute the policy initiatives and promote economic
development and the intricate relationship between varied organizations which have a stake in
tourism in Fiji.
The Role of the Fiji Islands Trade and Investment Board (FTIB)
The principle agency responsible for overseeing the investment incentives in Fiji for all
sectors of the economy is the Fiji Islands Trade and Investment Board (FTIB). The agency was
formally created in 1980 through the “Economic Development Board Act (EDB) No. 11 and
amended in 1999 to become FTIB “to promote, stimulate and facilitate economic development in
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Fiji.”35 The establishment of the FTIB signaled a systematic approach by the state to attract
foreign investments through incentives across all the major sectors of the Fijian economy. The
1999 Foreign Investment Act (Amended 2004) and the current Foreign Investment Regulation
(2009) provide the parameters for FDI in Fiji such as the following guarantees, competitive
taxation, investment allowances, freedom to repatriate funds, investment financing and work
permits:
Table 3.4: Policies and Incentives (FTIB)
Policies

Incentives

Guarantees

Protection regarding the compulsory acquisition of property.
The right to repatriate or remit funds.

Competitive Taxation for Investors

Corporate and income tax of 28%;
Tax holidays for a period of 13 years for NEW investments in the tax free
regions;
Exemptions of custom duty on equipments;
Export Income Deduction of 50%;

Investment Allowances

Industry specific incentives (tourism, ICT, mining, audio visual, ship
building, fishing, agriculture, bio fuel production, and the bus industry);
Dividend exemption scheme – corporate dividends are taxed only once,
avoiding the duplication involved with taxing both corporate profits and
shareholder incomes.
Double taxation agreements – Fiji has concluded double taxation
agreements with major trading partners, including Australia, Japan,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of Korea and the
United Kingdom. Double tax agreements with Australia, Japan, New
Zealand and the United Kingdom contain specific guarantees that tax
incentives and concessions granted by the Fiji Islands will not be by the
other party’s taxation.
All investors are required to lodge an application for a tax identification
number to the Chief Executive Officer, Fiji Island Revenue and Customs
Authority. This provides the basis for investors to pay taxes on their
business earnings, pay as you earn (PAYE) tax on behalf of their employees
and value added tax (VAT) on the products and services it sells in the
country.

Freedom to Repatriate Funds

Under the current exchange control regulations, local investors are free to
remit funds abroad to meet the costs of obligations incurred overseas.
In addition, foreign investors are able to remit profits and capital earned
from its operations in Fiji. At present, there are no limits to the amount that
can be repatriated as profits and earnings, subject to application to the
Reserve Bank of Fiji.

35

See website at http://www.ftib.org.fj/pages.cfm/ftiborgfj/ (accessed May 10, 2011).
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The Reserve Bank officials can readily provide investors with complete
information on the requirements relating to remittances offshore.
Financing Investment

Government encourages a competitive domestic financial market. Local
investors are freely able to seek finance for their investments from domestic
financial institutions, ranging from fully commercial banking institutions to
concessionary development financiers.
Foreign investors (companies) are allowed to borrow $3 for every $1
invested in Fiji and up to a total of F$10m from local lending institutions
without the approval of the Reserve Bank of Fiji. Foreign investors wishing
to borrow more than this delegated limit must apply to the Reserve Bank of
Fiji through their designated lending institution.
Individual foreign investors may also borrow locally up to F$0.5m without
the approval of the Reserve Bank of Fiji.

Entitlement to Work Permits

The Department of Immigration administers the Immigration Act, and its
officers will provide investors with any information they require on its
legislative provisions. All applications for work permits should be made to
the Department of Immigration, in accordance with the forms and
procedures specified therein. In addition, the Department of Immigration
has within it a special unit that specifically handles the processing of all
investment related work permits.
All investors, local and foreign, may apply to the Department of
Immigration for work permits to employ expatriate skilled technical
personnel. In accordance with the provisions of the Immigration Act, work
permits for up to a maximum of three years may be granted at any one time
to expatriates, whose skills are unavailable in the domestic labor market.
Investors are expected to develop and implement plans to train locals to
understudy, these expatriate employees.
Government therefore welcomes equally local and foreign private investors.
Government is also strongly committed to stimulating and facilitating all
private investment, whether from local or foreign sources.

Source: Fiji Islands Trade and Investment Board (FTIB)

The incentive policies articulated by the state through the FTIB projected the vision of
Fiji as an ideal location for investment opportunities and special packages for the tourism sector
(Hotels Aid Act, Short Life Investment) and encouraged foreign incursion into the tourist
market. The State argued that the positive spillovers accrued in the form of employment,
increased market share, improved infrastructure and destination branding36 outweighed the fiscal

36

See government media release at
http://www.fiji.gov.fj/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3624:government-to-continue-to-boosttourism&catid=71:press-releases&Itemid=155 and National Tourism Summit report at
http://www.internetpacific.com/tes/docs/speeches/tony_01.pdf. (accessed October 9, 2011).
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and opportunity costs associated with the generous incentive packages, especially for the tourism
sector.37
Five Year Development Plans
Legislatively, the government incorporated tourism into its annual development plan in
recognition of its increasing role in Fiji’s economic strategy. In Fiji’s Seventh Development Plan
(1976-1980), the government justified its direct involvement by stating that the “…contribution
of tourism to the economy is substantial, some 13% in 1975…” and projected that growth in
tourism will most likely outpace the rest of the economy as a whole and “…it is expected that in
1980, it will represent a bigger share of national income” (Fiji Seventh Development Plan
1975:170). The development plan in this period focused on three core areas related to tourism;
encouraging the use of local products, increasing local equity and ownership and developing
scenic infrastructure.
The government attempted to minimize some of the foreign exchange leakages due to
high rates of food imports by boosting local producers and commodities. The agriculture and
fisheries department helped local farmers and cooperatives to market their products to major
hotels and resorts, as well as educate domestic producers to the needs of the industry.38 While the
tax incentive packages (The Hotel Aid Act) encouraged the construction of new tourist sites, the
government began to invest in scenic infrastructure such as parks, beaches and other natural
attractions and continued underwriting the promotion of tourism through the Fiji Visitors

37

The FTIB has a special section dedicated just to Tourism, see http://www.ftib.org.fj/pages.cfm/forinvestors/sector-industry-profiles/tourism-sector.html(accessed May 10, 2011)
38
On a personal note, I clearly recall in the mid seventies at the time of this development plan helping my Uncle on
the farm to harvest local fruits and vegetables for the large tourist hotels in town. He had divided part of his land
from sugar cane to planting produce for the hotels as part of a cooperative arrangement. Unfortunately, I have not
been able to trace hard data that would track the scope of this policy and the precise incentive package offered to
local producers.
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Bureau. Table 3.5 shows the projected size of Governments capital expenditure for the industry
during the Seventh Plan period (Fiji Seventh Development Plan 1975:173).
Table 3.5: Capital Expenditure Program: Tourism (Thousands)
1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

TOTAL

Resort infrastructure development

10.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

210.0

Development of beaches, scenic resorts and
other natural attractions

20.0

20.0

20.0

20.0

20.0

20.0

TOTAL

30.0

70.0

70.0

70.0

70.0

310.0

Source: Fiji Seventh Development Plan

The high capital requirements posed a barrier to entry for local entrepreneurs to enter the tourism
sector and could potentially create a skewed ownership of the industry. The government as part
of its development plan floated the possibility of establishing a unit trust that would invest in the
tourism sector with shares that could be sold to the public at a later date, however, nothing
definitive was promulgated.
By 1979, tourism was Fiji’s second largest industry and the Eighth Development Plan
(1981-1985) looked to diversify the industry beyond its concentrated centers in the western part
of the main island. According to the Central Planning Office, the tourism sector had contributed
almost $16 million (1980 FD) to the regional GDP, not including the multiplier effect and other
tourist related benefits such as transportation, personal services and construction (Fiji Eighth
Development Plan 1980: 67). The focus was on expanding tourism to the outer islands and in
areas within the mainland that could benefit from the industry. However, not all islands were
determined to be adequate sites for tourism according to criteria established by the government,
only “Tourist Resort Islands” and “Day Visit Islands” were designated as suitable locations for
tourist development, whereas “Local Subsistence Islands” (indigenously populated islands
engaging in agricultural and fishing activities) and “Island Reserves” (possessing specific and
unique features of importance for the country as a whole which could be irreversibly damaged
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with large scale human activity) were off-limits for tourism (Fiji Eighth Development Plan 1980:
69). Similarly, tourism development in the mainland had to be sensitive to the interest of native
culture, environment and government objectives. Tourist development was primarily based on
the concept of “Visitor Accommodation Regions” first proposed in the 1973 UN Tourism
Development Program for Fiji, where government provided the infrastructure for specific
locations amenable for tourism (Fiji Eighth Development Plan 1980: 70). The time was ripe for
government to consider tourism development beyond these well established areas, albeit with the
following restrictions, native villages, scenic areas and country parks and national reserves were
off-limits for tourist developments. The following table (3.6) illustrated the government’s criteria
for possible tourist development:
Table 3.6: Types of Tourism Destinations
International Tourism Type

Alternative Low Key Tourism

Islands

Tourist Resorts
Subsistence Islands
Day Visit Islands
Island Reserves

H
C
C
C

C
H
H
C

Mainland

Resort Areas
Native Villages
Scenic Areas/Country Parks
Reserves

H
C
C
C

C
H
C

Source: Fiji Eighth Development Plan
Notes: C indicates a potential conflict
H indicates the possible harmony of development

Tourism in Fiji during the Ninth Development Period (1986-1990) played an increasing
role in generating employment opportunities either directly or indirectly. Government
projections estimated that an increase of about 12-13 additional visitors would create one
additional job in the tourism sector by 1990, an increase of almost 13,000 new employees (see
Table 3.7).
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Table 3.7: Potential for Labor Absorption in Tourism during Development Plan 9
1985

1990

Additional Employment

3,832
1,104
1,533
1,195

6,616
1,905
2,646
2,064

2,784
801
1,113
869

Direct Employment
Indirect and Induced Employment

7,664
10,159

13,231
17,538

5,567
7,379

TOTAL

17,823

30,769

12,946

Hotels and Restaurants
Wholesale and Retail Trade
Transport
Other Sectors

Source: Fiji Ninth Development Plan
Note: Indirect and induced employment shows employment generated in all the other sectors of the economy through the multiplier
effect for tourism expenditure.

Driven by the exigencies of creating jobs, government in these years boosted its
investment in the tourism sector through new sources of funding. The Fiji Development Bank,
(FDB) which traditionally served agricultural and small business needs of locals, could now
become a source of funding for tourism development and “where necessary, Government
guarantee will be given for the FDB to raise the additional resources” (Fiji Ninth Development
Plan 1985: 89). Also with unforeseen consequences, the government permitted funds from the
national retirement scheme, the Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF) to be channeled through the
FDB to support tourist development projects. The government believed that the projected
increase in visitor arrivals required the State to take a more proactive role in the construction of
3000 additional rooms during this period and therefore investment in tourism was congruent with
its policy of economic development via the tourism sector.
The public face of Fiji tourism was the Fiji Visitors Bureau (FVB), from its earlier
incarnation as the Fiji Publicity Board. The FVB is a statutory body operating under the Fiji
Tourist Commission and Visitor Bureau Act of 1978, and administratively situated in the Fiji
Ministry of Tourism. Among its key responsibilities is to promote Fiji as a tourist destination
through advertising and establishing overseas linkages with firms and agencies involved in travel
and tourism. While the private tourism sector in Fiji is involved in promoting its own individual
83

brands and product, the Fiji Visitors Bureau promotes “Fiji” as a whole and is fully funded by
the State to carry out its stated objectives, I was, however, unable to secure the total amount of
funding that the Bureau had received from the State in the period pertinent to this project (19752000) when I visited the FVB headquarters in Fiji last summer (2010). I have therefore gleaned
from the Government of Fiji’s annual budget summaries (the only available years were from
1981-1993) of amounts given to the Fiji Visitors Bureau and supporting projects in the form of
grants for the tourism sector. This provides an insight in the direct financial investment that the
government undertook in the tourism industry in Fiji (see Table 3.8). These financial
contributions by government to the industry belied the importance that the State placed in the
sector and its role in the national economy.
Table 3.8: Government Grants to the Fiji Visitors Bureau and Related Agencies 1981-1993
Year

FVB Grant

Parks/Beaches

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

725,000
760,000
800,000
800,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,425,000
1,300,000
1,300,000
1,500,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,000,000

3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
10,000
30,000

Total

15,910,000

57,500

Media/Film/Surveys/
Tourism Council

Joint Promotion/Air
Pacific/Qantas

Foreign Aid for
Tourism Dev.

180,000
20,000
95,000
66,000
66,000
100,000
204,000
232,700
250,000

200,000
250,000
250,000
1,000,000
1,700,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
2,277,500
2,500,000

1,213,700

12,677,500

Total Government Direct Financial Contribution in the Tourism Sector 1981-1993
Source: Fiji Islands Annual Budget Summary 1981-1993
Note: All amounts in Fijian Dollars.

133,000
460,000
525,000
1,118,000
30,976,700
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Brief Analysis of the Development of Tourism in Fiji
Three salient issues emerge when examining the pathways that tourism took in Fiji as it
developed in to a mature industry in these years.
(1) First, the record indicates that tourism in Fiji was far from an ad hoc experience and that
both industry and government calibrated the limits and possibilities of their involvement.
However, a closer analysis of data will determine if the projections and assumptions
made by both parties stand up and justify the enormous investments in the tourism
industry. Furthermore, how a change in rules for capital availability led the
superannuation scheme (FNPF) to invest in major tourism projects and subsequently
incur heavy losses decades later. This fundamental institutional shift in the financing of
tourism projects has had profound pecuniary implications, most notably the failed Momi
Bay project in 2008.
(2) The optimistic projections by the government and industry failed to account for the
political crisis in 1987 that devastated the tourism sector and compelled stakeholders to
reexamine their strategies.
(3) Why tourism ultimately survived and became a better conduit for economic development
in Fiji in comparison to the other main sector (Agriculture) despite the significant
obstacles that it had to overcome.
The next chapter will examine the role that the political crisis of 1987 played and the effect it had
on the industry. It is my contention that having survived the most serious challenge the country
had experienced since independence in 1970, the tourism sector demonstrated a resiliency
befitting society that had matured institutionally and thus overtime were able to adequately
address the many post-coup challenges it faced. The Fiji Islands despite its small-state status
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rebounded from its political crisis and reestablished its presence in the international travel
market. This is not to negate the serious challenges that political instability imposed on the
industry or the subsequent collateral damage done to Fiji’s image as a safe place to visit. The
policy lessons drawn from this event is on how tourism in Fiji survived, and why political crisis
impacts the sector more than it does other traditional industries in Fiji.
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Chapter Four
Analyzing Investment Strategies in the Fiji Islands
Introduction
Unlike Sugar production in the Fiji Islands, which was a direct result of colonialism,
tourism remained in the early decades an uncertain and tentative industry and essentially a
geographical stopover rather than a destination for travelers. The recognition by the State over
time of the economic potential of tourism ineluctably led to the evolution of institutions,
investments and the organization of formal structures to make tourism the dominant sector by the
beginning of the third millennium. The Fijian government by the 1990’s turned its focus on
direct investments in the tourism sector with far-reaching and problematic consequences. I will
explore two major investment failures by the government in its tourism ventures, but given the
choices Fiji was facing it was not an entirely unreasonable course of action.
I argue that the long decline of Sugar production in Fiji increasingly focused the States
attention on tourism and that the rise of the tourism industry can only be understood within the
changing agricultural fortunes of Fiji, dynamics that are similar to other microstates in Oceania.
The final section investigates the impact of political instability on tourism in Fiji and the
foreign policy responses from sending states. The variations in visitor arrivals as a consequence
of the military coups in 1987, 2000 and 2006 in Fiji suggest the complexity of the different crises
and the usefulness of the external policy responses by sending states, particularly Australia and
New Zealand.
State Investments in Tourism
Microstates in Oceania often lack substantial private capital to develop the necessary
infrastructure needed for economic development and investment opportunities. The imperatives
of meeting the needs of an expanding tourism market compelled the Fijian government to create
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innovative funding mechanisms that would provide a ready source of capital for large scale
tourist projects. In Fiji’s Ninth Development Plan beginning in 1986, the government channeled
funds through the Fiji Development Bank (FDB) out of the Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF)
for selected resort construction.39 This institutional shift in the financing of tourism development
would not be without serious consequences two decades later, and a substantial challenge to the
efficacy of using public funds for private enterprise. On the western side of the main Island (Viti
Levu), a comprehensive resort facility was envisioned to include private villas, professional golf
course and all the amenities ostensibly demanded by tourists, known as the “Natadola Tourism
Development.” The Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF) wholly invested in the project (FNPF
Annual Report 2007: 13) but for reasons that remain unclear the development forced the FNPF
in 2009 to write off F302 million dollars from its books and prompted the FNPF board to hire
Deloitte to open an investigation of these losses.40
The centerpiece of this troubled project was a F47 million dollar golf course designed by
the Fijian golfer Vijay Singh, a one time number one ranked player in the world.41 The project,
which took ten years to design, began in 2004 and included marquee accommodations such as
the five star Intercontinental Resorts and other high-end ancillary features such as spas,
international cuisine and boutiques. Overseeing the construction of the project was Asia Pacific
Resorts International (APRIL) with French national Louis Gerard Saliot as project manager. In
May of 2007, the government of Fiji fired APRIL and its project manager which led Singh to

39

I am unfamiliar of FNPF investments in tourism project prior to the Ninth Development Plan (1985-1990) and nor
have I been able to uncover from Parliamentary records of any serious objection to this policy.

All amounts are in Fijian Dollars as of May 16, 2011 at 1.00FJD = 0.56 USD.
40
See official FNPF media release at
http://www.myfnpf.com.fj/resources/uploads/embeds/file/FNPF%20appoints%20Deloitte.pdf. (accessed May 17,
2011).
41
See the report at
http://www.fijiworldnews.com/news/publish/News_1/Anthony_Accuses_Natadola_Chief_of_Stirring_Trouble_says
_Vijay_Singh_Endorsement_No_Loss_printer.shtml. (accessed May 17, 2011).
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terminate his part in the project. The government cited cost overruns, delays, design flaws,
financial irregularities and newly discovered criminal complaint against Louise Saliot to justify
bringing in another firm to oversee the project.42 The Fiji government is nonetheless committed
to finishing the project, albeit on a slower and smaller scale as indicated by Felix Anthony, the
chairman of Natadola Bay Resort Limited at a tourism forum in Fiji in 2008.43 The government
continues to make the case for tourism as a viable mechanism of economic development,
regardless of the setbacks it faced in the “Natadola Project,” one of the largest tourist
developments in the Pacific.44
A second major investment by FNPF in tourism development in Fiji was in the “Momi
Bay Integrated Resort Development” with a price tag of F225 million dollars (Fiji Times June 9
2009).45 Major investors included the Fiji Development Bank (FDB) with F18 million dollars
stake, the FNPF with F112 million dollars and New Zealand based Bridgecorp at F100 million
dollars (Fiji Times Online June 22 2010).46 Bridgecorp collapsed in 2007 as a result of massive
financial irregularities leading to criminal charges against its executives by the New Zealand
government (New Zealand Herald Online June 5 2009).47 The collapse of Bridgecorp led to the
failure of the “Momi” project leaving both the FDB and the FNPF with massive exposure of their
investments. The Fiji government in 2010 promulgated the “Momi Bay Development Decree”

42

“Waiting with Bated Breath” in Island Business at:
http://www.islandsbusiness.com/fiji_business/index_dynamic/containerNameToReplace=MiddleMiddle/focusModu
leID=18133/overideSkinName=issueArticle-full.tpl. (accessed May 17, 2011).See also
http://www.radiofiji.com.fj/fiji2/fullstory.php?id=6031. (accessed May 17, 2011).
43
See “Talking Points” at http://www.fijime.com/tourism-resources/tourismforum/Mr%20Felix%20Anthony%20%20Chairman%20Natadola%20Resort%20Limited.pdf. (accessed May 17,
2011).
44
See Felix Anthony at http://www.fijilive.com/news/2009/05/11/16046.Fijilive. (accessed May 17, 2011).
45
See Fiji Times article at http://www.fijitimes.com/print.aspx?id=123145. (accessed May 17, 2011).
46
See Fiji Times article at http://www.fijitimes.com/print.aspx?id=150577. (accessed May 17, 2011).
47
See New Zealand Herald article at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/news/print.cfm?objectid=10576539. (accessed May
17, 2011)
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after it failed to secure a buyer for the project.48 The decree allowed the Fiji National Provident
Fund (FNPF) to assume sole ownership of the project and begin strategizing on ways to recoup
its losses (Island Business Online June 21 2010)49. The Pacific Islands Report (April 7 2011)
indicated that the FNPF as of April 2011 was finalizing details on resuming development of the
project through new financing partners from Papua New Guinea with a possible set of new
international operators such as IHG, Marriot, Carlson, Wyndham, Accor and Anantara to manage
the tourist complex after completion.50 The decree however came at the expense of Bridgecorps
overseas investors who lost up to F106 million dollars as a result of the Fiji government’s action
(Otago Daily Times Online June 23 2010).51
Preliminary Analysis
The catastrophic failure of these investments incurred by the FNPF and to a lesser extent,
the FDB casts serious doubts on the governments’ policy to use public funds for what are
ostensibly private entities. While it is acknowledged that the availability of significant capital for
large projects is beyond the reach of private actors in small island states, it does not
automatically mean that the State ought to be the default lender. The argument however has been
that the tourism industry in Fiji was too important to not to invest for two important reasons, (1)
the mainstay of the national economy, sugarcane production was in a precipitous decline, and (2)
that tourism would continue to be a growth industry with consequent supply demands.

48

At a highly publicized auction in 2009, the Momi Project failed to get a buyer even at the rock bottom price of
F41 million dollars. See the National Business Review at http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/momi-bay-auction-passed-41million-negotiations-ongoing-109039. (accessed May 17, 2011)
49
See article in Island Business at http://www.islandbusiness.com. (accessed May 17, 2011). The FNPF justified its
takeover as “mortgagee in possession” following the decision by the Board to protect its assets. See official media
release at http://www.myfnpf.com.fj/pages.cfm/about-fnpf/media-centre/news/2009/ref1309-fnpf-moves-on-momibay-project.html. (accessed May 17, 2011)
50
See the report at http://pdip.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2011/April/04-08-07.htm. (accessed May 17, 2011).
51
See article at http://www.odt.co.nz/news/business/112199/bridgecorp-receivers-stymied-fiji-move. (accessed May
17, 2011).
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However my focus is not on how badly the government failed in its investments, as
important as they are for obvious reasons, the investigations as of now are still ongoing. With the
exception of key personnel involved in the debacle, nobody really knows what actually happened
(I accept the publicly verified account that the collapse of Bridgecorp led to the failure of the
Momi Bay project, whereas I am unable to ascertain on why the Natadola project incurred such
massive losses. I await the Deloitte and Touche report as well as other FNPF enquiries to
become available to piece together on how things went as badly as it did. The lack of internal
data and information simply makes it impossible to develop a reasoned analysis on an
extraordinary series of financial failures for a small economy. I have no doubt that this episode
will yield many studies for future research and contribute to the bourgeoning literature on the
subject.
Secondly, my argument thus far has been to suggest in the affirmative that national policy
encouraging the development of tourism in microstates is a reasonable proposition given the
intrinsic limitations faced by small island economies and the obvious geographical advantages
they have. The financial failures do not negate the importance of maintaining the developmental
strategy that Fiji has pursued thus far in spite of recent investment setbacks, but rather the need
to come up with better funding mechanisms (rather than the public pension fund) for
development projects.
The next section will examine the role of the sugar industry in Fiji and respond to why
the State felt an urgent need to ramp up its investments in the tourism sector. The political crisis
of 1987 and of 2000 will severely challenge the second assumption regarding the inevitable
upward trajectory of tourism in Fiji as a result of political instability and the regional response to
the crisis.
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The Fiji Sugar Industry
In spite of the economic and social importance of cane farming in Fiji for over a century,
sugar production has been in steadily decline in the last decade. The government of Fiji has
highlighted the issue of technical deficiency of the four sugar mills, which either have to be
replaced or modernized in order to boost production and efficiency as well as difficulties
associated with the complicated land tenure system administered under the Agricultural Landlord
and Tenant Act (ALTA) in Fiji (Naidu and Reddy 2002). Economists and policy analysts have
essentially focused on the system of price supports which has contributed to the lack of market
discipline in the production of sugar in the Fiji Islands. From a high of 517 thousand tons in
1994, sugar production fell to around 300 thousand in 2001 and to a large extant the mills are to
be blamed. The average cost of production among the four mills fell between $340 (Penang) to
$160 (Rarawai), whilst the average cost of production in most mills in India was at $70 a ton.
(All monies here are in Fijian dollars). Frequent breakdowns, closures and lack of adequate parts
for aging machinery resulted in delayed crushing, safety concerns, wastage, and delivery
backlogs. The Fijian government hired a team of technical experts from India at a cost of F86
million dollars to upgrade and modernize the four mills with hopes of lowering the cost of
production.
Price support for sugar production in Fiji came under the sugar protocol agreement with
the European Union. Under Article 1 of the sugar protocol agreement, the EU guaranteed
according to fixed quotas imports of sugar from the ACP countries at a price that was normally
set at 2-3 times the market price. For Fiji, this amounted to (2001 figures) some 195.6 thousand
metric tons, roughly three quarters of the country’s total sugar exports, or in dollar terms the
world market value for Fiji’s sugar exports in 2001 was at 62.9 million euro, but with EU
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preferential pricing, Fiji received 120.7 million Euros for its sugar. The EU subsidy to Fiji came
at 57.8 million Euros or 2.9 percent of its GDP. Graph 4.1 illustrates the pricing mechanism
under the sugar protocol between the world market price and the EU guaranteed price:
Graph 4.1: Fiji Sugar Protocol

Source: Levantis, Jotzo and Tulpule p.895

Furthermore, sugar produced beyond the quota requirement set by the EU since 1995
received another set of preferential agreements for ACP countries under the Special Preferential
Sugar (SPS) agreement where price was set at 5 percent below the Sugar Protocol pricing
system. For many ACP members only after the SPS allocations were met did they sell their sugar
in the open market (See Table 4.1 on quota percentages and income transfers for the ACP
countries and the economic significance of the Sugar Protocol Agreement, especially for Fiji).
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Table 4.1: Quota Percentages and Income Transfers for ACP Countries
Sugar Production and Income Transfers from Preferential Access to EU Markets, ACP Countries
2001

EU Import Quota

Income Transfer from the EU from
Sugar Trade Preferences

(Sugar Protocol Quotas plus
SPS basic allocations)

Mauritius
Fiji
Guyana
Swaziland
Jamaica
Barbados
Zimbabwe
Trinidad and Tobago
Belize
Malawi
Cote d’Ivoire
St. Kitts and Nevis
Madagascar
Congo
Tanzania
Zambia
Total

Tons (white
sugar
equivalent)a

Quota as a
Share of Total
Sugar Exports
(Per cent)b

Euro
Million

Euro
Per
Capita

Per Cent
of GDPc

580.9
195.6
188.6
169.4
140.4
59.5
60.8
51.8
47.7
34.6
22.1
18.4
12.7
12.1
12.1
12.1
1,619

>100
74
78
59
94
>100
36
91
52
63
72
89
>100
26
27
10
73

163.1
54.9
52.9
46.9
39.4
16.7
16.5
14.5
13.4
9.5
6.0
5.2
3.6
3.4
3.4
3.1
452.5

137.5
67.6
69.6
44.9
15.0
62.6
1.3
11.2
55.8
0.9
0.4
126.3
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.3
2.9

4.0
2.9d
8.1
3.4
0.6
0.7
0.2
0.2
1.8
0.6
0.1
1.8
0.1
0.1
0.04
0.1
0.7

Sources: Levantis, et al. 2001
Notes:
a

Preferential sugar import quotas and SPS basic allocation.
Percentages greater than 100 imply that the quota was not filled. Statistical discrepancies are possible due to conversion from raw sugar to
white sugar equivalent weights.
c
GDP data (not PPP adjusted) for the year 2000.
d
GDP for year 2000 based on Fiji’s national accounts.
b

Calculation based on a world market price of 238.78 euro per ton (2001 average price of London CIF price for no.7 raw sugar in bulk), a
preferential sugar price of 523.70 euro per ton, and a minimum purchase price under special preferential arrangements of 496.80 euro per ton.
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Critics of the Sugar Protocol such as Mahendra Reddy (2003), Paresh Narayan and
Biman Prasad (2005), Narendra Reddy (2003) and leading institutions like the Asian
Development Bank (ADB 2002) have argued that inefficiencies in production and declining
productivity caused by the EU subsidies and have thwarted the ability of market forces to
discipline the sugar industry. However subsidies cannot be solely blamed for the concealing the
actual price of producing sugar in Fiji; neither the lease agreements reflected the true value of
agricultural land used for growing sugarcane, nor did the costs of a largely informal labor sector
reflect the real price of growing and harvesting or the actual pricing mechanism used to award
the proceeds of the sale of sugar to the farmers and the mills operated by the Fiji Sugar
Corporation (FSC). In Fiji, the proceeds from the sale of sugar are determined by a third party,
referred to as the Master Award. During the colonial era the mill determined the pricing formula
often at the expense of the farmer who received his share after deduction of all costs. In the last
three decades, power has shifted towards the farmer represented by two powerful unions, and in
the current collective bargaining agreement the sugar proceed has been set at 70 percent for the
farmer and 30 percent for the Mill (See Table 4.2).
Table 4.2: Sugar Proceed Sharing Ratios (Master Award)
TOTAL SUGAR PRODUCED
Up to 325, 000 Tonnes
325,000 – 350,000 Tonnes
Tonnes in excess of 350,000

GROWER’S SHARE

MILLER’S SHARE

70 percent

30 percent

72.5 percent

27.5 percent

75 percent

25 percent

Source: Reddy (2003)
Note: These percentages are based on net proceeds on sugar and molasses sales after industry cost have been
deducted. Industry costs are defined as those relating to sugar marketing, and other industry institutions such as the
Sugar Commission of Fiji, and the Sugar Cane Research Centre (Source: Sugar Industry Tribunal).

As Reddy (2003) has pointed out, it was impossible for the mills to sustain an efficient
production schedule from its share of the proceeds, one could argue that as long as an artificial
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price kept the sugar industry afloat and third parties determined the payouts, neither the grower
nor the government (the mill owner) were willing to engage in corporative behavior, (the farmer
would extract the maximum proceeds possible, whilst the government had no desire or cash to
modernize equipment as it had very little leverage to increase its proceeds). Price supports
according to Voorend (2005) yielded Fiji triple the value of its sugar exports to the European
Union under the Sugar Protocol agreement. Koen Voorend (2005:55-56) illustrates in Table 4.3
the price mechanism; “The first column shows the world price in US Dollars. The second
column depicts the EU intervention price (the price that the ACP countries receive according to
the Sugar Protocol) in Euro per ton. Converting at an exchange rate of US$1.00 per Euro, which
is the exchange rate in December 2002, gives the third column, (The 1.1 exchange rate of
December 2002 facilitates the estimation procedure extensively and is therefore taken as Base
Exchange rate).”
Table 4.3: Raw Sugar (EU Price vs. World Price)
YEAR

WORLD PRICE

INTERVENTION PRICE

WORLD PRICE

USD PER TONNE

EURO PER TONNE

EURO PER TONNE (DEC RATE)

1991

180.8

439.4

180.8

1992

181.8

439.4

181.8

1993

200.7

439.4

200.7

1994

242.5

433.7

242.5

1995

268.7

523.7

268.7

1996

244.8

523.7

244.8

1997

241.2

523.7

241.2

1998

193.6

523.7

193.6

1999

130.7

523.7

130.7

2000

170.2

523.7

170.2

2001

182.3

523.7

182.3

2002

157.5

523.7

157.5

Source: Voorend 2005
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The End of the Sugar Protocol
The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) ruling on the legality of the Sugar Protocol in
2003 amplified further the existing problems of leases and tenure amongst farmers and
landowners in the troubled sugar sector in Fiji (discussed in greater detail in the next section).
Australia, Brazil and Thailand filed a complaint against European Commissions sugar preference
agreement with the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) bloc of countries (see Table 4.1) that
hurt large sugar producers like Brazil and Thailand by shutting them out of the European market
(New York Times: April 28 2005). The WTO panel ruled that the EU subsidies on sugar exports
exceeded the “commitment schedule” and thus a violation of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture (Conconi 2008: 2). Specifically, the panel findings concluded that (Oxfam 2004:2;
Financial Times April 28 2005).
1. EU exports of 2.7 million tonnes of unsubsidized sugar were in fact cross-subsidized by
EU support provided for the production of quota sugar.
2. EU contravened WTO commitments by subsidizing the re-export of amounts equivalent
to imports of Sugar from the ACP and India, and these subsidized exports exceeded the
EU’s permitted level of subsidized sugar exports (see Daugbjerg and Swinbank
2009:105-120).
The European Union in response put together a monetary package to aid sugar producers
affected by the cessation of preferential pricing, but the military coup in 2006 in Fiji would
complicate efforts to access those funds (Levantis, Jotzo and Tulpule 2003).
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The Problem of Land in Fiji
According to farmers the issue of land tenure has caused the decline in sugar
productivity.52 As a condition for Independence in 1970, the hastily arranged Agriculture Land
and Tenant Act (ALTA) was enacted in 1967 to assure a 30-year lease for farmers. Great Britain
with the connivance of domestic elites, crafted ALTA to satiate the immediate concerns of the
landowners and the farmers under a colonial era property regime that should have been scraped
in its entirety.
Not much is known about the prehistory of the Indigenous Fijian people before the arrival
of the Europeans, but by the 1800’s Fiji had become an active route for trade, especially
sandalwood, beechdemer, and whaling. By the 1840’s, a constant stream of missionaries began
arriving in the islands and set up churches and convert the natives. By the late 1850’s,
Christianity was accepted en masse as the religion of the indigenous people, and when Great
Britain assumed control of the Fiji Islands in 1874, contact with the outside world was already
established, especially amongst the native chiefs.
To offset the cost of maintaining an empire, Great Britain would attempt to foster
domestic economies to generate income for the colonies as well as the mother country.53 The
termination of the slave trade in 1835 threatened to stall the great imperial machine of the British
Empire, now in her full stride. To counteract the closure of the slave trade, Britain instituted the
Indentured Servitude Scheme, where labor from India would be dispersed throughout the Empire

52

In Fiji almost all farmland is leased from the indigenous Fijians who posses the absolute right of ownership and
the refusal to renew any lease cannot be vetoed.
53
The colonial economies of Great Britain were not particularly sophisticated, the industrial revolution was fine for
London and Liverpool, but not for non-white third world outposts. Extracting raw material, producing food and
meat, and ravaging forests and seas were good enough for Great Britain. Narayan, 27-60
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to carry in the work of generating income and production.54 Most of the indentured workers
would be sent to work in the plantations, mostly sugar,55 and a few lucky ones would become
menial laborers and servants of the colonial masters. On May 15, 1879, five years after Great
Britain officially colonized Fiji; the first group of Indians arrived on shore as indentured slaves
to work in the sugar cane plantations.56
Soon after colonization, Fiji’s first governor general, Sir Arthur Gordon codified into law
through a decree that 83 percent of all land was to remain in the hands of the indigenous Fijians
in perpetuity (Heath 1974). Ownership of land was to be communal rather then individual, and in
later years the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) was set up to administrate all issues related to
land in Fiji. The remaining 17 percent was for use by the crown, and that Britain would be a
custodian of the land until such a time when it saw fit to allow the indigenous Fijian to assume
control. This strategy allowed the British to minimize transaction costs associated with
ownership, contracts, enforcement, or development of land. At Great Britain’s disposal were
indentured workers who were housed on the edges of the fields they worked at, known as “coolie
lines” in single ten by ten rooms with up to fifteen per room.57 Since there was no possibility of
ever working up to owning a piece of land, and very little education available, mobility outside
the farm was virtually non-existent, and hence the regular and predictable supply of constant
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This was one of the more ingenious schemes of the British to exploit free labor from its Indian colony, and keep
the engine of imperialism and capitalism humming. The indentured scheme was a despicable system in application
and practice and basically amounted to a kind of legalized slavery (see Vijay Naidu 1980:8).
55
Sugar cane as a labor intensive industry had proved to be quite a boon for the British as a cash crop. An unlimited
supply of labor and land created optimum conditions for wealth; expansion and exploitation by the colonial masters
(see Minitz 1985).
56
The indentured scheme continued until 1920, after which it was abolished in the British parliament when public
outcry over the brutality of the system could no longer be ignored. In Fiji, by 1921, there were more then 60,000
Indians with the overwhelming majority confined to the sugarcane fields.
57
The indentured servitude scheme was particularly appalling for women and children. For every 100 men sent, 40
had to be women, and the devastating effect of gender disparity contributed to an increase in rape and suicides
amongst the indentured population. The low percentage of women among the male population left them vulnerable
in an already dehumanizing situation with very little opportunities for recourse (see Carter 1996:41).
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labor. A cursory glance at the colonial policy would quickly reveal a glaring lacuna; close to 100
percent of commercial sugar cane farming were done by Indo-Fijians in land that was not theirs,
and could never be. (By the time of independence in 1970, Indo-Fijians were about 49% of the
population, indigenous Fijians comprised about 47% and the rest were Whites, Chinese and other
Island groups) Therefore, when discussions about independence began in the 1960’s, it was
unsurprising that land quickly became the singular most vexing issue for all concerned. The
Indo-Fijian tenants feared exploitation at the hands of their Indigenous landlords, as echoed by
an early leader of the farmers,
“…We were [brought] to work under a system that saved the indigenous Fijian from coming under…As a
matter of fact, if anything, the coming of my people to this country gave the indigenous Fijians their honor,
their prestige, nay indeed their very soul. Otherwise, I have no hesitation in saying that the native of this
colony would have met the same fate that some other indigenous races in parts of Africa met. I would ask
my honorable colleagues to consider the aspect of it before they condemn my people.” 58

Subsequently, in preparation for independence, the Agricultural Landlord Tenant Agreement
(ALTA) was established in 1966, which would guarantee a twenty year lease to all farmers and
an automatic extension of ten years. Others provisions of the ordinance included share-cropping
and an assessment of the capital value of the land every five years. Understandably, the IndoFijian farmers feared abuse on the provisions and they were suspicious of the land owners
creating artificially high land values and raising rental rates. Nonetheless, the ALTA act was
passed and ratified by the legislative council and remained the touchstone for all future
negotiations on the issue of land tenure between the indigenous Fijians and the Indo-Fijians.
Beginning in 1997, these leases began to expire creating a period of heightened tension
and uncertainty not only in the sugar industry, but politically and socially. Table 4.4 below

58

Statement by A.D. Patel, the first Indo-Fijian political leader of the National Federation Party, a predominantly
farmers party. Quoted in Brij V. Lal (1992:143).
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shows that only about a quarter of the expired leases had been renewed for existing tenants
(almost always the new tenants were either the indigenous landowners themselves or members of
their clan). Falling productivity has also being linked to inexperienced growers who lack the
requisite skill of working the land with time honored techniques and knowledge (Reddy 2003:9).
TABLE 4.4: Expiring Land Leases in Fiji (1997-2001)
YEAR

EXPIRED SUGAR
CANE LEASES

LEASES RENEWED

NOT
RENEWED

RENEWED TO
EXISTING TENANT

ISSUED TO NEW
TENANT

1997

72

36

31

5

1998

157

45

107

5

1999

1073

350

511

212

2000

1708

311

469

928

2001

313

141

14

158

2002

457

na

na

na

3323

883

1132

1308

TOTAL

Source: Native Land Trust Board
Note: Totals up to 2001 only.

As suggested earlier, the demise of the sugar industry would be devastating for political
economy of the Fiji Islands. Cane Farming remains “the backbone of the Fijian economy” argues
economist Narendra Reddy and not without justification. Almost a quarter of the workforce is
employed in the sugar industry, 22 percent of export revenue is generated by sugar, almost 90
percent raw sugar is exported to international markets (74% to the EU alone, see Table 1 above)
and as well as the survival four major urban areas outside of the capital city known as the “sugar
belt” (Narayan and Prasad 2005).
The political instability following the 2000 coup thwarted any possibility of a long term
solution to the problem of land tenure in Fiji and the continuing instability wrought by the last
coup in late 2006 has foreclosed any immediate solutions on how to rectify the vexing issue of
land and equitable distribution of resources in the Fiji Islands. It is unlikely that the internal
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issues (land tenure, financial compensation, low yield, or even technical efficiency) surrounding
the Fijian sugar industry will be resolved anytime soon, and the cessation of preferential prices
and set quotas by the EU in 2007 have only intensified the dilemma surrounding the sugar
industry in Fiji (Mahadevan 2009; Oxfam 2005). The Fijian government in 2005 acknowledged
that the survival of the sugar industry in Fiji was in serious jeopardy without a comparable trade
package to replace the Sugar Protocol Agreement with the EU (Parliament Papers 2005).59
However a series of political events in 2006 overtook the necessity of securing new trade pacts
for the sugar industry in Fiji, the government of Lasenia Qarase abruptly called for elections in
June which thrust the country into a divisive and contentious political season followed by a
drawn out public conflict with the military resulting in Fiji’s fourth coup in twenty years in
December of 2006.
The immediate consequences of the 2006 military coup became painfully clear when the
European Union suspended its “stabilization funds” in October of 2007, with a caveat that only a
return to democratic rule and structural reforms in the Sugar industry would enable the release of
funds (Official Journal of the European Union 2011). As part of a negotiated settlement to ease
the pain of losing the highly lucrative Sugar Protocol Agreement, the European Union had
promised to provide financial aid to Fiji (and selected ACP members) under the Sugar
Readjustment Fund (Fiji Island Business 2007), this would amount to €60.024M (F120 million
dollars) over three years, substantially less than the €161M (F350 million) requested by Prime
Minister Qarase. Fiji received the fifth highest allocation after Mauritius (€127.541M), Guyana

59

See document at http://www.parliament.gov.fj/publications/viewResearch.aspx?research=21. (accessed May 18,
2011)
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(€84.170M), Jamaica (€77.547M) and Swaziland at €69.895M.60 According to reports in the Fiji
Sun (8/26/2008) the EU had planned another allocation of F132.6 million for 2011-2013 after the
first tranche of aid to farmers, but the failure of the Fijian government to transition towards
democratic elections have forced Brussels hand to freeze all financial assistance (The Australian
May 19, 2009).61
The declining fortunes and uncertain future of Fiji’s sugar industry placed extraordinary
pressures on other sectors of the economy to contribute towards development. The national focus
towards tourism seemed almost inevitable given the diminished stature of cane farming in Fiji
beset by intractable issues and without many resolutions in sight. The political events of 1987
and 2000 permanently shelved any steps towards solving the problem of land tenure in Fiji, and
the continued political instability, which culminated in the 2006 coup d’état further distracted
key actors in government to plan the ineluctable demise of cane farming as Fiji’s bell-weather
industry. Thus given the paucity of choices available to the government, it perhaps seemed
inexorable that state would ratchet up its investments in the tourism sector. Rapid increases in
visitor arrivals and tourism related products bore some justification for tourism in Fiji to become
a conduit for development and the State obliged by creating the organizational and institutional
structures to facilitate investments in tourism. The political crises that would hit Fiji in 1987 and
2000 would test these assumptions, of the desirability of investing in an image conscious
industry susceptible to shocks. The following section examines both the viability of tourism
under crisis and analyzes the policy response by the State, industry stakeholders and sending
states, specifically the role played by regional powerbrokers, Australia and New Zealand.

60

The Fijian conversion is for exchange rates that existed in April 2007. The currency rate as of May 18, 2011 is 1€
= 2.557FJD.
61
See article at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/eu-backs-away-from-fiji-sugar-support/story-e6frg6sx1225713297817. (accessed May 18, 2011)
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Political Instability in Fiji
Fiji has experienced four coup d’états beginning in May 1987 followed by a second one
in late September, then the putsch in 2000 culminating in the latest military coup of December of
2006. All of these non-democratic takeovers of the State have had competing objectives with
multiple objectives and allegiances. Within the parameters of this project, the political crisis in
Fiji will only be examined for its effect on the Tourism sector, and the possible policy responses
that were available to the various stakeholders in the industry.
The military coup in Fiji on May 14, 1987 shattered the idyllic image of the Pacific
Islands as places untouched by the realities of political strife and instability (Scarr 1988;
Robertson and Tamanisau 1988). The year began with general elections being scheduled for
early April in a contest largely fought between the incumbent Alliance Party and the newly
formed Fiji Labor Party. Fiji had undergone four previous general elections since Independence
in 1970, in (1972, 1977-twice and 1982) with remarkable ease and professionalism, and the 1987
elections promised the same.62 While it is beyond the scope of this enquiry to unravel the
complicated strands of Fijian politics that may have contributed to the beginnings of a twentyfive year political crisis, the events of May 14, 1987 set it motion a series of events whose end is
still not in sight.
The unexpected defeat of the incumbent Alliance Party in the general elections thrust the
Fiji Labor Party into power and ushered in the first overhaul in the administration of the country
since acquiring independence. The weakness of a nascent democracy became apparent when
social and political events overtook the euphoria of Labor’s win and set the stage for a military
takeover (Lawson 1991; Kaplan 1987; Van Fossen 1987). Senior members of the losing Alliance

62

On a personal note, I worked as a volunteer campaign staffer for the local branch of the Fiji Labor Party, the
campaigns and elections were quite free and fair and nothing could portend the crisis that followed.
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Party refused to concede their Party’s defeat and to publicly acknowledge the legitimacy of the
results of the ballot box63, secondly, the sudden rise of ethno-nationalism among the most fervent
supporters of the losing party undermined the delicate religious and racial pluralism of a
multicultural society, and finally the failure of the Fiji Labor Party to assuage the fears and
concerns of the fifty percent of people that did not vote for them.64 Within this toxic
environment, the Fijian military, which had historically remained aloof from national politics,
executed the first coup d’état in the South Pacific.65
The political crisis of 1987 could not have come at a more inopportune time in Fiji,
especially in economic terms. The erratic oscillations of GDP data reflected the underlying
reality of an economy largely dependent on agricultural exports (See Table 4.5).
Table 4.5: GDP Fiji Islands 1980-1988
Year

GDP
(million)

1980
910.0
1981
953.6
1982
1020.5
1983
1031.8
1984
1151.7
1985
1177.7
1986
1326.1
1987
1329.2
1988
1433.3
Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics

Growth Rate
(%)

GDP Per Capita
(thousand)

Growth GDP Per Capita
(%)

15.6
5.3
7.0
1.1
11.6
2.3
12.6
0.2
7.8

1421
1476
1551
1535
1678
1690
1857
1844
1993

13.2
3.9
5.1
-1.0
9.3
0.7
9.9
-0.7
8.1

63

There is a marked variance between the leader of the Alliance Party and defeated Prime Minister Ratu Mara
accepting the results of the elections and those of his Party who refused the legitimacy of the new incoming
administration (Mara 1997:191). This marked inconsistency was evident when Ratu Mara happily came back into
government at the beckoning of the military following the coup.
64
The Alliance Party lost in spite garnering 48.5 percent of the vote to Labor Party’s 46 percent (See Mara 1997:
190). A lamentable oversight by democracy scholars is the role played by losing parties in elections, especially in
ethnically divided societies and emerging democracies. Legitimacy is not only granted through the ballot box but
also by the public acknowledgement of the fact by the defeated parties and candidates. Conceding and election is
often as important as winning one, as the events in Fiji in 1987 demonstrated. See Anderson et al (2005) for a
current exposition on this important facet of electoral democracy.
65
The two national newspapers chronicled the aggressive rhetoric and marches by supporters of the losing party
through the streets of the capital Suva in the weeks and days leading up to the Coup on May 14, events which I
personally witnessed (See Fiji Times April 16 1987, p. 3, Fiji Sun April 21 1987 p. 2; Fiji Sun April 22 1987; Fiji
Times April 26 1987, p.1)
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Sugar production in 1983 declined by 46 percent because of devastating hurricanes in the
sugar growing regions and causing damages estimated at F150 million dollars (Lal 2010: 308).
With the exception of the Monasavu Hydro-Electric Scheme66 the government was redirected
funds away from public structure development and towards relief and rehabilitation. Further
austerity measures included a national wage freeze in 1984 in defiance of collective bargaining
agreements and over the objections of the Fiji Trade Union Congress (FTUC) (Lal 2010: 308309). The governments’ repudiation of consensual labor relations led to the formation of the Fiji
Labor Party (FLP) under the patronage of the FTUC in 1985, which would sweep into power two
years later, only to be overthrown in the coup after only four weeks in office. However, neither
politics nor natural disasters attenuated the flow of foreign visitors to Fiji during this period
according to Sturton and McGregor (1991), and growth in the tourism sector held steady, until
the political crisis of May 1987 (See Table 4.6 on tourist arrivals to Fiji between 1980-1990.
Table 4.6: Visitor Arrivals to Fiji (1980-1990)
Year

Aust.

NZ

USA

Canada

UK

Eur.

Asia

Pac. Is

Others

Total

72260
36389
30137
1980
80912
32490
24164
1981
95455
28304
23211
1982
85027
24048
25636
1983
101413
26803
37285
1984
89459
19540
49557
1985
86297
22720
69732
1986
1987
65382
16197
47037
75264
21507
42144
1988
96992
28128
34425
1989
103535
29432
36928
1990
Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics

13386
15708
13698
13037
16522
18908
23651
16819
16883
16536
18438

5244
4814
4332
5888
8569
7707
9972
8511
8464
11404
16773

8990
6921
6111
8330
11283
12667
15088
14726
20498
23916
27211

7141
10606
18029
14401
14864
12601
11801
5487
3425
16015
27874

10137
9617
9970
10588
13178
11936
12815
11217
14219
18064
17528

6312
4703
4526
4661
5320
5800
5748
4490
5751
5085
1277

189996
189935
203636
191616
235227
228175
257824
189866
208155
250565
278996

66

Funding came from a combination of internal and external sources such as the World Bank, Australian
Development Assistance Bank (ADAB), the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), The European
Investment Bank (EIB), The Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF) and the Government of Fiji. Although initially
projected at US64 million dollars (Mara 1997:190), the final cost came to F240 million dollars (See World Bank
Report 1978:23).
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It would be not until 1990 that visitor arrivals to Fiji would exceed pre-1987 levels as
political instability disrupted tourism and stunted its growth trajectory. The Pacific Islands first
coup had shorn Fiji’s carefully cultivated image of a safe and secure haven for visitors to escape
to, from a harried and troubled world. International tourism, I posit, is an industry highly
susceptible to disruptions which greatly impacts societies that have a substantial stake in the
sector such as Fiji. The following section will examine the relationship between crisis and
tourism and the impact of political instability in the tourism sector in Fiji.
Tourism under crisis has largely been considered as a marketing problem (Beirman 2003)
rather than interpreted through the lens of policy and politics. The challenge to tourism in Fiji
was political, the external response to the crisis that gravely affected the tourism sector was
political and therefore the domestic response by the State and industry stakeholders had to be
political. I shall further argue that the articulation of policy and the organizational response by
the government and the tourism sector saved the industry from irreparable damage and ensured a
full recovery and demonstrated the institutional capacity of even small island states to manage
severe exogenous shocks.
Tourism and Political Instability
Each successive political crisis in Fiji (1987, 2000 and 2006) triggered a series of travel
warnings by foreign office with profound social and economic consequences for the tourism
industry and ordinary Fijians whose livelihood depended on a thriving tourist sector. Substantial
investments by the State in the sector seemed to be negated by the episodic political instability as
well as Fiji’s international reputation and credibility. The international reaction to the political
events in Fiji illustrated the intricate web of economic relationships that small states have to
negotiate in the global economy (Fletcher and Morakabati 2008; Sonmez 1998). The adverse
effect of travel warnings in response to the crisis in Fiji further reinforced the ability of sending
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States to influence economics and politics of host economies. The Fijian government was during
the period of political crisis caught in an economic dilemma; it had institutionally organized its
development priorities around international tourism with substantial investments in the industry,
and therefore had exposed itself to international reactions regarding domestic events. Neither the
State nor the industry could insulate itself from external backlash that ensued after each coup in
Fiji (Burns 1995).
However data on visitor arrivals (Table 4.7) indicate that after an initial period of
recovery following the coups, tourism in Fiji has generally recovered to previous levels, which
suggests that (1) the nature of the crisis in Fiji has been misunderstood, (2) international response
is largely driven by political concerns and therefore is not commensurate with the reality on the
ground in Fiji and (3) the ability of industry stakeholders and the government to adequately
respond to the challenges facing the industry through innovative policy mechanisms which
enabled it to “bounce back” from fatally damaging tourism in Fiji. Travel warnings are often a
brusque response to situations that often require nuance, subtlety and divers actions to events that
are fluid and quite complex. They may serve to mollify partisan interests in governments that
have a stake in the domestic politics of the region as seemed to be the case between Fiji and the
two regional powers, New Zealand and Australia. These were also countries from which Fiji
traditionally drew a significant portion of international travelers and thus the issuance of travel
warnings by them significantly impacted travel to Fiji.
It is my assertion that the internal logic of travel warnings is fundamentally flawed and in
the case of Fiji, was unnecessarily alarmist when compared to available data on the political
situation in the ground. This is not to imply that travel advisories and warning are unjustified,
only that an imprudent application of a powerful instrument is harmful if it fails to delineate the
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multiple permutations of foreign office announcements to the specific contexts in which they are
applied. In the era of mass tourism, international travel is no longer a province of the privileged,
but accessible to citizens of advanced capitalist societies many of whom have now inherited a
new “culture of mobility” (Bianchi 2007). The theoretical rationale for travel warnings, if
examined at all have essentially been accepted prima facie by sending States as a public service
announcement for its citizens. An analysis of Fijian tourism during these periods of crises
suggests that travel advisories can also be understood within the framework of national interests
by the issuing countries and therefore interpreted as a politically motivated act, rather than a
spirited act of public service.
TABLE 4.7: Visitor Arrivals during Political Instability (1985-1990; 1998-2003; 2004-2010)
Year

Aust.

NZ

USA

Canada

UK

Eur.

Asia

Pac. Is

Others

Total

1985

89459

19540

49557

18908

7707

12667

12601

11936

5800

228175

1986

86297

22720

69732

23651

9972

15088

11801

12815

5748

257824

1987

65382

16197

47037

16819

8511

14726

5487

11217

4490

189866

1988

75264

21507

42144

16883

8464

20498

3425

14219

5751

208155

1989

96992

28128

34425

16536

11404

23916

16015

18064

5085

250565

1990

103535

29432

36928

18438

16773

27211

27874

17528

1277

278996

1998

100756

70840

48390

12837

39341

29334

45154

22850

1840

371342

1999

118272

72156

62131

13552

40316

28371

47216

26090

1851

409955

2000

76883

49470

52534

10532

29215

22506

29810

21534

1586

294070

2001

98213

66472

57711

10752

30508

20917

37897

23608

1936

348014

2002

123606

68293

58815

9802

43393

21654

45740

24051

2505

397859

2003

141873

75016

58323

10990

49794

21847

43265

28167

1525

430800

2004

176195

103900

65211

12435

47668

22720

46466

26182

3298

504075

2005

203250

112932

62640

12625

44472

25123

44252

28476

11375

545145

2006*

206529

107277

66631

14372

38239

26801

50463

29725

8552

548549

2007*

207001

99744

64687

16992

34785

26311

46975

34221

9165

539881

2008

247608

100018

63667

17871

33935

29512

47246

35936

9238

585031

2009

248589

90898

51592

13452

26213

28926

40849

35078

6589

542186

2010

318185

97857

53122

12970

28813

30088

50256

39198

6379

631868

Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics. Note: The last coup d’état occurred in December of 2006 and therefore visitor
numbers from 2007 better reflect the fallout from the political upheavals in Fiji.
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Table 4.7 contains an interesting variation between visitor arrivals and the coups in Fiji
that challenges the uniform sanctions imposed by host countries and why travel warnings have
lost its potency following the events of 2006. The fallout from the last coup (2006) was almost
negligible (2% decline in visitor arrivals) compared to the previous two coups in 1987 and 2000
(30% drop in visitors). The 1987 coup as I have argued was a truly unique event, Fiji gave the
Pacific Islands its first coup d’état and the shock of that event reverberated across all sections of
Fijian society, and corresponding external response to the crisis which acutely affected the
tourism industry with declining visitor arrivals. The second coup in 2000 took a more ominous
turn unlike the previous one, which explains the significant decline in tourist arrivals; (1) the
prolonged 56 day hostage of government MPs culminating in the storming of the Parliamentary
Complex by the Fiji military, (2) the internal mutiny by soldiers of the Fiji military who were
sympathetic to the coup plotters resulting in several fatalities, (3) the accessibility of real time
information through the advent of internet technology which the 1987 coup lacked.
It has been my argument that the 2006 coup d’état was neither a unique (as in 1987) nor a
violent (as in 2000) event and the subsequent consumer response vindicates it. The monolithic
policy response of sending states like Australia and New Zealand towards Fiji had more to do
with their own internal political machinations than with the actual reality on the ground in Fiji. It
is reasonable to postulate that the national interest of Australia and New Zealand resides in not
emphasizing the dissimilarities that exists between these different episodes spanning two
decades, but rather project on to them a larger pattern of instability. What I aim to demonstrate
within the scope of my research is (1) the negative impacts of political instability on tourism and
attempts by stakeholders to minimize the collateral damage, and (2) that the tourism industry in
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Fiji is a well developed, mature industry in spite of the chronic instability, remains an attractive
vehicle for investments and national development.
The subtle nuances of domestic political crises were nonetheless overtaken by the quick
and sharp policy reprisals from the major sending states in the form of travel warnings. State
behavior in this instance, especially by Australia and New Zealand seemed largely dictated by
realist assumptions, whereas consumer reaction could be properly interpreted as rational within
strict epistemic limits. Island communities have long been on the receiving end of “regional
realpolitik” by Australia and New Zealand who have essentially assumed “leadership” roles in
governing their backyard (Dinnen 2004; Hayward-Jones 2008, 2009; Buchanan 2007; McGraw
1995, 2005; O’Connor 2004; Kabutaulaka 2005. The ‘hard-line” policies pursued by New
Zealand and Australia towards Fiji could only be understood within the rubric of realism,
consistent with their approach in other troubled areas in Oceania. Judging from the behavior of
New Zealand and Australia in the post-coup period, I can only assume that it is in their national
interest to maintain a fairly belligerent and adversarial posture towards Fiji, perhaps as part of a
long-term strategy of political realignment in the Pacific (Ratuva 2008). Secondly, assuming that
consumers behave in a rational manner, it therefore follows that most would exercise caution
when forewarned by their respective governments on traveling to an unsafe location. Individual
cancellations of travel plans often rise to a “critical mass” level leading to industry wide
disruptions affecting airlines, seaports, food and beverage markets, etc. While State policy and
decision making may be driven by the imperatives of national interest, individual choices about
government warnings are severely circumscribed, i.e. bounded by incomplete information often
driven by media hysteria and State manipulation of actual events on the ground (the distortion
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may not be deliberate, but governments have an implicit perspective they wish to emphasize
which advances their policy objectives).
Robert Young Pelton’s (2000) intrepid travel guide to the world’s most dangerous places
is a cult favorite among travel aficionados who prefer to wake up to the staccato of gunfire rather
than the languid sounds of waves breaking upon the shore. For the majority of travelers it is
reasonable to postulate that they will engage in risk aversive behavior and order their preferences
accordingly. Consumers who travel to new vistas will generally avoid locations that place them
and their families at risk. It is in the utility of individuals to secure and prioritize their safety and
well being and thus rational for travelers to eschew places where self preservation and well being
is compromised (Kozak, Crotts and Law 2007; Peattie, Clarke and Peattie 2005; Simpson and
Siguaw 2008; Tasci and Boylu 2010; Fuchs and Reichel 2010; Yuksel and Yuksel 2007; Lepp
and Gibson 2003).
In the case of Fiji, the coups renewed the “necessity” of Canberra and Wellington to
assume a more activist role in managing the “failed” microstates of Oceania. This aggressive
posture seems to be driven by the “Africanisation of the South Pacific” thesis (Reilly 2000)
where political crises are endemic because ethnic considerations triumph pluralist virtues
(Thomas 1990; Lawson 1991). The “realism” espoused by Australia and New Zealand towards
the microstates of Oceania conveniently elides over the historical legacies of colonialism,
asymmetrical factor endowments, nascent institutions and uneven economic opportunities.
Tourism and the Construction of Risk
Tourism is an important industry and for many microstates an essential component of
economic development (Shareef and McAleer 2005; Croes 2006; Wilkinson 1989; Taylor 2006).
This has far reaching implications for all stakeholders involved in this vital sector, especially the
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sending nations whose actions have extraordinary consequences over the economies and
livelihoods of receiving states. While travel is not a general necessity for survival, the intake of
tourists for many small economies is (Wang 2009; Narayan 2005; Causey 2007). The efforts in
developing a viable and thriving tourism industry among the microstates have not gone
unnoticed, and governments in recent years have embarked on an ambitious effort to develop
tourism within their countries.
It is often said that the first casualty of war is truth, but for the travel industry it is merely
rumors of war that often damage communities that rely on trade in services. Tourism is
vulnerable to political shocks and instability (Beirman 2003) since tourists leave with their
resources in the event of a national upheaval or disruption (Faulkner 2001; Ritchie 2004; Wang
2009). The nature of the industry makes it impossible to be insulated from the mercurial politics
of host countries and the deleterious consequences that often ensue following a crisis. The
tourism sector is deeply susceptible to both internal as well as external shocks and therefore
minimizing disruptions and understanding risk is a central concern of tourism. (See Table 4.8 for
a list of disruptions that occur in the tourism sector). A large body of work has been produced to
isolate the complex levels of traumatic events that threaten the global trade travel and tourism
(Prideaux, Laws and Faulkner 2003; Howard 2009; George 2009; Causey 2007; Bianchi 2007;
Kozak, Crotts and Law 2007; Rittichainuwat and Chakraborty 2009; Lepp and Gibson 2003;
Simpson and Siguaw 2008; Carter 1998).

113

Table 4.8: Disruptions to Tourism
DISASATER

AREA AFFECTED
Natural

Environmental

Earthquakes

Chile

Tsunami

Indonesia

Hurricanes

South Pacific

Fires

California

Floods

Tennessee (Nashville)

Volcanic

Iceland

Oil spills

Gulf Coast
Alaska

Health

SARS

China

H1N1
Violence

Instability

War

Tamil Insurgency

Sri Lanka

Terrorism

IRA

Northern Ireland

Crime

Drug War

Mexico

Economic

Asia

Indonesia

Latin America

Argentina

Violent

Thailand

Non-violent

Fiji

Political

Travel Warnings as Public Service Announcements
Nation-states have a fundamental responsibility to protect and warn its citizens about
dangers abroad, and falling short of precluding travel, they use a variety of instruments to
apprise, caution and inform its citizens about their travel destinations. Travel warnings are
perhaps the most widely used informational tool sanctioned by the state to inform its citizens
about dangers abroad and forewarn travelers about locations they ought to avoid, or take
extraordinary health and safety measures if travel is unavoidable. Oded Lowenheim (2007:204)
has argued that travel warnings can be properly understood as a heuristic device used by
neoliberal societies to educate and “responsibilize” its citizens about how to manage risk in an
increasingly complex and interconnected world. The modern state not only scans the horizon for
possible and actual fires, it attempts to instruct its citizens on basic detection and risk
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management. The assumption is that the international traveler is a savvy and responsible
individual who values safety and security when abroad.
Travel warnings could therefore be understood as public service announcements; the
modern state with its vast intelligence apparatus and technical capabilities has at its disposal
information and data that is not available to the average traveler. Travel warnings perform a vital
role in democratic societies by disseminating critical information to its citizens that may not be
otherwise available about places beyond their borders. There are multiple reasons for transborder
travel including business, pleasure, education, family, etc, each of which involve a series of
complex decision-making process (Freedman 2005). One’s travel choices are often
circumscribed by time, resources and available information, and given the scarcity of these
goods the decision to travel will often be determined by any of these factors (Wong and Yeh
2009; George 2009). It is therefore reasonable to postulate that consumer decision to invest time
and resource will be determined by the available stock of information on the destination of
choice. Travel warnings play a significant role in the decision-making process for travelers to
potential locations by providing cues on where to best invest their time and resources (Castelltort
and Mader 2007; Uriely, Maoz and Reichel 2007).
Travel Warnings as Politically Motivated
Conversely, authors Richard Sharpley, Julia Sharpley and John Adams (1996) have
argued that travel warnings should be construed as a form of trade embargo or a soft sanction. In
reviewing the case of Gambia and the use of travel warnings by Great Britain following the Coup
in 1994, they concluded that Great Britain used its economic leverage as a sending state to
punish Gambia and transmit a message to the regime. In tracing the sequence of events in
Gambia in late 1994, the authors conclude that the harsh travel warning issued by the British
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Foreign Office was incongruent with the reality on the ground, the bloodless coup consisted of
the “army taking over an empty State House, [while] the President and his entourage being
guests at an American warship in Banjul Harbor…the trouble was restricted to one army base, all
roads and airport remained open” (Sharpley, Sharpley and Adams 1996:3). Despite protests by
the Gambian authorities about a realistic and truthful assessment of the situation on the ground,
Great Britain persisted with its dire warnings about travel to Gambia resulting in the complete
collapse of tourism, its most important industry for one of the smallest and poorest country in
West Africa (Sharpley, Sharpley and Adams 1996:5).
Tourism is a fragile and volatile industry deeply susceptible to endogenous and
exogenous components and often influenced by factors beyond its control. An overlooked issue
that authors Bianchi (2007) and (Kim, Timothy and Han 2007) point out is the long political use
of tourism by nation states in the international system. Among the more famous list includes the
travel embargo on Cuba by successive American administrations and travel warnings against the
Philippines by the US not because there was a threat on the safety and security of tourists, but
because the Philippines had failed to renew the US Bases Treaty (Bianchi 2007).
The Case of Fiji
I argue that travel warnings are a powerful tool for governments to construct an image of
a destination, not always for the purpose of safety and security but to maintain a specific policy
objective congruent with its national interests. The imperative of nation-states to pursue its
objectives is hardly a debatable proposition, but when it collides with interests beyond its
domestic concerns, it becomes necessary to reexamine existing policies. The contention is not
the issuance of travel warnings per se, by nation-states to protect its nationals in the event of a
crisis abroad, but on the continuance of a state of hysteria and fear, once a clearer picture of
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events on the ground emerge. Once it has been determined that the political situation in the
country under crisis does not pose a discernible danger to visitors from abroad, than travel
warnings move from being a public service announcement to a politically motivated act.
In the early days of the 2006 coup, the level of alarm and apprehension was
understandable, but as in the previous coups it soon became apparent that events in Suva had
absolutely nothing to do with tourists, visitors, hotels and resorts. However, I do not have access
to data on crime and social unrest surrounding the previous coups in Fiji (1987 and 2000), but
the political events of 2006 essentially followed a similar pattern i.e. bloodless coups followed
by a military junta and thus it is fair to extrapolate that the resulting political crisis would have a
comparable effect on tourists in Fiji during previous periods of instability. One could therefore
argue that travel warnings against Fiji was justified following the 2006 coup because of the
heightened risk to the safety and security of tourists as victims of crime in an unstable
environment with a weakened law and order. However as Table 4.9 (lists all reported crimes
against tourists from 34 hotels along the Coral Coast in Fiji from 2004-2009) shows, neither the
safety nor the security of travelers was in jeopardy, nor did resorts become violent targets and
centers of struggle. Among the possible disruptions that afflict the tourism industry (See Table
4.8) the events in Fiji had been benign, contained and quite underwhelming.
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Table 4.9: Tourism Related Offences- Coral Coast 2004-2009
OFFENCE
2004
2005
2006
2007
Harassment
Indecent Assault
Robbery
Rape
Assault
Trivial (Minor offense)
Civil
Lost & Found (Property)
Theft/Breaking (Criminal offense)
Undisclosed
TOTAL

2008

2009

1
1
23
4
73
20
5

1
1
1
46
2
67
17
6

1
1
3
34
3
41
9
6

1
1
24
2
30
9
4

1
1
27
2
37
11
2

1
2
2
31
1
35
10
2
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141

98

71

81

84

Source: Republic of Fiji Police Force, Internal Report

While a sharp drop in reported crimes from 2006 onwards could be partly attributed to a
decline in visitor arrivals to Fiji following the political crisis, the apparent consistency of data
does seem to suggest that Fiji was no more a risky destination following the crisis in 2006 then it
was prior to the political events. The actual reality on the ground is empirically at variance with
both official announcements and media portrayals about the “worsening” situation in Fiji and as
risky destination for travelers.67
The argument thus far has not been on minimizing the deleterious effects of political
instability on tourism in Fiji or the social and economic fallout as a result of the coup in Fiji. The
loss of both formal and informal employment in the industry was immediate and devastating and
contributed to further socio-economic immiseration of Fijian society. The difficulty is in
explaining the long-term resiliency and success of tourism in Fiji in spite of the chronic political
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Sending nations have as much an ethical responsibility to accurately inform and educate its citizens about the risks
and rewards of travel as receiving nations do to ensure the safety and security of visitors from abroad. Sending
nations wield extraordinary power to construct risk and frame images of societies that lack resources to mount a
counter-portrayal, especially if they have been unfairly portrayed. Image formation is not an ahistorical
phenomenon, unencumbered by the realities on the ground. The travel literature is replete with narratives about
exotic Asia, dangerous Africa, enchanting Oceania or the primitive Americas (Carter 1998).
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instabilities that have challenged the industry over two decades. While the data on visitor arrivals
to Fiji from sending states revealed the incongruence between official policy and individual
choice, the deeper institutional factors have been overlooked. Microstates possess not only a
greater sophistication in developing their economies than is often understood but have in the case
of Fiji responded with policies to crisis that could have fatally damaged a valuable domestic
industry. The survival of microstates in the global economy is not only predicated on their ability
to exploit their comparative advantages, but also on their capacity to innovate and modulate to
changing circumstances and political realities.
Conclusion
The tourism industry in Fiji as this case study reveals is situated within a complicated
socio-political context which exposes the industry to three intractable problems. The chronic
political instability is not unique to Fiji, as other Pacific Islands have undergone similar
difficulties with democratization, coup d’états and civil rebellions in the decades following their
independence from former metropoles (McCusker 2006; Chauvet, Collier and Hoeffler 2010).
There is an extraordinary variation in the nature and duration of these instabilities and the
complex demographic and historical experiences of these Islands defy simple generalizations and
monolithic interpretations. The “Africanization of the South Pacific” thesis (Reilly 2000) was
justifiably criticized for imposing singular causal factors such as ethnicity as key drivers of
conflict in the Pacific (Fraenkel 2004), and scholarship on conflicts in the region have greatly
improved. Anemic central authority, geographical fragmentation and provincial autonomy
doomed the prospects of the Solomon Islands to form a stable and cohesive nation-state,
predicated on the Westminster Model (Dinnen 2002). The Solomon Islands comprise a chain of
1,000 Islands stretching across 1,400 km of the Southwest Pacific with a population of half
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million speaking some 80 different languages. In contrast, Fiji has a powerful central
government, with the majority of the population of 800,000 clustered around two major Islands
(the rest live in traditional villages in the 90 outer Islands) and most speak 1-2 of the three major
languages (Finn and Smith 2000; Wainwright 2003). Issues of governance, corruption and rentseeking behavior have largely contributed to the turmoil in Nauru and Vanuatu (Henderson
2003; van Fossen 2003; Firth 2001), societies that geographically and demographically different
from each other.
The inapplicability of the Westminster model in nascent democracies, the embedded
tribal structures of these societies, the struggle for natural resources, the legacy of colonialism
and difficulties of managing multiethnic communities have all played a role in destabilizing
these Island Nations. The developmental and economic costs have been severe for these small
economies demonstrated by the data from Fiji that followed each of the coup d’états. Issues
pertaining to democratization and political development are long-term projects that will not be
rectified anytime soon, but these microstates do not have the luxury of waiting to develop their
economies until they get their political house in order. De-coupling economic development from
political development allows these microstates to increase well being and opportunity for as
many people as possible at a pace not determined by political events. Investing in tourism is not
an unreasonable mode for development and it is possible that within a specified set of conditions
i.e. the nature of the crisis, the quality of the organizations and the depth of the industry, tourism
can survive and even thrive, in spite of serious political disruptions and negative externalities
such as travel warnings.
The second problematic issue highlighted in the case study is the declining sugar industry
in Fiji. The collapse of the industry will engender severe socio-economic dislocations, yet there
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is no current discussion on how to move beyond the day of its reckoning. The only significant
proposal to date was by Oxfam (2005) that suggested converting the sugar mills to produce
ethanol but I have been unable to locate any official policy on the governments’ response to the
report. Thus far the government has been willing to prop up the sugar industry in Fiji with public
funds (for 2010, the government loaned F$100 million dollars to the Fiji Sugar Corporation).68
Finally, the financial mishaps revealed the extent of State exposure to its investments in
tourism in Fiji. This knotty issue facing tourism in Fiji is still being unraveled and remains
unclear on how it will impact future investments in the tourist industry. I am skeptical about the
necessary institutional changes that would prevent a reoccurrence of using public funds for
private industry, especially in a small state like Fiji. These problems however do not negate the
importance of cultivating tourism as a viable conduit for development in societies with deep
factor limitations and lack of natural endowments.
Tourism in Fiji has had to endure twenty-five years of political turmoil as well as meet
the challenges of sustainable development and the constant threat of natural disasters common to
small islands in the South Pacific. The next chapter explains the resiliency of tourism in Fiji and
the feasibility of microstates to organize their national priorities around the development of
tourism based economy. Tourism is a complex industry and imposes extraordinary demands on
host economies and while this project recognizes the limitations inherent in the nature of
microstates, the case study on Fiji confirms the rationality of developing tourism as a reasonable
tool for economic development.

68

Fijian economist Wadan Narsey argues that Fiji Sugar Corporation is an instance of “too big to fail” as it’s
collapse would cost the State around F300 million dollars. See report in Island Business at
http://www.islandsbusiness.com/fiji_business/index_dynamic/containerNameToReplace=MiddleMiddle/focusModu
leID=19417/overideSkinName=issueArticle-full.tpl?PHPSESSID=8b1b9cb01cc99e0439e9460e42478937.
(accessed May 18, 2011)
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Chapter Five
Policy Challenges
Introduction
This project demonstrates both the limits and possibilities in understanding the survival
of microstates in the global system and fills the lacuna in our comprehension of how small states
organize their economies in order to maximize their comparative advantage and fulfill the
promise of sovereignty and independence. The competing hypothesis argues that these
microstates in Oceania are severely circumscribed by geography, territory and demographics and
therefore lack the structural capabilities needed to overcome their intrinsic limitations.
Subsequently as a matter of national policy these small economies should reintegrate themselves
closer to their former metropoles or regional hegemons for their survival. Scholars have therefore
theorized that the continued existence and future prospects of these small islands ought to be
interpreted as examples of MIRAB economies (Bertram and Waters 1985; Berno and Douglas
1998; Milne 1992) in which the political economy of microstates are primarily organized around
migration, remittances and foreign aid. The case of the Fiji Islands illustrates the inadequacy of
the MIRAB model to explain the permutations of policy and institutions in microstates which
strive to exploit their comparative advantage in the global economy.
The Fiji Islands as typical microstates have taken advantage of their location, size, and
even low population density to construct a fairly sophisticated tourism industry within the global
travel market. Tourism is by now deeply integrated into the Fijian economy and will remain so
for the immediate future and carries important political and social consequences for these small
islands. The tourism industry in Fiji has been surprisingly resilient despite the extraordinary
challenges it has faced over the past twenty years and this section posits that the success of
tourism in Fiji cannot be overstated for its economy (see Table 5.1). I will further explore the
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political and environmental challenges facing the industry and the policy responses formulated to
meet those challenges. Ceteris paribus, the Fiji Islands as a typical microstate in Oceania made a
calculated decision within the limits of its resource capabilities and national priorities to invest in
tourism. This case study on Fiji affirms the efficacy of comparative advantage as a better
explanation of the survival of microstates than the prevailing MIRAB model.
Table 5.1: Comparative Gross Foreign Earnings 1975-2009 (FJD Millions)
YEAR
GROSS TOURIST RECEIPTS
69.0
1975
76.0
1976
80.0
1977
86.0
1978
102.0
1979
108.0
1980
122.0
1981
142.0
1982
135.0
1983
161.0
1984
168.7
1985
185.0
1986
148.0
1987
186.0
1988
269.6
1989
294.6
1990
286.3
1991
328.1
1992
347.4
1993
392.5
1994
405.0
1995
414.5
1996
446.7
1997
482.5
1998
558.6
1999
397.0
2000
464.0
2001
563.0
2002
646.0
2003
725.0
2004
813.0
2005
823.0
2006
784.0
2007
854.0
2008
817.0
2009
Sources: Fiji Bureau of Statistics; The Reserve Bank of Fiji

MAJOR DOMESTIC EXPORT
SUGAR
94.7
67.7
93.6
83.3
117.0
174.2
131.6
125.1
111.9
110.0
111.8
133.7
186.1
198.3
228.3
223.7
220.4
221.3
230.7
252.2
276.1
301.7
213.4
244.2
263.2
237.1
225.2
234.4
225.7
209.2
223.7
215.1
185.0
248.2
187.1
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The growth of tourism occurred beneath the long shadow of sugar production and while
the sugar industry retained its political and historical importance for the Fijian economy and
society, it had nonetheless steadily lost its role as an income generator as the data on gross
earnings in Table 6.1 demonstrate. Beginning in 1989 receipts from tourism eclipsed earnings
from sugar exports and by 2009, gross dollars from tourism were four times that of sugar cane
and remained ahead of sugar production even after the serious political crises of 2000 or 2006
when visitor arrivals plunged and revenues declined. The Fiji Islands would increasingly become
a tourist based economy and its success would depend on the States ability to adequately respond
to challenges unique to that sector.
The chronic political crises that afflicted Fiji since 1987 validated the MIRAB hypothesis
of microstates as intrinsically unstable, but it couldn’t explain the sophisticated policy response
by the state and industry stakeholders in sustaining tourism through periods of political
instability. The ability of Fiji to successfully respond to a crisis that could have been fatal to
tourism challenges the MIRAB model of microstates as fundamentally weak and lacking the
institutional and organizational capabilities of larger and more complex societies. The policy
response by the Fiji Islands following the 1987 and 2000 coups therefore provides valuable
insight on how small states in similar situations could respond to crisis that affect their tourism
sector. This section explores the three policy challenges facing Fijian tourism as a test of
institutional and governance capabilities and provides a reasonable assessment of the future
trajectory of tourism in Fiji. Political crises till now remain the most severe external challenge to
Fijian tourism and an important case study for the rest of Oceania. Neither grave natural disasters
nor public health outbreaks have threatened the tourism sector in Fiji or in the South Pacific
(with the exception of civil conflict in Vanuatu and Solomon Islands, both of which have a vastly
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underdeveloped tourism industry). Two further issues explored here which are intrinsic to the
political economy of tourism in microstates are the high costs infrastructural development and
environmental diversification in order to promote sustainable development. This section explains
how Fiji has responded to each of these issues and opens pathways for other Island economies
facing similar development challenges.
Policy Response to Crisis
I have argued that the external response to the crisis in Fiji was unjustified and
incommensurate with the reality on the ground. I postulate that much of the public posturing by
regional powers (Australia and New Zealand) had much to do with internal politics of the region,
and the perception of Oceania as intrinsically unstable and turbulent. One could argue that there
was an asymmetric imposition of responsibility against micro-states like Fiji to demonstrate its
commitment to democratic ideals or face severe consequences while larger states often violated
international norms with impunity but the international system is neither fair nor altruistic and
realism dictated that Fiji needed to move quickly to protect a valuable industry.
The exigent circumstances brought on by the coups necessitated a coordinated response
by the state and the industry in Fiji, to minimize further collateral damage. The effect of coup
d’états on tourism according to Teye’s “impact model” (1988: 344-345) is seen in three
significant areas:
(1) The effectiveness of the National Tourism Organization (NTO), in the case of Fiji,
the efficacy of the Fiji Visitors Bureau and the Ministry of Tourism to respond to the
crisis.
(2) The flow of international tourists (demand for the tourism product), measured in
visitor arrivals.
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(3) The development of tourism resources and attractions (supply and delivery of tourism
products).
For non-contiguous locations like Fiji, with one international airport and two passenger wharves
for cruise liners, it was crucial to maintain the flow and delivery of tourists and related products.
Besides the adverse publicity resulting from coup d’états, other impacts on tourism included
damage to parks and recreation areas, closure of entry points, violence against tourists and the
subsequent degrading of tourist infrastructure (Teye 1988: 346). Professor Teye however
attributes the collapse of tourism in Africa and specifically in Ghana following coup d’états as a
consequence of anemic and ineffective management structures overseeing tourism (Teye: 234,
244). National Tourism Organizations (NTO) argued Teye were largely underfunded and hostage
to the political fortunes of the changing political climate which left them vulnerable to the
frequent ebb and flow of policy, politics and leadership. In contrast, changes in the political
landscape in Fiji have at least to my knowledge never had any bearing on the organization or
management of the tourism sector in Fiji. Secondly, the Fijian government immediately stepped
in to protect the industry and insulate it from possible negative externalities of the coups in Fiji
by challenging the premise of travel warnings and providing additional security for resorts and
hotels to assure guests and staff of their safety during the time of transition. The Republic of Fiji
police officers had traditionally assisted tourist facilities security personnel as needed but by
1998, the Cabinet approved the establishment of a Tourist Police Unit (TPU) in conjunction with
the Fiji Visitors Bureau (FVB) to ensure the safety and security of tourist facilities, staff and
visitors in Fiji. In 2004, the TPU became a full fledged Tourism Police Division (TPD) funded
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by the government of Fiji to ensure that the tourism sector would not be any more victimized by
the political upheavals wracking the country.69
All manner of disasters have a way of testing the resolve and institutional capabilities of
governments including microstates. The islands of the Pacific have an intimate familiarity with
natural disasters and as shown in Table 5.1, governments and agencies have collaborated in
formulating a fairly sophisticated response to climatic disruptions, just as it did when confronted
with political trauma. This section provides an overview of state response to both natural and
political crises and illustrates the institutional and organizational capacities of even small
countries to manage disaster. Crisis often exposes institutional and organizational weakness (see
Gros 2011) in societies ill-prepared to timely and effectively deal with traumatic disruptions with
severe consequences. The empirical expectation under the MIRAB hypothesis would have seen a
sharp degradation in the ability of microstates to adequately respond to crisis (natural or
political). The experience of the Fiji Islands challenges the MIRAB assumption of institutional
fragility, especially when the state is really needed.
(a) Responding to Natural Crisis
The literature on disaster management at the macro-level is as expansive and specialized
as the capability of international organizations, national governments and non-governmental
organizations to respond to crisis anywhere in the globe today (Coppola 2007; Pirotte, Husson
and Grunewald: 1999; Granger 1999; Brecher: 2008; Bremmer and Keat 2010). The global
network of disaster relief agencies collaborate with national governments to secure supplies and
in some cases technical expertise for people and places that are stricken and in need of
assistance. The tourism industry in Fiji has a fairly comprehensive natural disaster preparedness

69

See article at http://www.fiji.gov.fj/cgi-bin/cms/exec/view.cgi/12/1294/printer. (accessed June 4, 2011).
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plan to cope with natural disasters managed by the Fiji Visitors Bureau (FVB) and the Disaster
Management Office in cases of weather related emergencies (see Diagram 5.1).
Diagram 5.1: Fiji Tourism Natural Disaster Management
FIJI VISITORS BUREAU (FVB) TASKFORCE

INFORM
REGIONAL DIRECTORS

FVB STAFF (ON RADIO)

DISCUSS WITH
GOVT AGENCIES

FOREIGN REPS

INDUSTRY PARTNERS

FVB MGMT ACTIVATES CONTINGENCY PLANS (for media/travel agents, in country and planned visits

COMPILE INDUSTRY CHECKLIST ON CURRENT/EXPECTED STATUS
Communication Lines
In-house guest nos.

Structural Damage
CONSTANT UPDATE OF FVB
BULLETINS
(Airlines/Guest services/tourist info)

Evacuation plans
Key Government
Departments
Police/Army/Dismac,
etc.

Casualties
Transport access

Critical FVB contacts
(Airlines/Hotels/Agents/
Wholesalers/Travel
Media

Online Updates
from official Fiji
tourism websites

Source: Fiji Visitors Bureau

The exigent circumstances of geography have made natural disaster management a
national priority for Pacific Island countries that have to respond to tropical cyclones on a
seasonal basis. The human dimension of tourism makes it imperative for host governments to
effectively and quickly respond to the needs of visitors from abroad who may be vacationing in
fairly remote and inaccessible areas. The safety and security of travelers enhances the intangible
attributes necessary for host communities in the Pacific Islands to market themselves as the last
bastion of safety and placidity amid the troubles and trauma of this world, and tourists trapped in
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a hurricane on a remote island is hardly the image they would like to project. (Daily Mail Oct. 22
2005; Telegraph Oct. 4 2011).70
(b) Responding to Political Crisis
Missing from the puzzle is the institutional and organizational ability of microstates to
effectively respond to disruptions caused by political events. This study provides an important
insight in crisis management at the micro-level which required a set of effective political
strategies by the State to minimize irrevocable damage to a vital domestic industry. The policy
response by Fiji fills another gap in the existing literature on disaster management, albeit by
small states that may not have the luxury of a “fallback” industry (Faulkner: 2001; Evans and
Elphik 2005; Faulkner and Vikulov: 2001).
Three weeks after the first coup in Fiji in May 1987, the government announced an extra
F500, 000 dollars to the Fiji Visitors Bureau in marketing, promotion and crisis management.
The Fiji Tourism Convention which was slated for late June 1987 went ahead as scheduled to
provide a sense of normalcy and business as usual. The then Governor General of Fiji (the
Titular Head of State) addressed the convention highlighting the importance of the industry, the
active role of the state in protecting the industry, and the formation of a Tourism Action Group
(TAG) comprised of government and industry stakeholders to oversee the industry during this
perilous time. The sole objective of the TAG group was “to arrest the decline of visitor arrivals
to Fiji as effectively and quickly as possible” (Rao 2002: 421) and included four critical
components (Berno and King 2001: 79),
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See http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-366221/Britons-trapped-Hurricane-Wilma-strikes.html
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/8418356/Thailand-floods-stranded-tourists-criticise-lack-ofinformation.html(accessed June 4, 2011).
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(1) The removal of travel warnings and union bans in Australia and New Zealand
(2) A doubling of the marketing budget for the Fiji Visitors Bureau
(3) Familiarization visits from the main markets for trade representatives; and
(4) Marketing of special airfares and packages to those markets.
The Fiji Visitors Bureau (FVB) meanwhile targeted a marketing drive for the Australian market
to revive Fiji’s image as a safe place for tourists, negotiated fare specials with the national carrier
Air Pacific from Australia and developed a training program aptly called “Partners in Recovery”
with the Fiji School of Hotel and Catering. The training program administered by the Fiji
National Training Council and supported by the Fiji Hotel Association (the main trade group)
took advantage of the downturn in the industry to assist managers and staff on how to negotiate
in the changed climate. Within three months of its genesis, the Tourism Action Group (TAG)
closed shop, secure that it had successfully prosecuted its core mission of retarding the negative
consequences of the coup and its effect on the industry. Visitor arrivals in 1988 (See Table 5.7)
were significantly up from the two target countries (Australia and New Zealand); although it
would not be until 1990 that tourist arrivals would exceed pre-coup levels. The Fijian experience
emphasized the active role of the state in responding to crisis with focused set of goals that could
be realistically achieved.
The template established by the Tourism Action Group (TAG) would again prove
invaluable during the protracted political instability in 2000 following another coup d’état. The
2000 TAG team included representatives from the Fiji Visitors Bureau (FVB), Air Pacific, Air
New Zealand, the Fiji Hotel Association, and the Society of Fiji Travel Associates. After a
successful lobby effort by TAG to the military government, it was able to secure F5 million
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dollars for a promotional campaign to militate against the damage done to the industry (Rao
2002:422). These efforts included;
(1) Seeking the services of a public relations and media management consulting firm to
assist in the management of the recovery program;
(2) Lobbying the governments and unions in Fiji’s key markets against sanctions and
travel warnings on Fiji;
(3) Coordination on advertising and promotional activities in proven media outlets in
Fiji’s key markets of Australia and New Zealand, and North America, Europe and
Japan; and
(4) Devising special recovery fare packages.
One notable strategy employed in 2000 which was not included in 1987 was the utilization of the
internet as a marketing tool by the tourism industry in Fiji to promote and preserve its image as
still an ideal place to visit (Beirman 2003:148). Rao (2002: 423) synthesizes the action plan
formulated by TAG in response to the political events in Fiji in 2000 (see table 5.2)
Table 5.2: TAG Action Plan following the 2000 Coup
May 19 2000

Attempted coup and seizure of Parliament

May 20 2000

Crisis meeting of Fiji Visitors Bureau (FVB), Air Pacific and industry representatives to discuss
the crisis. The decision is taken at this meeting to form the Tourism Action Group (TAG) and
appoint Damend Gounder as Chairman. The first course of action for TAG is to seek
international expertise on media management through the appointment of an international PR
company.

June 7 2000

Appointment of Hill & Knowlton, an international public relations consulting firm based in
Australia to provide PR consultation for TAG.

June 9 2000

Presentation to the Interim Military Government (IMG) formally seeking its assistance and
support.

June/July 2000

Monitoring of overseas media by Hill and Knowlton and lobbying with key union leaders in
Australia and New Zealand to reconsider trade embargoes on Fiji. Circulation of accurate
weekly news updates from TAG via FVB on the current situation to overseas media
organizations along with positive experience statements from tourists who had stayed in Fiji
during the crisis. TAG meeting with Fiji wholesalers to determine a recovery campaign in all
the key source markets and to seek financial support from wholesalers for cooperative recovery
marketing.

August 2000

End of consultancy services by Hill & Knowlton. Continued lobbying of embassies by TAG to
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revise travel restrictions for the Western region of the Fiji Islands, which had remained calm
and peaceful throughout the crisis.
September 2000

Capture and arrest of coup leaders. Modification of travel warnings by the Foreign Offices of
the UK, the USA, Australia and New Zealand. Travel restrictions eased for the Western regions
of the Fiji Islands. TAG meeting with the Interim Minister for Tourism and Transport to secure
funding support to TAG and FVB in 2001. First phase of the TAG Recovery Campaign is
launched in Australia and New Zealand with special recovery airfares and land content
packages.

October 2000

TAG continues lobbying through embassies to downgrade travel warnings on Fiji and to urge
overseas unions to remove trade embargoes.

November 2000

Announcement of FVB 2001 Marketing Budget of F11 million dollars. A total assistance
package of F16 million dollars is announced by the Interim Minister of Finance as part of the
Interim Government’s assistance in the revival of the local tourism industry. TAG launches the
second phase of its Recovery Campaign, with emphasis on efforts in Fiji’s long-haul markets of
Japan, North America, and Europe. Travel warnings on travel to Fiji were downgraded by the
Foreign Offices of Australia, New Zealand and North America.

December 2000

Second phase of TAG Recovery Campaign in full swing. Provisional results from the first phase
indicate a good success rate in terms of visitor arrivals. TAG makes a presentation to the Fiji
Tourism Forum with a summary report on its activities and the recommendation that TAG be
disbanded. TAG Boxing Day Specials are launched in Australia and New Zealand to stimulate
travel during this low season.

January 2001

TAG Committee votes to keep TAG active through monthly meetings with a focus on assisting
the Fiji Visitors Bureau (FVB) in its destination marketing efforts.

Source: Rao (2002:423)

The latest coup d’état in December of 2006 re-activated the Tourism Action Group
(TAG) to ensure that the tourism industry had the resources to manage the fallout from the
ensuing political instability. Official reports from the government indicated that TAG was able to
secure an initial tranche of F3.8 million dollars for marketing costs soon after the coup.71
Included in the TAG team for 2006 was the Australian airline Qantas as the core target according
to the Fiji Times report was the Australian market, a traditional sending state for Fijian tourism.72
A slight decline in total arrivals in 2007 (see table 4.7) was effectively reversed and by 2010,
tourist arrival in Fiji showed sustained growth across all major markets, especially Australia
which accounted for almost fifty percent of all tourists to Fiji. The main stakeholders in Fijian
tourism have thus far been successful in interrupting the deleterious effects of the coups on the
71

See the news release by the Fijian Embassy in Washington D.C. at
http://www.fijiembassydc.com/default.asp?contentID=695 (accessed June 6, 2011).
72
See article at http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=55033 (accessed June 6, 2011).
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industry. However, the perpetual cycle of crisis and reaction obscures more pressing issues
facing the industry, its ability to diversify and adapt to the environmental challenges and
demands imposed by an expanding tourism sector.
Building Infrastructure
The expanding market in tourism in Fiji ineluctably increased transaction costs and
externalities as it strove to meet the supply conditions demanded by the industry. Tourism in Fiji
increased six-fold, from 110, 042 visitor arrivals in 1970 to 631,868 by 2010 imposing
extraordinary demands on resources, manpower and infrastructure even when population only
expanded from 520,304 to 883,125 during the same period. Following the criteria stipulated by
Gearing, Swart and Var (1976: Table 3.2), host economies must satisfy the infrastructure criteria
required by the tourism sector. Both the enclave and functional models of tourism generate
resource constrains on host economies according to the unique attributes of the specific structural
development. Large scale projects are biased towards resort type structures inside confined
geographical locations often disconnected from host communities (such as the troubled
government funded tourist projects in Fiji) and cater to a segment of the tourism market that
favors comprehensive enclave types of structures. The more open functional model of tourist
development caters to down-market travelers, adventure seekers, urban tourists and transient
visitors and opens up opportunities for the tourism industry in Fiji to diversify its portfolio of
alternative products to meet a wide range of consumer demands. But transitioning from only
enclave types of resort developments puts pressures on host communities to engage in tourism
that is sensitive to the environment, geography and culture requiring the implementation of new
policies, institutions and political hurdles to overcome.
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Three ways in which Fiji attempted to equitably distribute the burden of infrastructural
provision was through incentives, partnerships and diversified ownership. The report on
infrastructure development by the Fiji Ministry of Tourism (2004) acknowledged the physical
impact that tourism had on communities, both structurally and aesthetically. Baseline
requirements for water, electricity, telecommunications, and waste management were necessary
to prepare sites for tourist development and public utilities had yet to reach many rural and outer
Island communities in Fiji. The government as part of its incentive package encouraged hotels
and resorts to generate their own electricity and sell excess wattage to the Fiji Electricity
Authority. Furthermore, the Fiji Tourist Development Plan (1998-2005) broadened the
partnership between developers and Government to share in the costs of utility provision for new
tourists sites. Table 5.3 shows that in the construction of water and waste management facilities
for new developments as of 2004, 35% was funded by the state, 34% of costs were borne by the
private sector and 31% of utilities construction was jointly financed.
Table 5.3: Water and Sewage Construction for Tourist Sites-2004
DEVELOPMENT
Raffles Tradewinds
Taunovo Bay
Waidroka Bay
Crusoe
Warwick
Mango Resort (Proposed)
David Miller
Naviti
Hideaway
Sovi Bay
Malaqereqere
Vuvale Resort (Proposed)
Fisher Corporation
Fijian Hotel
Y.P. Reddy-Cuvu (Proposed)
Natadola Marine Resort (Proposed)
Momi Bay
Sonaisali Island

WATER

SEWERAGE

Public Works Department (Govt.)
Public Works Department (Govt.)
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Public Works Department (Govt.)
Public Works Department (Govt.)
Private
Public Works Department (Govt.)
Public Works Department (Govt.)
Public Works Department (Govt.)
Public Works Department (Govt.)
Public Works Department (Govt.)

Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
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Vulani Island (Proposed)
Public Works Department (Govt.)
Anchorage
Public Works Department (Govt.)
First Landing
Public Works Department (Govt.)
Saweni Resort
Public Works Department (Govt.)
Yaqara Studio
Private (Initial)
Rakiraki Hotel
Public Works Department (Govt.)
Wananavu Resort
Private
Reddy-Volivoli
Private
Harper Estate-Nananu I-Ra
Public Works Department (Govt.)
Mokusiga
Private
Morgan-Dawasamu (Proposed)
Private
Naigani Island
Private
Savusavu Bay and Buca Bay
Private/PWD
Taveuni Island
Public Works Department (Govt.)
Mamanuca Group
Private
Yasawa Group
Private
Wakaya Island
Private
Koro Island
Private
Kadavu Island
Private
Beqa Island
Private
Ugaga Island
Public Works Department (Govt.)
Vatulele Island
Private
Katafaga Island
Private
North Fiji Group ltd, Naduri, Macuata
Private
Source: Department of Town and Country Planning, Suva Fiji Islands

Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Private

Developing tourism to meet demand conditions is an expensive undertaking for most
economies especially for small islands in the Pacific. Host nations like the Fiji Islands are
meeting some of the challenges of an expanding tourism sector by creating incentives that
promote collaborative partnerships between private and public entities to meet basic
infrastructure needs (see Table 6.3). Furthermore, while the Fijian government has never
discouraged enclave tourist structures especially in the outlying islands, it has in recent years
encouraged private operators to become responsible for their own water needs. The provision of
water in Fiji is a difficult public problem and very cost prohibitive for the outlying islands (Asian
Development Bank 2002; South et.al. 2004), as is common with other islands in the Pacific (See
Table 5.4). Ancillary to the debate on the ability of small economies to meet the high capital
requirements needed for infrastructure in order to meet demand conditions of international
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tourism is the question of ownership. Why should public funds go towards basic infrastructure in
projects with a largely foreign ownership when access to clean water and sanitation facilities
remain beyond the reach of inhabitants of these small islands? Establishing collaborative
partnerships for basic projects with tourism developers allows the state to promote tourism
without circumventing its obligations to develop its own communities and peoples. As Table 5.4
demonstrates, meeting basic infrastructure needs for its own people is a difficult proposition for
Pacific Island governments who must take innovative measures to balance investments and
economic development with the legitimate needs of its citizens.
Table 5.4: Selected Islands in Oceania with Access to Piped Water (% of Pop-1990, 2000, 2008)
Countries

Year

Urban
Pop

Rural
Pop

Urban Piped Water
(% of Pop)

Rural Piped Water
(% of Pop)

Total Piped Water
(% of Pop)

1990
42
58
2000
48
52
32
7
19
2008
52
48
1990
35
65
48
13
25
2000
43
57
47
21
32
Kiribati
2008
50
50
1990
15
85
61
4
13
2000
13
87
59
3
10
PNG
2008
12
88
57
3
10
1990
21
79
2000
22
78
75
52
57
Samoa
2008
23
77
1990
14
86
77
16
84
77
1
13
Solomon Islands 2000
2008
18
82
1990
23
77
2000
23
77
70
77
75
Tonga
2008
25
75
1990
19
81
79
27
37
2000
22
78
80
31
42
Vanuatu
2008
25
75
80
33
44
Source: WHO and UNICEF
http://www.wssinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/resources/1278061137JMP_report_2010_en.pdf. (accessed
July 27, 2011).
Fiji

Building Accommodations
Hotel accommodations argue Sinclair (1998: 19) “are characterized by fixed capacity,
associated fixed costs and economies of scale.” The globalized nature of international tourism
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and the high capital requirements associated with tourism infrastructure often make it cost
prohibitive for entrepreneurs in host communities to become operators (UN Report on
Transnational Corporations in International Tourism 1982; Sinclair 1992; Cavlek 2002). The
problem of ownership and control of hotels and resorts in international tourism validates many of
the criticism against a tourist based economy particularly in the developing world (Husbands
1981; Britton 1982; Brohman 1996; Shaw and Williams 2002). Data from individual websites
and industry news release (see Table 5.5) show the global reach of hotel chains that dominate the
accommodation component of tourism. Sinclair (1998: 19) posits that “the existence of
economies of scale at the group level provides a rationale for horizontal integration in the form
of common ownership or management control of hotels, while franchising arrangements provide
a means of transferring specialist knowledge across the group of franchisees.” Furthermore,
hotels in the developing world tend to also be more vertically integrated with airlines, rental cars,
travel agents and other related products (Sinclair 1998: 20; Bryden 1973), especially with the
phenomenon of enclave development and all inclusive resorts.
Table 5.5: Ten Largest Hotel Groups (2010)
NAME

HEAD OFFICE

OWNERSHIP

COUNTRIES

InterContinental Hotel Group

UK

Public

100

Wyndham Hotel Group

US

Public

50

Marriott International

US

Public

68

Hilton

US

Private

76

Accor

France

Public

100

Choice Hotels

US

Public

40

Best Western

US

Cooperative

80

Starwood Hotels & Suites

US

Public

100

Carlson

US

Private

150

Global Hyatt

US

Public

45

Sources: http://www.tourism-review.com and individual Hotel websites.
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Developing countries have a mixed record in penetrating the market for accommodations
which has historically been dominated by transnational conglomerates (UN Report on
Transnational Corporations in International Tourism 1982:9). Well established tourism based
economies like Jamaica have not had it any easier in retaining market dominance in tourism
ownership which dropped to 40% in 2009 from a majority position a decade earlier (The Gleaner
Oct 25 2009).73 In country case studies by the United Nations Commission on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD 2008) did show robust local ownership of hotels in three African
countries (see Table 5.6) with varying levels of foreign and joint ownership. However,
significant disparity exists between both sizes and classes of accommodations in these countries
indicative of the disparities that exist in international tourism. Domestically owned hotels in this
study were generally smaller and inexpensive whereas the larger high-end although fewer hotels
were either foreign owned or in a partnership with local investors. It was not specified in the
report regarding the nature of joint partnerships or the level of management control and decisionmaking assigned to the parties.74 In the case of Namibia, according to the Southern Africa
Documentation and Cooperation Centre (SADOCC), only 90 out of the registered 1,361 tourism
establishments were owned by Black Namibians while rest was either owned by White
Namibians (927) or foreigners (344).
Table 5.6: Hotel Ownership in Africa (2006)
COUNTRY

LOCAL OWNERSHIP

JOINT VENTURE

FOREIGN OWNERSHIP

Botswana
247
128
81
Kenya
107
38
23
Tanzania
338
33
105
Namibia*
90/927
na
344
Source: UNCTAD at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia20086_en.pdf(accessed August 22, 2011).
*SADOCC at http://www.sadocc.at/news/2010/2010-155.shtml(accessed August 22, 2011).

73

See http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20091025/business/business4.html (accessed August 22, 2011).
See Lin and Thomas (2008) for an analysis of management outsourcing in international tourism at
http://poole.ncsu.edu/documents/thomas-paper.pdf. (accessed August 22, 2011).
74
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Building accommodations together with basic infrastructure is a necessary precondition
for any host community that embarks on developing a tourist based economy. The Fijian
government has employed a number of strategies to meet these challenges in the last few years
with mixed results. Table 5.7 outlines the institutional response to the specific policy challenges
regarding the infrastructural and accommodations needs in the tourism sector in Fiji;
Table 5.7: State Response to Problems of Infrastructure Development in Tourism
PROBLEM

INSTITUTIONS

POLICIES

Tourism Development
-accommodations, activities,
entertainment, transportation

Hotel Ordinance Act (1964)
Hotel Aids Act (1976, 1981, 1986,
1996, 1999)

Incentives, subsidies, tax abatements

Scenic Infrastructure

Fiji Seventh Development Plan
1976-1980)

Direct investments in State Parks,
Beaches

Expanding Tourism in Fiji

Fiji Eighth Development Plan
(1981-1985)

State incentives for developing
tourism in the outer Islands

Capacity Enhancement

Fiji Ninth Development Plan
(1986-1990)

Government directly funding tourism
projects

Utilities
-electricity

Fiji Tourist Development Plan
(1998-2005)

Operational license to generate and
sell access electricity for resorts

Basic Infrastructure
-water, waste management

Infrastructure Development Plan
(2004)

Shared costs/Partnerships with tourism
developers

Given the limitations unique to Small Islands in the Pacific, the Fijian government has
quite successfully developed an institutional regime capable of meeting most of the
infrastructural requirements necessary for tourism through partnerships and incentives between
the State and the private sector. The most pronounced policy failure thus far is in the publicly
funded tourism development projects it undertook in Natadola and Momi Bay with losses that
are still under investigation but the underlying rationale for State investments in the projects was
to enhance capacity and quality in the tourism sector and given the unavailability of private
sources of capital compelled the government to become a direct investor in tourism development.
Meeting the accommodations needs of travelers as a key component of global tourism poses
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significant challenges for host economies and the integrative nature of the industry exacerbates
disparities in ownership and management. Comparable data from other tourism based economies
in Africa and Jamaica suggest variations in ownership and control of the accommodation
component of international tourism and evidence from the Fiji Islands shows a similar
distribution of ownership and international penetration in the tourism sector (see Tables 5.8 &
5.9).
Table 5.8: Hotel and Accommodation Ownership in the Fiji Tourism Industry
LOCAL OWNERSHIP

FOREIGN OWNERSHIP

HOTELS

187

179

Beds 1-50

152

117

Beds 51-100

20

22

Beds 101-200

12

18

Beds 201-300

3

9

Beds 301+

0

13

Source: Office of the Attorney General, Suva.

Table 5.9: Ten Largest Hotels in Fiji
NAME

BEDS

PARENT COMPANY

HEAD OFFICE

Shangri-La

913

Shangri-La

Hong Kong

Radisson

860

Carlson

USA

Sofitel

598

Accor

France

Naviti

598

Warwick International

France

Warwick

529

Warwick International

France

Worldmark Denarau

478

Wyndham

USA

Hilton

447

Hilton Hotels

USA

Sheraton

420

Starwood Hotels

USA

Westin

383

Starwood Hotels

USA

InterContinental

366

InterContinental Group

UK

Source: Office of the Attorney General, Suva.

It is unlikely given the globalised nature of the tourist industry to foresee an abatement of
multinational penetration or even the desirability of pursuing a policy that would restrict their
presence in overseas markets. Data from Fiji suggest that even though local incursion in the
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tourism sector is confined to smaller down-market properties, there is a fairly equitable
distribution in ownership between foreign investors and domestic entrepreneurs. I do not have
access to data to determine the distribution of incentives between national and international
investors but evidence regarding ownership does imply that government policies has thus far
created a diversified ownership in the tourist sector. Secondly, the robust penetration by
international conglomerates situates Fiji within the global tourism market and signals to potential
investors that Fiji is an attractive host community for travelling and investing.
Meeting the physical demands of tourism will remain a significant challenge for small
economies with limited resources. The high capital requirements needed to construct acceptable
accommodations and develop basic infrastructure will remain beyond the reach of many local
investors. Government underwriting of major tourism development projects with public funds
has not yielded the desired results when compared to incentives mechanisms and partnerships for
tourism development in Fiji. A delicate balance will have to be maintained between large-scale
projects and smaller locally owned initiatives, giving host communities a stake in the tourism
sector and evidence suggests that opportunities exists across a range of proprietary possibilities.
One avenue in which to involve local entrepreneurs in the tourism industry in Fiji and elsewhere
in the Pacific that does not require substantial capital intake is through nature based ecotourism.
Alternative Tourism
Minimizing the negative externalities associated with large influxes of people in small
communities is a fundamental concern for Pacific Island communities engaged in the tourism
industry (Fagence 2001; Stronza 2001; Tucker 2001). Commensurate with large-scale tourism
projects are the associated costs of environmental degradation, pollution, waste management,
resource allocation and physical vulnerability on fragile ecosystems. All the major industries in
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the Pacific Islands such as tourism, agriculture, forestry, mining and fisheries generate waste
either as a byproduct of activity or a necessary part of the product stream in a UNESCO study
(2008: 27) by the Pacific Centre for Environment and Sustainable Development. Regional waste
composition is broken into the following categories (see Table 5.10) from selected urban centers
in four Pacific Island countries from 1990-1994.
Table 5.10: Characteristics of Solid Waste in Selected Pacific Island Countries (1990-94)
Waste Classification

Honiara
(Solomon Is.)

Nukualofa
(Tonga)

Lautoka
(Fiji Is.)

Port Villa
(Vanuatu)

Average
Weight%

Paper

5.9

31.3

15.7

11.4

15.8

Plastic

16.8

5.2

8.1

7.7

9.5

Glass

4.5

3.3

2.7

3.3

3.5

Metals

6.1

8

3.2

3.6

5.2

64.6

47.2

67.8

71

62.7

Textiles

1.8

3.7

3

1.6

2.5

Potentially hazardous

0.1

<1

0.2

0.7

0.5

Construction & Demolition

0.1

1

0

0.7

0.5

0

0.3

0.2

0

0.1

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

Biodegradable

Other
Total
Source: UNESCO (2008:27)

Preventing environmental degradation and managing pollution is an essential requisite for Island
economies venturing into the tourism sector because it is the aesthetic packaging and promotion
of the destination product which brings visitors to host communities. The image of Fiji and other
pacific islands as a largely unspoiled and pristine environment is what brings travelers to these
shores and consumers to buy the product. The Pacific Islands have a long awareness of the
unique nature of their societies and its natural endowments, and minimizing the ecological
footprint while engaging in tourism is an issue at the forefront of their development agenda
(Cater 1993; Craig-Smith 2005; Crosby 2002; Schellhorn 2010). Microstates in Oceania have
enthusiastically participated in regional and international forums concerning the environment in
lieu of their own vulnerability and fragile status (see Table 5.11-5.12).
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Table 5.11: Regional Agreements/Conventions
PACIFIC
ISLANDS

WAIGANI
CONVENTION

SPREP
CONVENTION

COOK ISLANDS
R
FIJI
R
KIRIBATI
R
MARSHALL IS.
R
FSM
R
NAURU
R
PNG
R
SAMOA
R
SOLOMON IS.
R
TONGA
R
TUVALU
A
VANUATU
R
Source: UNESCO 2008:77
R = Ratified; S = Signed; A = Acceded

WHALING
TREATY

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

APIA
CONVENTION

PACIFIC TUNA
CONVENTION

R
R

S
S
S
S
S

R
R

S

R

R
R

S
S

COOK ISLANDS
FIJI
R
A
KIRIBATI
R
MARSHALL IS.
R
R
FSM
R
NAURU
PNG
R
R
R
A
SAMOA
R
SOLOMON IS.
R
TONGA
R
TUVALU
R
A
VANUATU
R
R
A
Source: UNESCO 2008:77
R = Ratified; S = Signed; A = Acceded

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

R
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A

A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A

A
A
A
A
A
A

A

A

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
A
R
R

R
R
A
R
R
R
R
A
R
A

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

S
R
S
A
A
R

A
A
A
A
R
A
A
A
A
A
A
R

POPs (Stockholm)

UNCCD

Cartagena Biosafety

CBD

Kyoto Protocol

UNFCCC

Rotterdam Convention

Basel Convention

Montreal Protocol

Ozone Layer (Vienna)

UNCLOS

Migratory Species

CITES

MARPOL

World Heritage

PACIFIC ISLANDS

Ramsar

Table 5.12: Global Agreements/Conventions

R
S
A
S
R
S
R
S
S

Domestic institutions regulating the physical environment such as the situation in Fiji
many which date from the colonial era fell within a patchwork of rules organized around natural
resource extraction and agriculture rather then a centralized regime sensitive to new modes of
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development or concern for future inhabitants of these islands (see Table 5.13). Only in recent
years has the traditional awareness for the environment translated into a formalized regime of
rules that stipulates the proper use and care of the physical environment and the resources that it
contains.
Table 5.13: Rules Regulating Physical Development in Fiji
INSTITUTION

YEAR

Crown Land Act

1946

Native Land Trust Act

1946

Town and Country Planning Act

1946

Land Conservation and Improvement Act

1953

Forest Act

1953

Drainage Act

1961

Land Development Act

1961

Mining Act

1966

National Trust Act

1970

Irrigation Act

1974

Agriculture Landlord and Tenants Act
Fisheries Act
Environmental Act

1976
1978
2005

Source: Parliamentary Reports

The institution of the Environment Management Act of 2005 codified the rules regarding prudent
use of natural resources and its impact on the environment and established the regulatory
framework to oversee sustainable development specifically in key sectors like tourism.75
Building on the 1995 Government White Paper on current trends in ecotourism in Fiji (ESCAP
2003: 14), the new Act promulgated important changes that directly impacted the tourism
industry in Fiji, including rigorous environmental impact assessments (EIA) before undertaking
any commercial projects involving hotels, resorts, airports in environmentally sensitive areas
75

A copy of the Act can be accessed at
http://www.environment.gov.fj/pdf/Policies/Acts%20and%20Regulations/Environment%20Management%20Act%2
02005.pdf(accessed August 22, 2011).

144

such as coastlines, beaches and foreshores that measured soil erosion, plant and marine life,
water quality, pollution, etc. The Act specified the formation of an Environmental Trust Fund to
pay for monitoring and enforcement, hire technical experts, environmental rehabilitation work,
undertake research projects and if necessary for the repayment of environmental bonds. Funding
for the trust fund would come from government appropriations, bonds, donations, penalties and
fines or from other sources as directed by the government. The government also made it as a
matter of national policy to promote and develop opportunities for environmentally sensitive
tourism in Fiji in communities through an initial grant of F$500,000 dollars in the 2006-2007
budget for the Tourism Ministry (Ministry of Tourism Corporate Plan 2006).
Sustainable Tourism Projects
Fiji Islands is uniquely positioned to develop a robust ecotourism industry as it
“represents a microcosm of the whole spectrum of the South Pacific island environments. It
contains high volcanic islands...intact and eroded limestone islands and cliffs…caves, islets,
coasts and coral atolls…Fiji has been called the ‘ecological theatre’(Ayala 1995:42).”
Ecotourism, even while a fairly niche product, has been implemented in a diversity of regions
with a large tourism sector such as Tanzania (Charnley 2005), Thailand (Kontogeorgopoulos
2005), India (Sonak 2004), Nepal (Zurick 1992) and Colombia (Ospina 2006). The collaborative
aspect of ecotourism involving local communities has made it an appealing model of sustainable
development. A successful example of an ecotourism project is the Shark Reef Marine Reserve
venture in the Fiji Islands which began as a private initiative by a local entrepreneur who
compensated local villages not to fish in a specific area in order to maintain and replenish Bull
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Shark populations for his dive operations over a number of years (2006-2008).76 The total levies
paid to the villages and the contractual operator according to Brunnschweiler (2010:29-42) up to
2008 was US$58,040 and will rise to US$100,000 in the next five years. In addition to the
monetary benefits for these villages, the contract also stipulates a sponsorship program in which
(1) the dive operator every year trains one person from each village up to the level of a dive
master, (2) the dive operator acts as the mediating agent between the villages and the
government, (3) the dive operator is responsible for all technical details such as required
moorings and markers, (4) the dive operator assists the villages in monitoring the marine
protected area and (5) the dive operator collaborates with the Department of Fisheries to train
volunteer Fish wardens that provide oversight in the marine reserve (Brunnschweiler 2010:33).
The size of the stakeholders (three villagers and one private dive operation) have made
this a manageable and successful project, but it does expose some limitations in sustainable
modes of development such as ecotourism. Chinese scholars (Guangming et.al. 2008) in their
study of Panda nature reserves in China discovered that the distribution of benefits and
opportunities from ecotourism were quite disparate among local communities as it simply
reflected the inherent disparity in the distribution of natural resources. But because ecotourism is
a localized bottom-up project (Gatzweiler 2005; Stone and Wall 2004), communities feel a sense
of entitlement because it is their resources and their management of it. It was a matter of luck
that a very small collection of villages in Fiji discovered in their traditional fishing grounds
marine life highly desirable to adventure divers and erodes communal linkages and traditional
obligations (Crosby 2002; Schellhorn 2010). This will remain an issue among communities who

76

A comparable project elsewhere in the Pacific Islands is in Moorea, French Polynesia. See Boutillier and Duane
(2006).

146

benefit from the governments renewed emphasis on ecotourism and those who live away from
areas not deemed suitable for tourism projects.
Besides the abundance of marine resources that make Fiji a suitable site for ecotourism
development is also large tracts of pristine tropical forests institutionally protected from
commercial development for decades (see Table 5.14). These areas are divided between forests
reserves where tourist activity is permitted and nature reserves that do not allow any tourist or
commercial activity. The only forest reserve that has been developed for ecotourism thus far is
the area known as Colo-i-Suva containing barbeque spots, walking trails, sheds and toilet
amenities for visitors and both areas have been regulated under the Forestry Act of 1953 and the
recent Environment Management Act of 2005 (Waqaisavou 1999:97).
Table 5.14: Selected Forest & Nature Reserves in Fiji
FOREST RESERVES

SIZE (ha)

RESERVED

NATURE RESERVES

SIZE (ha)

RESERVED

Taveuni

11,290

1914

Nadarivatu

93.1

1956

Buretolu

1197.9

1926

Naqaranibuli

279.2

1958

Nadarivatu

7400.7

1954

Tomaniivi

1323.4

1958

Maranisaqa

77.3

1955

Ravilevu

4018.7

1959

Qoya

67.2

1955

Darunibota

2.2

1959

Vago

24.6

1959

Vuo Island

1.2

1960

Korotari

1046.9

1961

Vunimoli

20.2

1968

Yarawa

161.9

1962

Colo-i-Suva

369.5

1963

Savura

447.6

1963

Saru Creek
3.2
Source: Waqaisavou (1999: 99)

1973

Communities located in the villages of Taveuni began in the late 1980’s with the
assistance of the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB), the Forestry Department, the Fiji Museum,
the Ministry of Fijian Affairs, the Department of Tourism and the New Zealand Government to
begin a four phase ecotourism project in Bouma covering 1,603 hectares from the coast of the
island to the mountainous central plateau, which included Fiji’s largest lake. Most of the area is
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covered under a tropical rainforest and already designated as a forest reserve (Crosby 2002:373).
The first two phases of the development opened in 1991 and 1993 and included of walking trails,
lodges and visitor amenities around the Tavoro water falls. The later two phases minimizes
physical development inside the forest reserve and only is open to guided tours to Lake
Tagimoucia and a hiking along a heritage trail through the lush tropical forest (see Table 5.15
and Crosby 2002: 373-374).
Table 5.15: Bouma Forest Reserve Ecotourism Project
PHASE

ATTRACTION TYPE

AREA (ha)

Tribe/Villages

1

Forest based, Waterfalls, Natural Attractions

535

1

2

Coastal based, Coastal Walks, Marine Attractions, Trekking

645

1

3

Forest and Culture based, Cultural sites, lodges, etc.

423

2

4

Forest based, Inland hiking, Bird watching

603

4

Source: Seroma (1995) at http://www.fao.org/docrep/X5336e/x5336e0b.htm(accessed August 22, 2011).

Unlike the Shark Marine Reserve Project, the Bouma ecotourism development has been a top
down initiative for obvious reasons, it covers a very large geographical area, the project is
situated on a small island of the mainland, and the land is designated as a forest reserve and
hence falls under the jurisdiction of the Forestry Department. The New Zealand government
underwrote the initial two phases of the project while the villages provided much of the labor
(see Table 5.16).
Table 5.16: Summary of Costs of the Bouma Ecotourism Development
PHASE 1 ($)

PHASE 2 ($)

(4,450 hrs-$1.98/hr) 8,678

(8,900 hrs-$2.48/hr) 22,072

Materials/Equipment

23,564

16,994

Labor

17,275

9,091

Services

16,921

15,391

2,230

4,524

Voluntary labor provided by villagers

Allowances & Subsistence

TOTAL
68,668
Source: Seroma (1995) at http://www.fao.org/docrep/X5336e/x5336e0b.htm (accessed August 22, 2011).

68,072
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Prices range between five to sixty dollars a day for visitors depending on the level of activity and
have been a commercial success for the villagers in and around the ecotourism project (see Table
5.17). The low cost of ecotourism development has also been advantageous for local
communities with little capital who are the traditional custodians of the land in the island
(Turnbull 2003; Scheyvens and Momsen 2008). This is not to begrudge the good fortune of these
villages, but to highlight the criticism by Guangming et.al. (2008) that localized tourism
disproportionately benefits communities who find themselves in the enviable position to having
ownership of desirable sites with a high potential for diverse development projects.
Table 5.17: Income and Expenditures at Tavoro Falls in Bouma Forest Reserve (1/7/93-30/6/93)
INCOME
Park

VISITORS

REVENUE (FJD)

EXPENSES (FJD)

PROFIT (FJD)

3735

15,978

6,814

9,165

292

60

232

Refreshments

TOTAL
3735
16,270
6,874
Source: Seroma (1995) at http://www.fao.org/docrep/X5336e/x5336e0b.htm (accessed August 22, 2011).

9,397

These two projects demonstrate the potential for sustainable tourism in the Pacific Islands which
a richly endowed with natural beauty and ecological diversity and within the resource parameters
can either originate from local initiatives or State directives. Gains from sustainable remain fairly
modest and remain a very small part of the overall portfolio of the tourism market and whether it
is able to increase its market share remains to be seen. The lone dataset of ecotourism visitors
from 2003 to Fiji show that out of the annual 430,800 arrivals (see Table 5.7) only 20,249
tourists engaged in nature-based tourism which amounts to less then 5% of travelers that year
(see Table 5.18). Interestingly, visitors from Australia and New Zealand which comprise a
majority of travelers to the Fijian market represented a much smaller percentage of ecotourists
when compared to countries outside the region.
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5.18: Ecotourism Visitor Arrivals (2003)
COUNTRY
Australia
New Zealand
United Kingdom
Ireland

ARRIVALS
2106
972
6888
954

Continental Europe

1716

USA

3203

Canada

786

Japan

293

Others

2093

TOTAL
Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics

20249

Mainstream tourism will in the foreseeable future control the lion’s share of the tourist market,
but it does not mean that local communities cannot find a foothold in the sector, and given their
modest beginnings, ecotourism project can only increase their opportunities. The institutional
challenge lies in the ability of local and national actors to create rules that collateral damage in
the communities where the projects are undertaken while maximizing the benefits beyond the
immediate beneficiaries.
Conclusion
The success and failure of tourism in Fiji is largely predicated upon the State’s ability to
respond to three serious challenges, two of which were intrinsic to the industry per se, namely
the cost prohibitive aspect of infrastructure provision demanded by tourism and the
environmental externalities imposed by the arrival of large groups in small societies with limited
resources. The external challenge to Fijian tourism over the past twenty-five years has been the
periodic political instability that has inflicted severe costs on the tourism sector from loss of
visitors to the negative image of the country and damage to its international reputation.
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This section has demonstrated the institutional capabilities of Fiji as a typical microstate
to articulate policies in response to these challenges and successfully prosecute its development
objectives via the tourism sector. While it is undeniable that State underwriting of tourism
projects has been a financial failure, the underlying concern of moving beyond sugar production
is a legitimate issue that has to be resolved, and given the limited options Fiji has as is the reality
with the other island economies, tourism provides a reasonable opportunity for development.
I have also argued that Pacific Islands are justifiably concerned with the environment and
have taken commendable steps to ensure that they are able to contain degradation as much as
possible within their means. An attractive way to meld development and tourism has been to
encourage ecotourism projects in areas with the participation of local communities. While
ecotourism remains a niche product with modest returns, it has nonetheless provided
communities with a source of income and a stake in the developments of their region. It remains
to be seen if the projects can be replicated on a much wider scale and if the benefits can be
dispersed in a more equitable manner. However the policies put in place by the government in
response to the specific challenges contradict the assumptions of the MIRAB model (see
Diagram 5.2) that these islands are fundamentally incapable of organizing their societies in lieu
of their size, resource limitations and historic metropolitan relationships.
Diagram 5.2: Model of a MIRAB Economy
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The concluding chapter of this project will examine the following issues regarding Fijis place in
the global economy, why tourism is a reasonable conduit for development and the future of the
industry for Fiji and other island economies. This project has argued that comparative advantage
(see Diagram 5.3) is a better theory that explains the survival of microstates in the global
economy and that these small islands have the ability to create the institutional structure
necessary to exploit their natural endowments and develop a tourism industry. The evidence
presented in this project testifies to the theory of comparative advantage as a sufficiently better
explanation than are model predicated on colonialist assumptions of dependency, helplessness
and patronage. Small states do not have the resources to engage in speculative investment
strategies and investment policies in microstates therefore reflect industries best able to fulfill its
development priorities. The Pacific Islands because of their natural endowments have a
comparative advantage in the tourism sector and have developed policies to benefit their
societies and allow them to thrive in the global economy.
Diagram 5.3: Comparative Advantage and the Political Economy of Tourism
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Chapter Six
Conclusion
Introduction
The route to developing tourism as a viable sector in Fiji has neither been facile nor
restrictively arduous for a small economy with limited resources in the midst of substantial
political and social change. The complex and unwieldy nature of international tourism demanded
that Fiji over time create structures and institutions conducive to the growth and nourishment of
tourism as a viable industry and its eventual role in national development. The pivotal role of
tourism in enabling the state to engage in institutional formation is an area of inquiry overlooked
by scholars and which this project has endeavored to rectify. The tourism sector has made
significant contributions to the political economy of the Fiji Islands under less then ideal
conditions, demonstrating both the limits and the potential of microstates to successfully
negotiate through the global economy. In this chapter I employ a basic SWOT analysis to
examine both the contribution and threats to the tourism industry in Fiji and enquire into the
future of the industry in the Fiji Islands (see Table 6.1 on a SWOT analysis of tourism in Fiji)
One of the crucial contributions of tourism in Fiji has been in providing employment
opportunities for the people of Fiji and analysis of data from the Fiji Bureau of Statistics reveal
that the “employment effects” of tourism development is a significant benefit (Elkan 1975: 129)
and justified the strategy pursued by the state in building the tourism sector. Secondly, the
tenuous political climate in Fiji has remained the principal threat to tourism and I have outlined
specific policy challenges facing the tourist industry in Fiji but to propose policy on the political
situation in the Island, or proposals for land reform is beyond the scope of this project. Thirdly,
the long denouement of sugar production has provided an occasion for tourism to climb to its
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ascendant position as the country’s leading sector and inadvertently exposes a central weakness
of small economies where a single sector dominates the socio-economic landscape and should be
a legitimate concern for the state and the stakeholders. Finally the willingness to invest in
training and education in order to develop a diversified workforce inside the tourism sector as
well as beyond it is a challenge and an opportunity for the state and the industry and is a
harbinger of the future direction of tourism in Fiji. The concluding section reiterates the
importance of institutions and the role of the State to ensure the survival and flourishing of small
islands in the global economy and adumbrates issues that would benefit from further enquiry.

Table 6.1 SWOT Analysis
Strengths
Employment
Institutions

Weakness
Sector domination
State Investments

Opportunities

Threats

Diversification
Human capital

Political instability
Land tenure

Tourism and Employment
Increased employment opportunities proffered by a bourgeoning tourism sector has been
compelling enough for the government to channel resources and advocate the desirability of Fiji
having a robust tourism industry (Fiji Development Plan 2007; Fiji Times November 24 2009;
November 28 2009)77 a perspective echoed by external agencies such as the Asian Development
Bank (ADB).78 The strength of the tourism industry in Fiji has been to provide employment
opportunities for people of a small island economy with limited resources and declining options.

77

http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=134204 http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?ref=archive&id=134434
(accessed October 11, 2011).
78
http://www.adb.org/projects/pres/pres_case_05.pdf (accessed October 11, 2011).
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However the salutary benefits of employment though tourism tend to be eclipsed by the fuzzy
measurement of those directly employed by the tourism industry and the low wages they receive.
Because the tourism sector provides both direct and indirect employment within the broad
spectrum of services, distinction is made between employment in tourism related industries and
employment in tourism enabling industries (Johnson and Thomas 2001: 39-41). The former
includes people directly employed in hotels, restaurants, clubs, bars, museums etc, while the later
classification comprises individuals providing ancillary services such as transportation, retail, etc
(Johnson and Thomas 2001: 43-44). Leiper (1999) has argued in an Australian case study that
confusion regarding direct and indirect employment leads to an exaggerated and misleading
relationship between the tourism sector and its impacts on job creation. Leiper concludes that
official government figures may have inflated jobs in the tourism industry by as much as three
times the actual employment on a full-time regular basis comparable to other sectors (Leiper
1999: 606). The second problem associated with employment in tourism is the low wages and
benefits for work that is demanding, stressful and public requiring the cultivation of a certain
image and composure. Studies from tourism intensive States like Montana and Utah79 and
municipalities such as Los Angeles80 as well country studies from the Cayman Islands (Amit
2001) and Central America (Ferguson 2010) as well as analysis by the International Labor
Organization (ILO)81 all concede that poor wages is endemic to tourism.
The problem of low wages in the tourism sector makes it difficult to defend the efficacy
of investing in the development of the industry as a vital part of national development. However

79

http://www.itrr.umt.edu/research/WAGES.pdf
http://travel.utah.gov/research_and_planning/special_reports/documents/BEBRWageStudy.PDF (accessed October
11, 2011).
80
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/25/business/fi-tourism25 (accessed October 11, 2011).
81
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/press-and-media-centre/news/WCMS_007840/lang--en/index.htm
(accessed October 11, 2011).
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the tourism industry in Fiji emerged not from a denuded industrialized economy with previously
high levels of income, but from a largely agricultural economy with significant levels of informal
and irregular paid employment. Analysis of employment data (Table 6.2) will therefore reveal
that the tourism sector has actually been one of the better paid industries in Fiji when compared
to both agriculture and manufacturing. A reasonable case can be made for the positive role of
tourism in Fiji as a net generator of employment and one of the main strengths for the
development of the sector.
Beyond the problem of measuring who directly benefits from tourism and how much they
are being compensated is the deeper issue of skill formation and the development of human
capital. Thomas (1980), in her study of the impact of tourism on Gullah Blacks from the islands
of South Carolina, derisively labeled the employment effects as one of “a chambermaid-caddy
economy”(Thomas 1980:11). In a study of the Cayman Islands whose economy is dominated by
tourism and the financial sector, Amit (2001) discovered that most natives eschewed working in
the tourism industry and opted for either fishing or working in finance (585-586) leaving
temporary workers from the surrounding Caribbean Islands to fill demands in tourism.
Alternatively a number of scholars such as Levy and Lerch (1991), Jenkins and Henry (1982),
Narayan (2000), Shaw and Williams (2002) and Richter (1989), even while acknowledging the
low-skilled aspect of tourism related work, argue that it provides economic opportunities for
individuals and communities who would otherwise have been excluded from the formal
economy such as women, tribal communities, rural inhabitants and other groups. The
development of sustainable tourism, which requires minimal skill formation and technical
expertise, is an example of previously excluded groups being able to participate, albeit with
modest financial rewards when compared to economies of scale in the global tourism market.
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A cursory examination of the relationship between tourism and employment exposes
problems of measurement, compensation and skill formation which are unlikely to be resolved
anytime soon and beyond the limits of this project. I have only endeavored to argue that tourism
in Fiji has made positive contributions to employment and data from the Fiji Bureau of Statistics
(see Table 6.2) confirms my position that the employment effect has been one of the strengths of
tourism in Fiji.
Table 6.2: Sectoral Comparison of Paid Employment and Wages in Fiji (1975-2004)a
Year

Agriculture/Forestry/
Fishing (Employees)

Mean Daily
Wage (FJD)

Manufacturing
(Employees)

Mean Daily
Wage (FJD)

Retail/ Hotels/
Food (Empl.)

Mean Daily
Wage (FJD)

1975
2,845
4.98
13,185
1976
2,599
5.03
11,444
1977
2,441
5.76
11,253
1978
2,787
6.67
13,484
1979
2,303
6.88
13,948
1980
2,627
7.44
15,413
1981
2,509
6.24
14,223
1982
2,274
6.16
13,522
1983
2,517
6.96
14,702
1984
2,238
8.64
14,184
1985
2,577
8.32
14,057
1986
2,165
8.24
13,973
1987
1,986
8.64
13,680
1988
2,004
8.56
14,040
1989
2,130
11.92
19,666
1990
2,312
10.96
21,051
1993
1,881
13.28
24,882
1996
1,980
15.68
24,634
1997
1,925
12.88
27,039
1998
2,202
13.36
29,200
1999
1,647
16.77
29,202
2000
1,776
16.95
28,536
2003
1,670
19.44
25,467
2004
1,570
19.50
25,011
Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics Annual Employment Survey
a
Data is missing for years 1994-1996, 2001-2002
b
Data is inconsistent and unexplained in official records

6.19
6.64
6.87
8.10
8.48
9.52
10.56
11.20
11.92
12.00
12.16
11.84
12.32
12.56
11.36
11.44
13.92
16.32
15.12
14.48
15.15
15.97
17.91
18.95

10,319
11,701
12,117
12,778
13,099
13,378
14,140
13,878
14,888
14,904
14,805
14,100
12,024
11,864
14,330
14,849
17,880
20,730
20,888
21,025
20,337
22,097
25,781
26,684

5.68
6.54
6.89
7.26
7.85
8.88
10.24
10.32
11.04
11.20
11.36
11.28
11.68
12.00b
12.08
12.80
15.76
20.00
16.96
17.60
18.38
18.58
20.89
20.56
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Analysis of Employment in Fiji
Table 6.2 above charts paid employment (formal) with the mean daily wages in dollar
amounts in three sectors from 1975-2004 (minus the missing years) and provides a glimpse of
the political economy of employment in the Fiji Islands and situates the relationship between
tourism and labor. The most significant exclusion is employment and payments in sugar
production which dominated vast sections of Fijian society for decades and ancillary industries,
many of which would fall under and informal economy. Secondly, the sudden expansion of the
manufacturing sector from the late eighties should not be interpreted as a positive turn towards a
more technical/industrial pathway to development as almost all the jobs in manufacturing had to
do with the establishment of sweatshops in the garment sector where average wages ranged from
$0.78 in 1988 to $1.36 an hour in 1999, or daily wages on an eight hour shift ranged from F$6.24
in 1988 to F$10.88 in 1999 (Prasad, Ram and Marr 2009:755; Oxfam 2003). Accordantly the
problem of measurement as emphasized by Leiper (1999) is evident in data on labor in the retail,
hotel and restaurant industry which agglomerates employment in tourism related industries with
employment in tourism enabling industries (Johnson and Thomas 2001).
Without eliding over the reservations noted here regarding the data on employment and
wages in Fiji, two observations are salient to the relationship between tourism and labor within
the context of the Fiji Islands. First, I concur with the general assessment that service sector jobs
in general and tourism industry work in particular a mostly low-wage employment (Kim 2000;
Iverson and Wren 1998; Albrecht et. al. 2000; Howell and Wolff 1991; Choy 1995; Gladstone
and Fainstein 2001; Szivas, Riley and Airey 2003; Faulkenberry et.al. 2000) even though the
tourism industry may occasionally attract a thin strata of specialized personnel demanding higher
wages (Liu and Wall 2006; Szivas and Riley 1999; Baum 2007).
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The problem of low wages within the Fijian context as the data demonstrates is not
unique to tourism but has been an issue across major sectors of the economy. In fact wages in the
retail, hotel and restaurant industries have paid slighter better than either agriculture or
manufacturing since 1989, and no perceptible decline in wages occurred after the first coup in
1987 but a lack of data from 2001-2002 and from 2004 onwards disallow any comparative
assessment of political crises and wages. Secondly, employment in agricultural related industries
has continued to decline since 1975 and manufacturing since its peak in 1998 while employment
in retail, hotels and restaurants have increased two-half times from 10,319 in 1975 to 26,684 in
2004 corresponding to the increase in visitor arrivals to Fiji from 161,707 in 1975 to 504,075 in
2004. It is reasonable to postulate that a vital contribution of tourism in Fiji has been the creation
of much needed jobs in the absence of other more desirable alternatives and though these jobs
were not as highly remunerative, they were in comparison to the other sectors a better option for
the people of Fiji.
Another issue that has plagued the tourism sector besides low-wages is the low-skilled
nature of work in the service sector (Bluestone and Harrison 1988; Jovanovic and Nyarko 1997;
Szivas, Riley and Airey 2003) and remains a challenge for governments to move employees up
the skill ladder. In Fiji, the state through its investments in post-secondary education has fairly
well established institutions in both the University of the South Pacific82 and the Fiji National
University83 in developing a better trained and internationally qualified workforce for the tourism
industry. Investments in training and education whether through formal or informal institutions
allows an equitable dispersal of goods and services and creates opportunities for skill formation,

82
83

See USP website at http://www.tourism.fbe.usp.ac.fj/ (accessed October 12, 2011).
http://www.fnu.ac.fj/ (accessed October 12, 2011).
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literacy and development which is a necessary condition for success as tourism becomes more
internationalized in the global economy.
The state has played an active and successful role in establishing tourism as a viable
industry in Fiji but there is a noticeable absence of collaboration between the state and the
tourism industry in elevating the training and development of workers in the sector. Incentive
structures set up by the institutions and administered by the respective agencies are
preponderantly biased towards the infrastructural demands of creating tourism in Fiji, whereas
there are no comparable mechanisms to incentivize the industry in investing in human capital to
ensure that Fiji is not reduced to a “chambermaid-caddy economy” (Thomas 1980:11). Baum
and Szivas (2008:791-792) present the case of tourism in Ireland and suggest that state
engagement in tourism moved in three different stages of human resource development,
immature, intermediate and mature. In the initial phases, the government was reduced to
providing enough training for personnel to work in the tourism industry in accordance with
sectoral demands. In the intermediate stages, greater stress was placed on individual skills after
careful national assessments of the labor market, the development of national curricula and
accreditation of training programs. In the final phase of state involvement in tourism in Ireland,
the government has created a development agency that coordinates all training in tourism84
which prepares a national human resource development strategy for tourism on behalf of the
government and delivers senior management and post-graduate programmes for people in
leadership positions and those who are entering into management in the industry.
Fiji is comfortably moving towards the later stages of the industry and it would behoove
the government to take a more active role in the development of human capital and to build

84

See http://www.failteireland.ie/ (accessed October 16, 2011).
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institutions that would engage the industry to become a more active partner in building human
capital and contributing towards skill formation (Fidgeon 2010; Baum 2007).
The Future of Tourism
The optimistic projection by the government of a consistently expanding sector is neither
warranted nor guaranteed in lieu of the complicated political situation in Fiji over the last
twenty-five years which inevitably pose a significant threat to tourism in Fiji. Unfortunately this
optimism has encouraged the state to invest with public funds in tourism development projects
that have accumulated deep losses that are currently under investigations. This financial
mismanagement does not bode well for the industry in Fiji and reveals a potentially serious
weakness in which the government has created a “champion industry” and placed its bets on a
single sector. Cutter, Boruff and Shirley (2003:12) suggest that a “singular reliance on one
economic sector for income generation creates a form of economic vulnerability” that is
unhelpful for communities whose fortunes rise and fall with those of the industry. The
disproportionate allocation of resources into one sector by the state to the exclusion of other vital
industries will create a clientelist relationship between the state and the tourism industry and in
which productive cooperation degenerates into one of entitlement as the tourism industry
becomes “too big to fail.”
Secondly as Leiper (2008) and Berno (2001) have argued tourism is a composite product
that ranges across the entire cross-section of society. Investment strategies that are merely
focused on building accommodations or developing golf courses will overlook productive uses
of valuable capital in other less visible areas such as training, education, environment, culture,
food etc, all of which are impacted by tourism in host communities. It is recommended that the
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state divest itself from its substantial investments in the tourism development projects in Fiji and
resume its positive role as a builder of institutions rather than resorts.
The most serious threat to tourism in Fiji is the chronic political instability that has
continued to disrupt the industry since 1987. The travel warnings triggered by the successive
coups have heightened the tension between the tourism industry in Fiji and the intractable
political problems that has beset Fijian society for the past twenty-five years. The tourism
industry had a fortunate escape after the political crisis of 2006 when visitor arrivals only
registered a 2% decline unlike the 30% drop in arrivals following the events of 1987 and 2000. It
is likely that future outbreaks of instability will significantly erode its market share and further
damage Fiji’s image as an ideal travel destination.
The external fallout as a consequence of political instability is not sustainable for
microstates that must by necessity forge interdependent relationships within their region. The
ongoing political maneuverings have heightened the divisions between the Melanesian bloc85
(Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea) which favor a more conciliatory policy
response towards Fiji and the Polynesian group (Niue and Tonga)86 led by Samoa87 and
supported by Australia and New Zealand, who insist on maintaining a more aggressive posture
towards the political situation in Fiji88. For example, the Australian sanction regime places Fiji in
the unenviable company of Myanmar, North Korea, Yugoslavia, Iran, Libya, Syria and
Zimbabwe which makes the Fiji Islands a dangerous and rogue nation on par with some nuclear
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See website at http://www.msgsec.info/ (accessed October 19, 2011).
See the Report by Graham Davis at http://www.pmc.aut.ac.nz/articles/playing-fire-are-australia-and-nz-usingsamoa-stalking-horse-regime-change-fiji (accessed October 19, 2011).
87
The Samoan policy on Fiji is at http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/pacbeat/stories/200907/s2628104.htm (accessed
October 19, 2011).
88
For the official New Zealand Policy on Fiji see website at http://mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Pacific/0-FijiFAQ.php (accessed October 19, 2011). For the official Australian Policy on Fiji, see website at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/un/unsc_sanctions/fiji.html (accessed October 19, 2011).
86
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armed states! (See the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs website). The political damage
to Fiji’s credibility as a reliable center for Pacific leadership is threatened by the ongoing
political instability with unforeseen shifts in alliances and relationships that could be detrimental
to Fijian interests, especially its economy.89 The changing political dynamics in the South Pacific
is a fertile area for future research by scholars probing the behavior of microstates that are
jostling for power, resources and influence in the shadow of a regional hegemon.
I have only responded to the political situation in Fiji within the context of its impact on
the tourism sector and the threat that periodic crises poses to the industry. Resolving the political
crises in Fiji would not only attenuate the chronic political instability that has damaged Fiji
politically and economically but would ameliorate the negative fallout in the tourism sector in
which the government has made substantial investments over many years. The four coup d’états
since 1987 have economically cost the country a combined F$9.4 billion dollars in investments
and lost revenue (Fiji Times December 10, 2007; The Australian November 9, 2009)90 adding to
the already discussed political consequences of instability. Fiji has a well developed tourism
industry with an established consumer base that bodes well for its future but until it resolves its
political situation that future will remain tenuous and perhaps thwarted.
Microstates in the Global Economy
Global economic realities dictate that societies regardless of size or resource capabilities
develop institutions to help navigate them through the international system or fall further behind,
as is the unhappy fate of states that fall in the United Nations category of least developed
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See http://www.theage.com.au/world/fiji-remains-an-outcast-in-pacific-20110908-1jzte.html (accessed October
19, 2011).
90
http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?ref=archive&id=76233 (accessed October 19, 2011),
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/coup-culture-risks-starving-people-of-fiji/story-e6frg6nf1225795565541 (accessed October 19, 2011).
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countries (LDC) 91and specifically the four microstates in Oceania (Vanuatu, Solomon Islands,
Samoa and Kiribati, see Table 1) that form part of the LDC group. Collectively all the small
islands in Oceania share certain attributes that make their survival as independently thriving
communities highly improbable, which has led scholars to search for a theory that best explains
the endurance of microstates in the global economy. The flow of foreign aid, remittances and
labor migration, which is not unique to the South Pacific, nonetheless led theorists to build a
model of a MIRAB economy that best explains both the structure and the survival of microstates.
This project has alternatively argued that the theory of comparative advantage best
explains how the small islands in Oceania organize their state and economy to maximize their
natural endowments instead of being merely passive actors that are wholly reliant on the
goodwill of regional powers and former metropoles for their livelihood. One of the ways in
which the Fiji Islands as a typical microstate in Oceania has overcome the limitations of size and
resources is to exploit its location, scenery and climate by developing a robust tourism industry.
The transition from sugar production to tourism services seemed a natural evolution within the
circumscribed limits of Fiji’s resource capabilities as both sectors are labor intensive and low
skilled (Katouzian 1970).
The MIRAB model is in essence a philosophical argument regarding the existence and
structure of microstates in the international system and rests on a series of questionable and
unsustainable assumptions. The fundamental postulate of the MIRAB hypothesis is that
microstates are institutionally failed societies and therefore lack the organizational and political
capacity needed to construct and develop economic policy. The level of sophistication and
expertise required for institution building is beyond the ken of these small islands and the best

91

For a complete list of LDCs see UNCTAD website at
http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3641&lang=1 (accessed October 19, 2011).
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that they can do is to ingratiate themselves with either their former metropoles or regional
hegemons who would than ensure their survival in the global economy (Baldacchino 1993). The
development of tourism in the Fiji Islands demonstrates that microstates are quite capable of
building institutions and formulating policy to meet the challenge of social and economic
development even in the midst of political upheaval and crises. This project advanced the
hypothesis through a case study of the Fiji Islands that comparative advantage was a better
explanation for the endurance of microstates in the international system than one predicated on a
subservient and dependent relationship and the evidence articulated thus far preponderantly
favors the hypothesis. The hypothesis once established as Lijphart (1971: 692) proposed can now
proceed for either confirmation or disconfirmation with further comparative analysis and study.
The peoples of the Pacific deserve nothing less.
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